White Pathology: The African American Critique of Black Pathology Discourse at the Turn of the Century by Davis, Matthew
 








WHITE PATHOLOGY: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN CRITIQUE OF BLACK 










SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 

























WHITE PATHOLOGY: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN CRITIQUE OF BLACK 
PATHOLOGY DISCOURSE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 










































































© Copyright by MATTHEW DAVIS 2018 
All Rights Reserved. 





The only constants in this project have been the people who have encouraged 
me along the way. Their enduring support has guided me through uncertainties and 
challenges and coached me to the finish line. Francesca Sawaya has been an expert 
mentor. Beginning with our conversations about Charles Chesnutt at the University of 
Oklahoma and continuing by correspondence over the past two years, our exchanges 
have driven my thinking about this project. Her feedback at every step along the way 
has challenged my thinking and led me to more nuanced conclusions. She is a teacher in 
every sense of the word, and I’m a better reader and thinker for knowing her. Thank you 
to the members of my committee—Henry McDonald, Jim Zeigler, Ben Alpers, and Ron 
Schleifer—for showing me steadfast support and helping to guide me through this 
process, and to Dan Cottom for challenging me in classes, during office hours, and 
through my general exams. My family, including both the Davises and the Walkers, 
have shown incredible patience over holidays and vacations when my work intervened, 
and I appreciate their encouragement and their faith in me. Finally, Ashley has been a 
consummate partner in this and all endeavors, encouraging me when my confidence 
waned, challenging me to reach my potential, and always cheering me on. She never 
stopped believing in me, and I know that no matter what I take on next, she will be there 
to see me through it. I can think of no more comforting thought. 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction: White Supremacy, Black Pathology, and Resistant Responses...............1 
2. Thomas Dixon and Biopolitical Fantasies of National Citizenship............................35 
3. The “heart of the home life”: Critical Histories and Black Pathology in Pauline 
Hopkins’s Contending Forces.........................................................................................78 
4. “The Virus of Race Prejudice”: Violence and White Pathology in Sutton Griggs’s 
Imperium in Imperio and The Hindered Hand..............................................................117 
5. “Faded away like a vision of the night”: Lynching and Black Political Agency in the 
Work of Charles Chesnutt.............................................................................................164 
6. Epilogue: The Persistence of Black Pathology Discourse........................................212 










This project examines the ways African American authors from the turn of the 
twentieth century challenged racist violence and white supremacy and sought to create 
nuanced political responses and strategies. I focus on how Pauline Hopkins, Sutton 
Griggs, and Charles Chesnutt respond to a discourse of black pathology, exemplified in 
the work of Thomas Dixon, that inscribes racial difference in both biological and 
cultural terms. This discourse of black pathology emboldens white racism and enables 
violence against African Americans, so these critical voices identify and subvert that 
discourse to paint white supremacy in pathological terms. I lay out the paranoid logic of 
white supremacy in my chapter on Thomas Dixon, whose work argues for a biological 
definition of citizenship, rather than a socially constructed one, and depends on 
assumptions about pathological blackness to do so. I argue that one of Pauline 
Hopkins’s most famous novels emphasizes the importance of a dynamic resistant 
political response to white supremacy that does not silence the voices of black women 
and that values history as a means to reject attempts to naturalize black pathology. In 
my chapter on Sutton Griggs, I argue that he confronts the specifically pathological 
language of white racism by depicting white supremacy in pathological terms, what he 
calls the “virus of race prejudice.” Next, I argue that Charles Chesnutt’s The Marrow of 
Tradition uses a metaphor of lynching to analyze the ways that white supremacy uses 
political disfranchisement to create abject citizens who are vulnerable to white 
supremacist violence. Finally, my epilogue locates persistent examples of black 
pathology discourse, as well as resistant responses, in our current age, highlighting the 
continued relevance of black literary voices from the “nadir.” 
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Introduction: White Supremacy, Black Pathology, and Resistant Responses 
 Kendrick Lamar’s widely acclaimed album DAMN. was released in April 2017. 
Though he has found success with a number of albums in the past ten years, DAMN. 
represents a new milestone for Lamar in terms of albums sold and acclaim. Critics have 
praised Lamar for surpassing already high expectations, and this album represents 
perhaps the best example of his talent for music and trenchant social critique. The 
second track on the album, “DNA,” expresses a theme that exists throughout the album: 
the direct confrontation with and rejection of an audience intent on dismissing the artist 
and his work.1 The song includes a five-second audio sample from former Fox News 
anchor Geraldo Rivera, identifying Lamar’s audience, at least initially, as the media, a 
group who contributes to popular distortions of young black men and hip-hop music.2 
Rivera makes the incredible claim: “This is why I say that hip hop has done more 
damage to young African Americans than racism in recent years.” Because Rivera is a 
mouthpiece for Fox News in this scenario, his statement represents what Lamar and 
other artists see as a prevalent attitude among media outlets about rap music. Rivera’s 
argument is preposterous and specious in terms of its quick dismissal of racism in the 
United States, but it also situates itself in a long tradition of denying black agency and, 
in the case of hip hop, of viewing the artistic endeavors and resistant responses of black 
people as politically dangerous, irrelevant, or merely evidence of their cultural—and 
                                                
1 The first track on the album, “Blood,” includes music as well as spoken-word text to 
frame the album. It would be fair to say that “DNA” is the first “song” on the album. 
2 Lamar’s targeting of Fox News continues in the next song, “Yah,” as he says: “Fox 
News wanna use my name for percentage,” suggesting that the channel benefits from its 
racist critiques of his music in terms of Fox News’s economic bottom line. 
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therefore racial—inferiority.3 This history, and Rivera’s and Fox News’s contributions 
to it, demonstrates attempts to deflect blame and make African Americans responsible 
for their own oppression. This example of white supremacist logic tries to erase 
accountability and figuratively cleanse whiteness of responsibility for black suffering. 
Furthermore, Rivera’s claim demonstrates both historical continuity and adaptive 
change in terms of white supremacist ideology, as the paranoia evident in Rivera’s 
assertion is consistent with overt nineteenth-century examples of biological essentialism 
but is covered by assumptions of cultural inferiority from the twentieth century. 
Lamar begins “DNA” by confronting the discourse Fox News and its proxies 
use to dismiss him: the supposed pathology of blackness, an ideology that implicitly—if 
not explicitly—promotes the belief that black people are essentially inferior and black 
culture is self-defeating. Rivera’s statement suggests that this particular genre of music, 
commonly authored by young African Americans, is another sign of the moral failure of 
black America. It is a form of pathological blackness that migrated from the realm of 
biological race to that of culture in the twentieth century. By calling out “young African 
Americans” and denying their agency in constructing rap as an art form, Rivera hails a 
tradition that denigrates black cultural production and black culture generally. 
According to Rivera’s position, rap music represents and supposedly glorifies the 
degeneration of the black family and its values. The “young generation” is often the 
target of older generations’ ire, but in the specific case of black culture in the United 
States the implications are particularly complicated. Historically, supposed black 
                                                
3 In a review for The Guardian, Kitty Empire explains that Lamar “boggles at Fox 
News’s wilful misunderstanding of hip-hop’s relationship to black suffering.” 
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cultural shortcomings have been marked as signs of racial inferiority, both by avowed 
white supremacists and paternalistic liberals. 
Lamar responds to the sample by embracing a metaphor central to white 
supremacist racist critiques of black people that parallels this long history. The song 
begins with a catalog of what the speaker has “inside [his] DNA,” including “loyalty” 
and “royalty” (2). He claims both “war and peace” as well as “power, poison, pain and 
joy inside [his] DNA,” rejecting the premise that an effective response to a white 
supremacist discourse of black inferiority should be to tell anything but a whole and 
complex truth. Immediately after the Rivera audio sample, Lamar responds, “This is my 
heritage, all I’m inheritin’,” laying claim to the power to define his own identity as he 
rejects Rivera’s position. He says, “My DNA not for imitation / Your DNA an 
abomination,” and in saying this, he reverses the assumptions that guide Rivera’s logic 
and privileges his heritage and identity in the face of a media narrative that perpetuates 
stereotypes of black inferiority. Lamar begins his album with a song that asserts his 
power to define himself while pointing out an insidious discourse of white supremacy 
that attempts to define blackness in the language of pathology. For Lamar, Rivera’s 
statement participates in a continuing discourse of black inferiority. Lamar responds to 
the sample’s language that fetishizes supposed racial identity as blood with similar 
language—DNA in the 2017 context—and by doing so he takes over a pervasive white 
supremacist discourse. 
 In the chapters to follow, I assert that the period at the turn of the twentieth 
century that Rayford Logan famously dubbed the “nadir” for African Americans 
represents a key moment in the development of a discourse of black pathology, 
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ultimately serving as a precursor to contemporary works such as Lamar’s.4 
Accordingly, a number of black artists from that period challenge black pathology 
discourse directly. I analyze four authors in terms of how they address white supremacy 
and the ways it constructs a discourse of pathological blackness to entrench racial 
hierarchy and to justify violence against African American citizens. I begin by 
examining the work of a famous white supremacist, Thomas Dixon, to trace the 
contours of white supremacist ideology and to provide a context for black responses to 
its logic and consequences. Three African American authors comprise the remainder of 
my study, and I identify the various ways they challenge a pervasive discourse of 
pathological blackness. Like Kendrick Lamar in 2017, the resistant black voices in this 
project recognize that white supremacy depends on discursive power as well as physical 
violence and that the ways in which black people are stereotyped and characterized 
have profound impacts on lived experience. White supremacy benefits from its 
adaptability in American culture and by its opportunism as white supremacist 
assumptions are naturalized and incorporated into mainstream thought. For this reason, 
part of my analysis concerns the important historicist work these black authors perform 
to reject white supremacist assumptions. Coupled with discursive interventions that call 
into question the language of black pathology, these historical frames elucidate and 
reject assumptions of racial hierarchy as the authors attempt to theorize white 
supremacy in order to offer resistant responses. 
 As editors Barbara McCaskill and Caroline Gebhard observe in the anthology 
Post-Bellum, Pre-Harlem: African American Literature and Culture, 1877–1919, this 
                                                




particular period in African American literary history is often characterized as 
transitional. Charles Chesnutt’s coinage of “post-bellum, pre-Harlem,” according to 
these authors, “looked back to antebellum years and forward to a future glimpsed but 
not yet codified by the term ‘Harlem Renaissance’” (1). The in-between 
characterization of this period is further bolstered by negative critical responses 
dismissing the literary merits of the work of the period, focusing on its “political” 
nature, often a euphemism for the absence of literary value. For these reasons, 
McCaskill and Gebhard assert the need for an “overdue appraisal” of “a period of high 
aesthetic experimentation and political dynamism” (2). My work contributes such an 
assessment. It treats the literary contributions of Pauline Hopkins, Sutton Griggs, and 
Charles Chesnutt as offering much more than reductive analyses of political questions 
posing as narrative. Instead these works provide innovative ways to address enduring, 
complex questions in the medium of the novel. In fact, the coexistence of continuity and 
subtle discursive shifts borne of white supremacist cultural adaptability between these 
turn-of-the-century authors and current resistant voices like Kendrick Lamar illustrates 
the impact of their artistic voices as well as the continuing problem of the white 
supremacist discourse of black pathology. McCaskill and Gebhard challenge the usage 
of “renaissance” to describe that particular period of black cultural development in the 
twentieth century precisely because it assumes a breaking with the past that “does not 
necessarily fit African American culture.” According to McCaskill and Gebhard, 
politics “ha[ve] always played a dominant role in African American cultural 
production,” and “the staying power of African American culture has been that it circles 
back to its roots to renew the fight once more” (7). Kenrick Lamar’s “loyalty” affirms 
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historical parallels in white supremacist history while he crafts a resistant position that 
rejects white supremacist assumptions about what black cultural identity should look 
like. My study echoes the importance of a “cultural development … marked more by 
continuity with than by rejection of the past” while also acknowledging that the 
flexibility of white supremacist ideology represents a particular threat (8). By first 
tracing the history of black pathology discourse and then analyzing its theoretical 
implications, I illustrate the enduring presence of white supremacy and black response. 
It is a more complex relationship than is often understood, as parallels to the past 
indicate the persistence of racism, and modern claims of racial progress risk dismissing 
continuities in white supremacist thinking. At the same time, as evidenced in the 
discourse of black pathology, racial thinking evolves to respond to cultural pressures, 
hiding racist assumptions behind the language of cultural pathology and racial progress. 
Voices from the past echo in the present, illustrating this complex irony in the American 
racial scene and demonstrating the dynamism and applicability of these critical voices 
and the insidious and pervasive nature of white supremacy. 
 
Scientific Racism and the Roots of Black Pathology Discourse 
 The black pathology discourse I describe is rooted in scientific racism, which 
developed over centuries but found specific application in the American context in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Outcasts from Evolution: Scientific Attitudes of 
Racial Inferiority, 1859–1900, John S. Haller, Jr. argues that the work of nineteenth-
century physicians, anthropologists, sociologists, and other scientists “provided a 
vocabulary and a set of concepts which rationalized and helped to justify the value 
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system upon which the idea of racial inferiority rested in American thought.” He traces 
the way that eighteenth-century ideas of racial difference became codified in a 
nineteenth-century discourse of racial hierarchy that animated both conservative and 
liberal ideas about race, because for those “educated Americans who shunned the 
stigma of racial prejudice,” science represented a means by which to confirm supposed 
African American inferiority and to rationalize “the politics of disenfranchisement and 
segregation into a social-scientific terminology that satiated the troubled conscience of 
the middle class” (x). A new enthusiasm for data and social science, coupled with the 
popularity of evolutionary ideas after Darwin, focused racial attitudes into empirical 
frames. Both Southern white supremacists and Northern liberals found in this data and 
in these conclusions reasons to believe that their racist feelings were justified, 
regardless of whether they believed that black physiological and cultural deficiencies 
were a promise of future extinction or were a lamentable tragedy. The history of 
scientific racism, like the history of white supremacy more broadly, reveals a changing 
and expanding discourse of racial thinking that adapts to new ideas and public trends. 
As part of this historical development, a specific discourse of black pathology began to 
structure white supremacist thinking in important ways that threatened African 
Americans. 
 In this Introduction, I rely on Haller’s Outcasts from Evolution and Stephen Jay 
Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man to trace the history of scientific racism and to provide 
the context for applied scientific racism at the turn of the twentieth century, when 
violence against African Americans increased and citizenship rights receded. Both 
Haller and Gould identify key contributors and influential ideas in the development of a 
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white supremacist race science that relied upon circular reasoning and flawed 
methodology to proliferate ideas about racial hierarchy and black inferiority. Haller 
points to Carl Linnaeus and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach in the eighteenth century as 
foundational figures who established racial categories based on skin color and ascribed 
behavioral characteristics to those apparent distinctions. Haller asserts that Linnaeus’s 
observations about racially deterministic traits—including some who were “phlegmatic, 
cunning, lazy, lustful, careless, and governed by caprice”—influenced a scientific 
taxonomy and “became more fixed than the races themselves” (4). Blumenbach 
extended Linnaeus’s racial classification of skin color to consider “a combination of 
color, hair, skull, and facial characteristics as fundamental means for classifying the five 
varieties of man” (5). He constructed three “principal races”—Caucasian, Mongolian, 
and Ethiopian—and believed that Caucasian was primary while the other two were 
derived from the Caucasian. The work of these early fathers of anthropology 
demonstrates the co-mingling of attitudes about racial difference with the apparent 
objectivity of science. In the nineteenth century, an interest in anthropometry, or the 
production of empirical data for the purpose of anthropological study, further ingrained 
social belief into a system of scientific classification and comparison. 
 In The Mismeasure of Man, Stephen Jay Gould provides a history of 
anthropometry and scientific racism and observes the ways that influential ideas about 
supposed racial difference found their way into American racial thinking. Gould points 
to “the doctrine of polygeny” as an importantly American idea in race discourse that 
won the respect of European scientists, “so much so that Europeans referred to 
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polygeny as the ‘American school’ of anthropology” (42).5 Put simply, polygeny is the 
belief in multiple origins for racial groups, as opposed to monogeny, which argues for a 
single origin, in which all current races descended from a common origin.6 Polygeny 
asserts that “lesser” races are actually a different species from the Caucasian race, and 
polygeny’s most famous advocate, the Swiss naturalist Louis Agassiz, “converted to the 
doctrine of human races as separate species after his first experiences with American 
blacks” (43).7 According to Gould, Agassiz’s personal revulsion extended to his work, 
as he “never generated any data for polygeny … [and] [h]is conversion followed an 
immediate visceral judgment and some persistent persuasion by friends.” His support 
for the doctrine “rested on nothing deeper in the realm of biological knowledge” (44). 
                                                
5 Polygeny and monogeny are also called “polygenesis” and “monogenesis.” For more 
on the history of the concepts that I explain in this section, see Louis Menand’s The 
Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America. 
6 George M. Frederickson identifies Samuel Stanhope Smith as a well-known advocate 
for monogenesis, who argued that all races “were members of the same species and had 
a common remote ancestry [and] differences in color, anatomy, intelligence, 
temperament, and morality could be attributed to different physical and social 
environments, especially climate and the contrasting habits of life produced by 
‘savagery’ and ‘civilization’.” According to Frederickson, such a view “did not make 
Smith a thoroughgoing egalitarian in the twentieth century sense” because “like most 
other eighteenth-century advocates of the unity of the human species, he believed that 
the white race was the superior race, the original human norm from which other races 
had degenerated.” Blacks “could become equal to the whites, but only by ceasing to be 
a Negro—i.e., by actually turning white” (72). 
7 George Frederickson notes that Dr. Charles Caldwell was an early critic of Smith and 
the monogenesis doctrine. Caldwell, “employing the accepted Biblical chronology of 
Archbishop James Ussher, argued that Negroes were known to have existed 3,445 years 
ago, or only 743 years after Noah’s ark—not enough time for a new race to come into 
existence through the effects of climate” (73). The only explanation, then, was that 
blacks were separately created as a different species. 
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As is the case with many of these nineteenth-century race scientists, Agassiz privileged 
feeling and belief over evidence in his work.8 
 In the middle of the nineteenth century, Agassiz’s concept of polygeny was 
controversial not because of its lack of evidence but because it challenged the prevalent 
belief in monogeny advocated by the Bible and its myths of human origin. The conflict 
between Agassiz and monogenisists demonstrates the adaptive nature of racial thinking, 
as no contradiction, even an existential one, proved too challenging to overcome in the 
logic of white supremacy. According to Gould, polygeny, “in asserting a plurality of 
human creations, contradicted the doctrine of a single Adam and contravened the literal 
truth of scripture” (70). In The Black Image in the White Mind, Frederickson observes 
that Dr. Josiah Nott was one of the most provocative contributors to this controversy in 
the 1840s and 50s, as monogenesists “accused him and his supporters of infidelity for 
denying the accepted biblical view of the origin of all races in the progeny of Adam” 
(82).9 Environmental explanations for racial difference asserted the influence of climate 
and other environmental factors and therefore supported the monogenesist view. 
Frederickson argues that “the narrow and technical nature of this controversy, when 
                                                
8 As another example of a useful theory for racial hierarchy, “recapitulation theory,” or 
the idea that “an individual, in its own growth, passes through a series of stages 
representing adult ancestral forms in their correct order,” found adherents in the 
nineteenth century and “provided an irresistible criterion for any scientist who wanted 
to rank human groups as higher and lower.” Gould explains that, according to this view, 
“If adult blacks and women are like white male children, then they are living 
representatives of an ancestral stage in the evolution of white males” (114-15). 
9 Frederickson notes the concern for racial beliefs to remain in keeping with biblical 
truths, and he states that Samuel Cartwright, a physician from Louisiana and a 
proslavery writer, “is of particular significance in the Southern context because of his 
strenuous efforts to make pluralism jibe with the Bible.” He wanted to “reconcile 




considered in relation to its immediate and practical consequences, soon became 
apparent,” because there was still consensus about racial hierarchy even though 
disagreement existed about the origin of the races (82-3). According to Frederickson, 
“In a real sense the monogenesist view, as formulated and defended in the antebellum 
South, was, like the pluralist view, a form of biological racism and not a genuine revival 
of eighteenth-century environmentalism” (83). Despite debates about racial origins, the 
practical implications remained. Both monogeny and polygeny could be used to argue 
for slavery, for instance, as the racial hierarchy was not disputed. 
 In the 1840s, Dr. Samuel George Morton developed the science of craniometry 
in part, according to Frederickson, “to bring an end to loose speculation about racial 
origins and differences by opening an era of hardheaded empiricism.” Morton measured 
differences in skull capacity for his Crania Americana in part by filling skulls with 
various matter, including millet, and, after reporting statistical similarities within racial 
groups, he “concluded that the races had always had the same physical characteristics 
and, by implication, the same mental qualities” (74). Such conclusions supported the 
doctrine of polygenesis by rejecting the theory of change over time that monogenesis 
required, and Dr. Josiah Nott was an early supporter of Morton’s work. According to 
Frederickson, Nott’s specific study of “mulattos” had led him to the conclusion that “the 
mulatto was a genuine hybrid, weaker and less fertile than either parent stock,” further 
supposed evidence that “the Negro was not a blood brother to the whites” (75). 
Consistent with previous studies of racial difference, Nott’s work suffered from circular 
logic and preconceived ideas, which Nott himself seemed unperturbed by, according to 
Frederickson, who notes that Nott admitted that his focus was “not so much in races in 
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general as in the Negro in particular” and suggested that he designed evidence to 
“attract attention and add support to an a priori assumption of innate Negro inferiority” 
(78). For many, these conclusions provided scientific justification for slavery and 
revealed that apparent black inferiority proved to be an overriding influence, regardless 
of where one stood in debates about racial origins, categories, or physiological features. 
 Empirical race science eventually extended beyond popular belief to inscribe 
racial difference in physiological terms, cultivating a discourse of pathological race 
identity. Contemporaneous with Morton and Nott, Samuel Cartwright attempted to 
connect blackness and mental pathologies in particular. In Difference and Pathology, 
Sander Gilman notes that Cartwright published a paper in 1851 to try to “substantiate 
the association of blackness and madness by specifically identifying psychopathologies 
to which blacks alone were prey” (138). Cartwright’s inventions included 
“drapetomania,” or the “diseases causing slaves to run away,” and “dysaesthesia 
aethipis,” more colloquially referred to as “rascality” by slave overseers. According to 
Gilman, “In both instances, manifestations of the blacks’ rejection of the institution of 
slavery were fitted into the medical model of insanity” (138). Assumptions about black 
susceptibility to disease dominated nineteenth-century race discourse and, according to 
David McBride, had consequences into the twentieth century. In From TB to AIDS: 
Epidemics Among Urban Blacks Since 1900, McBride argues that early ideas about 
African Americans and disease, “combin[ed] biological and sociological notions that 
blacks were biologically most susceptible to primary infectious diseases, [and] 
reflect[ed] that mainstream American society through the World War I decade generally 
viewed black Americans more as a source of contagion than as fellow victims” (15). At 
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the same time, the completely opposite view could be held about race and disease. In 
Epidemics and History: Disease, Power, and Imperialism, Sheldon Watts demonstrates 
how colonialists used apparent disease susceptibility—for example, the idea that blacks 
were immune to yellow fever—“to demonstrate that the Christian God has specifically 
created them to serve as slaves in North, Meso- and South America” (xvi). The 
connection of disease with blackness further informed beliefs about racial inferiority 
after the Civil War when increased data collection emphasized deteriorating health 
conditions for freedmen. In “Race, Gender, and the Political Conflation of Biological 
and Social Issues,” Dorothy Roberts observes that after emancipation scientists “blamed 
the deteriorating health of the American Negro on a biological incapacity to adjust to 
freedom.” By ascribing inferiority to their supposed susceptibility to disease, white 
supremacists could justify their beliefs while “discrediting the need for radical social 
transformation” (239). 
Established physiological difference prompted many nineteenth-century thinkers 
to surmise that behavior obeyed hereditary impulses as well. And in this way, according 
to these authors, blackness itself proved pathological. Haller notes that Dr. R. M. 
Cunningham, a former penitentiary physician, argued that “just as there were innate 
hereditary influences which prompted the Negro to acts of crime, so there were also 
anatomical and physiological differences between him and the Caucasian—differences 
which made him not only inferior to the white man but which predisposed him to 
disease, high mortality, and race deterioration” (48). Frederickson observes that Dr. 
Eugene Rollin Corson, author of “The Vital Equation of the Colored Race and Its 
Future in the United States,” concluded that the “younger generation [of blacks], 
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deprived from birth of the paternalistic protection of slavery, were liable to succumb at 
an even greater rate to a variety of diseases which supposedly hit Negroes harder than 
whites” (248). In the “science” of racial hierarchy, the line between apparent physical 
difference and moral potential blurred to pathologize blackness. To be black was to be 
inferior, sick, and dangerous, and white supremacists took advantage of opportunities to 
naturalize these supposed facts about the hierarchy of the races. 
 Data collection worked to codify principles of racial hierarchy based on 
physiology and behavior and played an important role in post-emancipation policy and 
attitudes toward African Americans. According to Haller, the “watershed” moment for 
data collection and its importance to scientific racism was in the Civil War. The “wide-
scale measurement of the soldier during the war years” produced “evidence” that 
applied in various ways beyond the turn of the century (19). Haller explains that the war 
served as the impetus for a focus on anthropometry and the creation of the United States 
Sanitary Commission charged with taking on this task for two primary reasons: the 
“embarrassing Union defeat in the first battle of Bull Run” and Lincoln’s decision to 
allow black troops into the Union army (20). American scientists, as well as their 
European counterparts, saw this as “an opportune means of investigating race 
differences on a scale never before achieved” (21). A contained population of soldiers, 
especially of African American soldiers, allowed scientists to produce data that 
influenced social thought for decades.10 
 
 
                                                
10 Haller and Gould explain in detail the metric devices used to collect data regarding 
anatomical features, lung capacity, and intelligence. 
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The Census and Codified Black Pathology 
 The national census was especially useful as an instrument for codifying black 
pathology and white supremacy. Postwar census data stoked fear of a growing black 
population and the threat of the black birth rate, which appeared to outpace the white 
birth rate. Race scientists quickly attempted to find mitigating results, and they 
comforted their readers by focusing on black mortality rates and increased rates of 
disease as compared to whites. A dependence on faulty census data, as well as the Civil 
War studies, contributed to the idea in the late nineteenth century that African 
Americans faced extinction as a race (41). Studies and data supporting extinction and 
the idea that “a fundamental change was taking place in the physiological and 
pathological makeup of the Negro since the days of slavery” began to proliferate. 
According to Frederickson, the 1890 census countered what some saw as the paranoia 
engendered by the reports of the previous two decades, as “General Francis A. Walker, 
a leading northern economist and a former superintendent of the United States census” 
argued that the 1890 census “revealed that the blacks were in fact increasing at a rate 
substantially below that of the whites and were concentrating in a diminishing area of 
the deep South.”11 He argued that the data reported in the 1870 and 1880 censuses that 
caused so much alarm was faulty, as “the census takers had overlooked many blacks in 
1870” (245). The decreased numbers of African Americans and their relative isolation 
                                                
11 According to Sander Gilman, the census had long served as a method for constructing 
racist ideology, and he points specifically to the debate engendered by the 1840 census, 
in which “it was the first time possible to obtain data concerning mental illness in the 
United States.” Gilman notes that 3,000 of the 17,000 “reported to be insane and feeble-
minded” were black. According to Gilman, “If these staggering census statistics were to 
be believed, free blacks had an incidence of mental illness eleven times higher than 
slaves and six times higher than the white population” (137). 
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provided comfort to many whites, and Frederickson sees the 1890 census as 
instrumental in galvanizing belief in black degeneracy and overall weakness, hardly a 
threat to the supposedly superior Caucasian. According to Frederickson, because the 
1890 census “coincided with the full triumph of Darwinism in American thought,” the 
supposed evidence that blacks were in decline “readily fitted into a thesis of ‘the 
survival of the fittest’ in an inevitable ‘struggle for existence’ among the human races.” 
Consequently, the following decade “saw an unparalleled outburst of racist speculation 
on the impending disappearance of the American Negro” (246). A belief in diminished 
black capacity and cultural failure fueled attempts to deny black rights and further 
endangered the lives of African American citizens. 
 
Black Pathology and Violence 
 Violence against African Americans directly resulted from these beliefs in 
degeneracy and black pathology and the anxieties they provoked. At the same time, the 
discourse of black pathology provided readymade justifications for acts of violence, as 
white supremacists rationalized violence with the excuse that they had to defend 
themselves against black pathology and deviance. The 1890s in particular represent a 
period of increased violence and important additions to black pathology discourse. In 
Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th-Century American South, 
Edward Ayers observes that a belief in the acute danger of black sexual violence 
likewise provoked media saturation of reports of black rapists. Ayers argues that this 
fear was spurred on in part by the ignorance born of the separation between the races 
resulting from de facto segregation, as well as the proliferation of news reports of 
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sexual crimes supposedly justifying lynchings. According to Ayers, “at no time did 
[white women] hear more about black rapists than in the early 1890s” (241). Ayers 
notes that “[t]hanks to the speed and thoroughness with which news of lynchings were 
spread by the press of the late nineteenth-century South, the crisis of one isolated 
county could soon fuel the fears and anger smoldering in a county hundreds of miles 
away” (243). These stories contributed to an environment of fear and paranoia that 
stoked additional violence, and when “white Southerners read of a widely publicized 
lynching, … they automatically assumed that a rape had indeed occurred and began to 
look for warnings of the crime in their own community.” In this way, almost any 
supposed suspicious behavior “could be taken as evidence that an ‘outrage’ might be 
imminent” (243). As Trudier Harris explains, “[l]ynchings for alleged sex crimes 
became cover-ups for other suppressions whites wanted to effect, whether they admitted 
that or not” (18). In each of these cases, the sign of black sexual criminality, which 
black pathology created, motivated retributive violence. 
Lynching as a technology of social control depended on assumptions of black 
criminality derived from beliefs in black physiological difference, biological 
determinism, and cultural and existential degeneration. Frederickson argues that 
lynching at the end of the nineteenth century was “symptomatic of a conviction that the 
legal mechanisms of repression that accompanied segregation and disfranchisement did 
not go far enough and that a satisfactory balance between separation and control had not 
yet been established” (275). According to Frederickson, part of this need for control 
was tied directly to the supposed criminal tendencies of black people. The image of the 
“black beast,” based on the belief that African Americans, and men especially, were 
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unable to control animalistic sexual passions or “criminal natures stamped by heredity,” 
proliferated to justify lynching. White supremacists argued that this apparent danger 
also justified the denial of political rights, which many saw as the root of a reversion to 
savagery in the African American population after emancipation.12 According to 
Frederickson, “it was argued [that political dreams] … had led to dreams of ‘social 
equality’ and had encouraged blacks to expropriate white women by force.” As a result, 
“the Negro’s overpowering desire for white women was often described as the central 
fact legitimizing the whole program of legalized segregation and disfranchisment” 
(282). In this climate of fear and increased violence against African Americans, analysis 
of the 1890 census provided perhaps the most influential attempt to naturalize and 
codify black pathology, given the existence of a flexible and politically expedient 
discourse of race science that could justify white supremacist fears. Consequently, the 
1896 publication of Frederick Hoffman’s Race Traits and Tendencies of the American 
Negro represented an especially influential contribution to scientific racism and 
galvanized the discourse of black pathology. 
 
Hoffman’s Race Traits as a Black Pathology Text 
 Frederick Hoffman, an agent for the Prudential Insurance Company, produced 
his highly influential work of statistical analysis in part as a response to the heightened 
                                                
12 Frederickson also points to Philip Alexander Bruce’s The Plantation Negro as 
Freedman, in which Bruce argues that an increase in sexual crime, most evident in an 
increased number of sexual assaults committed against white women, is a sign of black 
“degeneration” after Emancipation (259).  
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interest in statistical data inspired by the previous three censuses.13 Race Traits and 
Tendencies of the American Negro targeted African Americans in attempt to explain the 
future possibilities for the race. According to Megan J. Wolff, it also had economic 
motivations, as the Prudential Company solicited the study “in response to a wave of 
state legislation banning discrimination against African Americans” (84).14 As both a 
sign of structural racism and an opportunity to entrench a discourse of black pathology 
to support supposed white supremacist truisms, Hoffman’s document represents a key 
moment in the history of white supremacist discourse. Building off the conclusions 
ratified by the discourse of scientific racism, Hoffman inscribed black pathology into 
this document based on his analysis of racial “degeneration,” including black mortality 
rates, poor health numbers, and supposed immoral behaviors. Hoffman responded 
directly to the data that suggested a decreasing black population overall but an 
increasing population in large cities. According to Hoffman, this tendency could, “if not 
                                                
13 Hoffman originally hailed from Germany, and Frederickson reports that “Hoffman’s 
foreign origin allegedly made him unbiased.” According to Frederickson, however, 
Hoffman “was not an objective outside observer,” as he had spent years “as an 
immigrant trying to get ahead in the insurance business [and] had undoubtedly learned 
to conform to the racial beliefs of his clients and associates.” Frederickson claims that 
Hoffman’s “racist predispositions, coupled with his mastery of the currently fashionable 
statistic approach to social problems, made his book … the most influential discussion 
of the race question to appear in the late nineteenth century” (249). 
14 According to Wolff, Prudential argued that black clients “caused a drain on revenue” 
and the company was therefore smart to deny them coverage. These claims, however, 
were “spurious” because “the anticipated drain was not due to differential mortality but 
rather to the reduction of sales to white customers assumed to be unwilling to patronize 
a company that considered black lives worth insuring.” As part of a “calculus of social 
worth,” the company had considered “financial value, public opinion, and corporate 
profit” to direct their corporate strategies, and “[t]o sell insurance policies at equal rates 
or for equal benefits across racial lines would offend a predominant system of social 
beliefs about the worth of human lives” (86). Beatrix Hoffman confirms that racial 
discrimination in this field “was so widespread at the turn of the century that African 
Americans were forced to create their own institutions, making black insurance 
companies among the most successful ‘race’ business of their time” (170). 
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checked in a few decades, materially increase the colored population of all the large 
cities of the country” (13). Following the conclusions already available in the discourse 
of scientific racism, Hoffman averred that an “abundance of testimony” illustrated that 
“previous to emancipation the negro enjoyed health equal if not superior to that of the 
white race.” Hoffman points to the higher death rate of African Americans in his 
research and in the 1890 census to argue that this rate “must be considered evidence of 
race deterioration, which in part will explain the gradual lowering of the rate of increase 
of the colored population brought out more distinctly than ever by the census of 1890” 
(55). According to Hoffman, the recent developments in black mortality and relatively 
low birth rate must be a sign of racial degeneration that puts the population at risk, 
echoing post-Reconstruction apologists for slavery as well as racial Darwinists and 
providing encouraging data for white supremacists that feared the proliferation of black 
people into white spaces. 
 In Race Traits Hoffman rejects claims that environmental influences, rather than 
biological determinism, might play a role in these apparent conditions for African 
Americans, in part by pointing to the Civil War statistical analysis conducted decades 
before. Hoffman believed that the supposed standardization of those tests on a 
putatively controlled population could be extrapolated to account for African Americans 
across the country, and he dismissed any challenges to the reliability of the data or the 
validity of his conclusions. He argued that it was “not in the conditions of life, but in the 
race traits and tendencies that we find the causes of the excessive mortality [in African 
Americans].” According to Hoffman, as long as “these tendencies are persisted in, so 
long as immorality and vice are a habit of life of the vast majority of the colored 
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population,” the consequence for African Americans would be the increased “mortality 
by hereditary transmission of weak constitutions” and a lower “rate of natural increase, 
until the births fall below the deaths, and gradual extinction results” (95, italics in 
original). Hoffman speaks as a true believer in racial Darwinism, and he exploits the 
blurred line between physiological constitution and moral behavior evident in earlier 
texts of scientific racism. An ambiguous relationship between physiology and behavior 
allows him to pathologize black culture and hail racial liberals who might reject 
Darwinian biological determinism. A focus on culture instead of on biological 
determinism illustrates the adaptive nature of white supremacist discourse, as black 
pathology seamlessly connects biology and culture under the sign of black degeneracy. 
 Criminality represents perhaps the most influential sign of black cultural 
degeneration in white supremacist discourse, and it provides the justification for 
continued denial of political rights. In making his argument for black extinction, 
Hoffman advocates depriving African Americans of the rights of citizenship because, to 
him, criminality was inherent in black populations. Hoffman observes that “[a]ll the 
tables for various states and cities confirm the census data, and show without exception 
that the criminality of the negro exceeds that of any other race of any numerical 
importance in this country.” He argues that “education has utterly failed to raise the 
negro to a higher level of citizenship, the first duty of which is to obey the laws and 
respect the lives and property of others” (228).15 This essential criminality, according to 
Hoffman, also validated violent responses in the South, as lynchings “are not the result 
                                                
15 Hoffman’s argument about education recalls post-Emancipation apologists for 
slavery who argued that Reconstruction attempts to support black education were futile 




of race antipathy, but are due to crimes which meet with summary justice in cases of 
whites and blacks alike” (230). These crimes are most commonly the crime of rape, and 
the “rate of increase” of lynchings “may be accepted as representing fairly the 
increasing tendency of colored men to commit this most frightful of all crimes” (231). 
The responsibility for “the removal” of what Hoffman calls the “crime of lynching” lay 
with the African American population. In a moment that anticipates that language of 
black pathology as applied to culture, and also represents the most overt assertion of 
biological racism, Hoffman claims that until the African American “learns to respect 
life, property, and chastity, [and] until he learns to believe in the value of personal 
morality operating in his everyday life,” his “criminal tendencies … will increase, and 
by so much the social and economic efficiency of the race will be decreased” (234-5). 
Hoffman’s warning hails avowed white supremacists as well as those 
supposedly more moderate, and even liberal, whites who felt concern for the supposed 
growing storm of pathological blackness. Hoffman comforts the former with an 
assertion of inevitable black extinction, and he responds to the latter by assuring them 
that any philanthropic attempts to lift the race out of despair will only fail if blacks fail 
to help themselves. According to Beatrix Hoffman, while the statistics in Race Traits 
“brought to light the serious discrepancies in black and white health conditions, the 
book’s conclusions reassured complacent whites, encouraging political inaction by 
arguing for a racial, rather than a social, explanation” (167). Similarly, Frederickson 
notes that “Hoffman drew inspiration from the hardest school of social Darwinism and 
condemned philanthropists who would interfere with the struggle for existence by 
seeking what amounted to the artificial preservation of the unfit” (251). Hoffman’s text 
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focused white supremacist arguments about black inferiority to deny African American 
social progress and to entrench structurally guaranteed gains in white wealth at the 
expense of black people.16 The correlation of purported racial inferiority with 
criminality impeded social progress long before twentieth-century debates about 
poverty and employed the language of black pathology discourse in ways that would 
prove influential in later discussions of black culture. 
In The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern 
Urban America, Khalil Gibran Muhammad also argues for the centrality of Race Traits 
and the 1890 census as significant texts in black pathology discourse, and he tracks the 
history of black criminality as a white supremacist assumption. Muhammad’s work is 
                                                
16 African American responses to his ideas were swift, and a strong resistant response 
recognized the danger of allowing these specious assertions to go unchecked. Kelly 
Miller, a contemporary of Hoffman, was one of the latter’s most vocal and convincing 
critics. In a review written just after Hoffman published Race Traits, Miller, an African 
American sociologist, got to the heart of the problem in Hoffman’s article. According to 
Miller, rather than representing a legitimate work of science and statistical analysis, 
Hoffman’s article featured problematic circular logic. Miller states that “it would seem 
that his conclusion was reached from a priori considerations and that facts have been 
collected in order to justify it” (3). Further, Miller attacked Hoffman’s dubious use of 
“evidence,” and he claimed that Hoffman’s figures regarding “pure” or “mixed 
Negroes” taken from penitentiary records, a population that Hoffman saw as 
standardized much like in his military statistics, “cannot be relied upon since the census 
bureau acknowledges that it has no definite method of determining the different shades 
of color and grades of mixture among Negroes” (21). Regarding Hoffman’s appeal to 
the supposed essential criminality of black people, Miller acknowledges high relative 
crime numbers but insists upon environmental explanations and rejects Hoffman’s 
biological determinism as born of little evidence and bad science. According to Miller, 
“The social degradation of the Negro” represents “the greatest factor contributive to this 
high criminal record.” Miller acknowledges as given that “poverty, ignorance, and 
crime” are “indissolubly connected” and claims that African Americans “represent the 
stratum of society which commits the bulk of crime the world over.” But such social 
conditions, if applied to whites, would lead to similar results. According to Miller, “The 
census records nowhere show that there is any connection between crime and race, but 
between crime and condition” (28). As a result, any claimed “immorality” associated 
with blackness is certainly a “race trait,” according to Miller, “but it is a human race 
trait, and is limited to no particular variety thereof” (33). 
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especially influential on my study because he insists on shifting the timeline of the 
origin and operation of black pathology discourse, placing it precisely in the decades—
the 1890s and just after the turn of the century—in which resistant black literary voices 
proliferated. Muhammad explains that in the 1890 census, “prison statistics for the first 
time became the basis of a national discussion about blacks as a distinct and dangerous 
criminal population” (3). The scientific encoding of assumptions of black criminality 
into an extant discourse of black inferiority suggests that the Progressive era was “the 
founding moment for the emergence of an enduring statistical discourse of black 
dysfunctionality rather than the 1960s, as is commonly believed” (7). With Daniel Paul 
Moynihan’s 1965 report in mind, Muhammad looks back to the Progressive decades of 
the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries to observe that the specific language of 
black criminality and cultural pathology reduces “the gap in the racial crime rhetoric 
between avowedly white supremacist writers and white progressives” (8).17 In fact, the 
apparently racially liberal social workers of the first decade of the twentieth century, 
who began “to explain black criminality in terms of environment” rather than the 
biological determinism adhered to by avowed white supremacists, attempted “to defend 
the humanity of blacks and their right to fair play in American society, and at the same 
time to concede that blacks were still sufficiently inferior behaviorally or socially to 
                                                
17 Moynihan’s The Negro Family: the Case for National Action argues that the African 
American population in the United States has “paid a fearful price” over three hundred 
years of oppression, which results in an ineffective matriarchal family structure, 
negligent black fathers, and a “tangle of pathology” that “retards the progress of the 
group as a whole.” While this twentieth-century text represents an important reference 
point in the history of black pathology discourse, especially as it highlights the racist 
assumptions of well-intentioned liberals, my focus in this project is on the historical 
roots that influence a document such as the Moynihan Report, so I do not figure it as a 
source of analysis. 
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warrant special attention, but not necessarily special help” (113). These liberal 
reformers represent the consequences of a century of scientific racism and a subsequent 
shift to black cultural pathology written into the discourse of race.18  
Frederick Hoffman is an especially important figure for Muhammad, as he is for 
Haller, Gould, and Frederickson, because of his success in proliferating racial statistical 
analyses into mainstream American public discourse. Most important to Muhammad is 
the way Hoffman focused on “setting the terms and shaping the frame of analysis.” He 
did this by “combin[ing] crime statistics with a well-crafted white supremacist narrative 
to shape the reading of black criminality while trying to minimize the appearance of 
doing so” (51). In this way Hoffman’s work represents the perfect sign of an 
opportunistic white supremacy focused on discursive intervention that occludes history 
and naturalized its motives. According to Muhammad, because Hoffman centered black 
criminality as an important measure of racial inferiority just as his forebears had 
focused on death rates and anatomical measurements, “Hoffman wrote crime into race 
and centered it at the heart of the Negro Problem” (51). While Muhammad’s work 
focuses on the effects of criminalizing black populations in urban spaces, his notion of 
“writ[ing] crime into race” demonstrates that black pathology discourse serves a central 
role in white supremacy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, enduring to the 
                                                
18 In Black Neighbors: Race and the Limits of Reform in the American Settlement 
House Movement, 1890–1945, Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn analyzes the history of leading 
settlement house reformers including Jane Addams, Frances Kellor, and John Daniels. 
She asserts that they “blamed the perpetuation of poor economic and social conditions 
among blacks partly on society but primarily on what they considered the weakness of 
the black family, the degradation of the black individual’s psyche, and the annihilation 
of culture all resulting from the system of slavery” (13). She also argues that these 
reformers’ “focus on environmental origins of varying capacities failed to contradict the 
portrayal of blacks as inferior,” and as a result, their “stress on cultural deficiency 
created, in the minds of many whites, a new rationale for discrimination” (19). 
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present day. By focusing on four important authors from the turn of the century, I affirm 
Muhammad’s revised timeline of black pathology and analyze the ways these authors 
theorize white supremacy. Consequently, I also address the broader theoretical 
implication of such attempts, as my work with black pathology reveals some 
commonality with recent work in biopolitical theory focused on racial history. 
 
A Critical Vocabulary of Race and Racism 
 My analysis of white supremacy in this project depends on Karen E. Fields and 
Barbara J. Fields’s Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life. Their critical 
vocabulary generally, including their coinage of “racecraft” and their stipulation that 
“[b]io-racism” represents “a more precise appellation for … nineteenth-century 
research…than the more usual term, ‘race science,’” gets to the heart of my inquiry, 
which, in part, is to analyze the ways that white supremacist discourse became 
naturalized and applied in the nineteenth century through a discourse of black pathology 
(4). Fields and Fields define racism as “first and foremost a social practice, which 
means that it is an action and a rationale for action, or both at once” (17). Their use of 
“craft” in their definition joins the supposed fact of race with the ambiguity of 
superstition embodied by witchcraft, and they note that racecraft “occupies a middle 
ground … an invisible realm of collective understandings, a half-lit zone of the mind’s 
eye” (23). According to the authors, racecraft is especially pernicious because it is 
disguised as nature: “This purposefully encoded, politically deployed racecraft serves as 
a reminder that what depends on imagination and action is more flexible than nature and 
has the power to create a quasi-nature more convincing than nature itself” (70). Finally, 
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Fields and Fields argue that race “as culture is only biological race in polite language: 
No one can seriously postulate cultural homogeneity among those whose racial 
homogeneity scholars nonetheless take for granted” (156). These assertions isolate as 
especially insidious our willful attempts to misunderstand race and to look past racism. 
Fields and Fields emphasize the flexible and therefore adaptable nature of white 
supremacy and its dependence on a discourse that equivocates biology and culture and 
disguises feeling as science. The authors in my study, with the exception of white 
supremacist Thomas Dixon, recognize these principles and mount resistant responses 
that intervene upon and subvert this discourse. At the same time, rejections of reductive 
“race as culture” assumptions in these responses illustrate the complexity generated by 
the central presence of white supremacy in American culture. Kendrick Lamar claims 
“loyalty” not to emphasize cultural continuity in an essentialist sense but to reject that 
white supremacist assumption of black cultural stasis by laying claim to a carefully 
considered resistant culture that identifies and destroys white supremacist assumptions. 
 
Black Pathology, Biopolitics, and the Limits of Theory 
 To examine the way the authors I study theorize white supremacy, I particularly 
examine twentieth-century political theory and its relation to racist oppression and 
violence. I relied on contemporary biopolitics because of the ways it unpacks the 
relations between how the state uses the body and knowledge about it to control 
different populations. Consequently, the theoretical genealogy of my project begins 
with Foucault’s concept of biopolitics and shifts to an application of some of its 
assumptions to the context of the nineteenth century and to the discourse of black 
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pathology. Because I engage Giorgio Agamben’s work in two chapters of this project, 
and because Agamben’s work follows Foucault, it is useful to gloss some of the most 
important principles of biopolitics as they apply to the development of a discourse of 
black pathology specifically and to the operation of racism and white supremacy more 
generally. Foucault defines biopolitics as a specifically modern conception of life and 
its political valence. In The History of Sexuality he observes: “For millennia, man 
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a 
political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a 
living being in question” (143). Foucault argues that the modern state makes its mission 
the administration of life, whether through sustaining it or killing it. Foucault notes that 
by killing he does “not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect 
murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some 
people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (256). 
Agamben’s notion of the homo sacer, which I use as a sign of black abjection in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, derives from this definition of killing in Foucault’s 
sense. 
 To the extent that racism in the American context represents complex dynamics 
of state-sponsored and capitalist oppression or complicity to cultural modes, Foucault’s 
discussion of racism provides some useful concepts but also proves limited in its 
application. In Race and the Education of Desire, Ann Laura Stoler analyzes Foucault’s 
theory of race as a technology of biopower. She calls Foucault’s concept of racism 
“internal to the biopolitical state, woven into the weft of the social body, threaded 
through its fabric,” and as such, Foucault’s theory “is no scapegoat theory of race.” 
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Stoler explains that scapegoat theories “posit that under economic and social duress, 
particular sub-populations are cordoned off as intruders, invented to deflect anxieties, 
and conjured up precisely to nail blame.” Stoler states that for Foucault “racism is more 
than an ad hoc response to crisis; it is a manifestation of preserved possibilities, the 
expression of an underlying discourse of permanent social war, nurtured by the 
biopolitical technologies of ‘incessant purification’” (69). While she does not address 
the context of the nineteenth-century United States, Stoler’s emphasis on how racism 
inheres in the state invites comparison to the context of my project. Stoler points out 
that Foucault is focused on state racism as such, and not on its more “popular forms”; 
however, my project cannot make that distinction in the context of the late-nineteenth 
century. For instance, lynching in the United States represented the slippage between 
popular state-sponsored racial violence; it was authored through extra-legal means but 
benefitted from the complicity of the law. At the same time, the centrality of white 
supremacy to American politics at the time, including the writing into law of some of 
the most oppressive means by which to disenfranchise African Americans, 
demonstrates the importance of an analysis of racism and its relation to the modern 
state. Likewise, scapegoating is not an accurate descriptor of American white 
supremacists’ attitudes toward black citizens, as it fails to recognize the fact that 
slavery, and its aftermath, had marked African Americans as “intruders” at least since 
the seventeenth century. As the politics of American race science and sociology 
demonstrate, a priori assumptions of black inferiority endure through American history 
and adapt to various historical circumstances. In fact, this pervasiveness and 
adaptability have proved to be constants of American white supremacy. 
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A second problem with Foucault’s work and that of other biopolitical thinkers 
like Agamben is, as Alexand Weheliye argues, its tendency to avoid any extended 
analysis of racial thinking. In Habeas Viscus, Weheliye criticizes Foucault for 
“reinscrib[ing] racial difference as natural” in his analysis of biopower, and he makes 
important assertions about theory’s limits. Weheliye states that Foucault “never 
interrogates the bare existence of racial difference and those hierarchies fabricated upon 
this primordial notion.” For Weheliye, Foucault accepts as fact that racism derives from 
“preestablished variances among different ethnicities” and fails to analyze how such 
causation came about. Consequently, race for Foucault “emerges as a fixed category 
rather than as the biopolitical apparatus it actually is” (62). Weheliye furthermore 
criticizes Agamben’s work for privileging an analysis of the law at the expense of the 
“life” supposedly at the heart of his concept of bare life. According to Weheliye, 
Agamben’s bare life “leaves no room for alternate forms of life that elude the law’s 
violent embrace,” and as a result homo sacer “remains a thing,” unable to act on its 
own. Agamben elevates the law of the sovereign to such power that no liberating 
possibilities apply. According to Weheliye, “Because alternatives do not exist in 
Agamben’s generalized sphere of exception that constitutes bare life, the law denotes 
the only constituent power in the definition and adjudication of what it means to be 
human or dehumanized in the contemporary world” (131). Weheliye’s work represents 
an important challenge to political theory that risks being blind to the human 
experiences behind its abstractions. Keeping this line of critique in mind, in these 
chapters I focus on attempts by resistant black voices to theorize white supremacy and 
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ground my attention in lived experience even as I consider the ways that political signs 
might reveal the more subtle operations of white supremacy. 
 In the chapters that follow, I analyze white supremacy in its turn-of-the-century 
American context to trace the contours of black pathology discourse and resistance to it. 
In Chapter One, I focus on the work of Thomas Dixon, an avowed white supremacist 
who wrote highly influential novels that glorified white supremacist violence and 
attempted to relitigate the Civil War and Reconstruction during the post-Reconstruction 
era. His work conceives citizenship as a biological imperative rather than a social 
construct, and he attempts to inscribe what I call biopolitical citizenship into history and 
the law. I use Giorgio Agamben’s figure of the homo sacer to explore white 
supremacists’ paranoia about black rights. Dixon connects the oppression of black 
people to white suffering, as his fear of federal overreach is supposedly the real story of 
racial politics in the United States. Dixon’s white supremacist theorizing traffics in the 
language of rights in part to occlude its antidemocratic logic. In this chapter, I examine 
references to habeas corpus and other examples of rights discourse in his texts in the 
context of their complex histories to show how Dixon attempts to naturalize white 
supremacy into the history of American citizenship. Dixon’s work fuels particular 
resistant black responses that challenge naturalized white supremacy and its 
assumptions and attack the discourse of black pathology that perpetuates and enables 
them. 
 In Chapter Two, I explore the ways Pauline Hopkins intervenes in black 
pathology discourse and rejects its assumptions about African American women and 
families while challenging other political discourses that attempt to silence their stories. 
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I focus on Sappho Clark as the central figure in Hopkins’s novel Contending Forces, 
and I argue that Sappho exemplifies a compelling political identity in that she 
challenges insufficient political strategies and recognizes the family as a dynamic 
political unit rather than a referent for black suffering or cultural pathology. Hopkins 
focuses on lynching as a sign of white supremacist obsession with black women’s 
sexuality, and she suggests that white supremacy represents an insidious pathology that 
claims moral superiority while it enables racist violence and manipulates the facts of 
history to support its assumption. For Hopkins, history itself is the political terrain on 
which to wage these battles that reclaim black agency and reveal the operation of white 
supremacy and black pathology discourse. 
 In Chapter Three, I focus on racist violence and pathology in more detail as I 
investigate the ways that Sutton Griggs emphasizes the horrors of white supremacy. 
Specifically, he depicts its medicalized and scientific history and reappropriates its 
language to sabotage black pathology discourse. In his two most popular novels, 
Imperium in Imperio and The Hindered Hand, Griggs connects a history of scientific 
racism to white supremacist violence committed against black victims. Griggs uses 
images of the dissection of black people to recall the long history of violence 
perpetrated by white supremacists obsessed with black bodies, and he uses the language 
of disease to illustrate how black pathology discourse operates to endanger African 
Americans. In the process, he subverts that discourse to put the responsibility for 




 In Chapter Four, I show how Charles Chesnutt’s use of lynching as a metaphor 
in his novel The Marrow of Tradition explains lynching’s political motivations. For 
Chesnutt, there is an explicit cause-and-effect relationship between black 
disenfranchisement and racist violence. In this chapter, I return to Agamben’s figure of 
the homo sacer to show how abject black political identity enables white supremacists 
to commit murder, and I illustrate the ideological slippage in the relationship between 
white supremacist violence and the law. Chesnutt’s novel recognizes that black 
pathology discourse validates white supremacist resentment and violence, and he 
highlights how lynching’s status as both within and without the law benefits from the 
proscription of black rights and the law’s complicity in looking the other way when 
racist violence was necessary. 
 Finally, I demonstrate in the epilogue for this project that the discourse of black 
pathology continues to exhibit the complex status of white supremacy in a country that 
claims ideals of democratic equality. This contradiction at the heart of American 
democracy, however, did not seem to plague the black authors in my study, perhaps 
because lamenting the problem of white supremacy as a tragic aspect of American 
democracy occludes the lived experiences of its victims and participates in the historical 
work of white supremacy. For Hopkins, Griggs, and Chesnutt, white supremacy was an 
urgent part of everyday life that required an immediate resistant response. Each author 
struggled to find political strategies that offered hope while also recognizing the 
existential threat that white supremacy posed. The complexity of their literary 
contributions reflects their creativity and political commitment, while at the same time, 
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the persistence of white supremacy and black pathology discourse illustrates the 


























Thomas Dixon and Biopolitical Fantasies of National Citizenship 
“Are they not citizens of the United States? Does not the Fourteenth Amendment apply 
to a white man as well as a Negro?”—Thomas Dixon19 
 
The above quotation, from a climactic scene in Thomas Dixon’s 1902 novel The 
Leopard’s Spots, may strike the modern reader as strange. How could the Fourteenth 
Amendment—such a central part of Reconstruction and an important referent for the 
struggle for black civil rights—represent an appeal instead for white rights? Though it 
now embodies such a place of esteem at the center of guaranteed American rights, the 
Fourteenth Amendment is an essential Reconstruction text, and it represents a 
revolutionary reappraisal of some of the most important assumptions about the rights 
American citizenship guarantees.20 Consequently, the Reconstruction legislation that 
surrounded it, including the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments guaranteeing the end 
of slavery and the right to vote, respectively, proved to be especially provocative to 
Southerners and their sympathizers long after the Civil War ended. A constellation of 
civil rights ideals surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment depended on some of its 
                                                
19 Thomas Dixon, The Leopard's Spots: A Romance of the White Man's Burden—1865–
1900, p. 160. 
20 The genealogy of United States citizenship, specifically regarding race and 
Reconstruction, as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment includes a set of important 
decisions and legislation, beginning with Chief Justice Roger Taney’s ruling in Scott v. 
Sanford that African Americans were not citizens of the United States (19 How. 393, 
404-407). In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the state retained 
most of the rights of citizenship, and that the promises of the Fourteenth Amendment 
largely did not apply (Foner 531). In U.S. v. Cruikshank, the Court further solidified the 
power of the states in Enforcement Act cases, in which the federal government 
attempted to protect African Americans from racially motivated violence. According to 
Eric Foner, Cruikshank “rendered national prosecution of crimes committed against 
blacks virtually impossible, and gave a green light to acts of terror where local officials 
either could not or would not enforce the law” (531). 
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central assumptions, including the right of basic citizenship unencumbered by racial 
identity, a tenet that struck at the foundational assumptions of white supremacy. The 
perceived threat to rights and liberties of white American citizens that increasing 
African American freedoms represented animated much of the persistent disagreement 
about citizenship and civil rights in the nineteenth century even though actual freedoms 
for African Americans continued to be proscribed after Reconstruction.21 At the heart of 
the conflict is a longstanding assumption held by the majority of white Americans of the 
time and of the present that citizenship and the ideologies and legal instruments that 
support it—including the rights of habeas corpus and its promise of basic civil 
liberties—are a biological imperative, not a social construct subject to the whims of 
progressive history. And Thomas Dixon is perhaps the author at the end of the 
nineteenth century most compelled to take up the cause of biologically defined 
citizenship. In a series of sermons delivered in the buildup to the Spanish American 
War and in his three novels, Dixon articulates a clear vision for an Anglo Saxon 
citizenship in the United States that conflates biological identity with political identity, 
and his work attempts to inscribe what I call his notion of biopolitical citizenship into 
history and the law. 
 Dixon’s position at the turn of the twentieth century as a central voice for white 
supremacy has received important critical attention in the past two decades. Most 
                                                
21 In Reconstruction, Foner explains that like “the republicanism of the American 
Revolution, Reconstruction Radicalism was first and foremost a civic ideology, 
grounded in a definition of citizenship” (233). That definition, as embodied by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, sought “to conjure into being a new political leadership that 
would respect the principle of equality before the law” (259). As a result, citizenship 




notably, Brook Thomas has illuminated the implications of Dixon’s work on nineteenth-
century citizenship and legal history. Thomas’s key intervention in critical works like 
Civic Myths and his article “The Clansman’s Raced-Based Anti-Imperialist 
Imperialism” is to demonstrate that Dixon’s white supremacist rationale is coherent.22 
He argues that Dixon’s argument is consistent given the two impulses that animate 
Dixon’s work: a pro-imperialist attitude about U.S. intervention abroad and an anti-
imperialist mistrust of federal power as applied to the American South. Additionally, 
Dixon’s work illuminates the complex contradictions embodied in nineteenth-century 
texts about citizenship when racial identity motivated so many interpretations of rights 
and liberties, and legal decisions often amplified the fluidity of racial categories and the 
importance of racial thinking. Thomas’s analysis of the relationship between rights and 
liberties in Dixon’s work inspires my analysis in this chapter, and I extend Thomas’s 
argument by acknowledging the importance of historicizing Dixon’s work in the 
context of citizenship.23 One of Thomas’s most important conclusions, one that guides 
                                                
22 Brook Thomas asserts that Dixon’s novels, The Clansman in particular, reveal a 
“more complicated Dixon than the one we are so accustomed to dismissing.” He notes 
that Dixon’s novels “raise complex constitutional and historical dilemmas” and 
contends that it was Dixon’s “inability to live with their paradoxical complexity that, in 
part, led [Dixon] to seek simplistic resolutions” (“The Clansman’s Race-Based Anti-
Imperialist Imperialism” 307). Thomas traces his argument in “The Clansman’s Race-
Based Anti-Imperialist Imperialism” through various explanations for Dixon’s pro-
imperialist attitude at the turn of the century at odds with Dixon’s “anti-imperialism” 
applied to Reconstruction. Thomas’s focus on citizenship and its high-profile 
nineteenth-century sources proves most useful for my analysis. 
23 Thomas contends that Dixon believes that African American equality can come only 
“at the expense of liberty” for white Americans. Thomas argues that The Clansman 
alludes to Ex parte Milligan, “the most famous civil liberties case to come out of the 
war,” as representative of the relationship Dixon establishes between civil rights and 
civil liberties, terms once used “interchangeably” prior to the war but ultimately 
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my own inquiry, is that Dixon’s anxiety about threats to white citizenship recognizes 
the extension of federal power represented by Reconstruction, as well as the ways that 
the denial or bestowal of citizenship enables or restricts violence against certain 
members of society. 
 But there are also limits to Thomas’s arguments that create points of departure 
for my work. While Thomas wants to appreciate Dixon’s complexities in considering 
constitutional issues, he does so by divesting them from their ethical context and 
implications. To avoid simply identifying Dixon’s racism, Thomas treats Dixon as a 
constitutional interventionist. While it is important to recognize the instrumentality of 
the nineteenth-century legal context for Dixon’s thinking, it is equally important to 
make clear that this context does not free Dixon from the ethical responsibilities of his 
own historical interventionism.24 Dixon’s racism must not reduce the instructive value 
of his work regarding nineteenth-century cultures of white supremacist thinking, but the 
tendency of his work to raise interesting questions about the legal history of the 
                                                                                                                                          
distinguished in the modern sense they now reflect by the Fourteenth Amendment (“The 
Clansman’s Race-Based Anti-Imperialist Imperialism” 309). Dixon’s reference to 
Milligan also raises the issue of habeas corpus, which Thomas does not explore in detail 
but which identifies an important way Dixon dramatizes the relationship between 
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship and civil liberties, African American rights, and 
Anglo Saxon liberties. Further, as one of the representative cases of Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, Milligan represents civil liberties 
prevailing over civil rights as a clear rejection of federal overreach. Thomas explains 
that “Dixon uses the fact that political and civil equality for African Americans could be 
sustained only by an imperialistic central authority as proof that such equality would 
come only at the expense of liberty” (308). 
24 In Dixon’s case, his historical interventionism involved mapping turn-of-the-century 
anxieties about racial identity and expanding American borders—including its 




nineteenth century must not occlude its insidious racist logic that had far-reaching 
consequences. Disagreement between my work and Brook Thomas’s centers on this 
point.  
Thomas insists that Dixon cannot be representative of white supremacist 
thinking because of his ability to support American international intervention while 
attacking federal power at home, a combination of ideas contrary to most white 
supremacists in the late-nineteenth century whom, according to Thomas, opposed 
American imperial intervention—most notably because of their fears of incorporating 
“lesser” races. But Dixon’s popularity indicates that he touched a nerve and illuminated 
widely held beliefs. His work is interesting in part because it demonstrates both the 
insidiousness and opportunism of white supremacy. By considering Thomas’s 
historicist approach to Dixon’s work, specifically in the nineteenth-century context of 
rights and citizenship, I demonstrate in this chapter how the ethical implications of 
Dixon’s work are imbued in its legal history. Dixon’s version of white supremacy 
reveals a set of anxieties about rights and citizenship, as well as a strategy for displacing 
those anxieties onto African Americans. More specifically, this version of white 
supremacy utilizes a language of pathology that attempts to codify biological 
uncertainty into legal guarantees. Dixon reveals the interplay of biological thinking and 
political expediency in white supremacist ideology regarding the most defining issue in 
the nineteenth century: what it means to be American in a system of laws that 
supposedly enacts and protects liberal democratic ideals. 
 A logical manifestation of this anxiety is the belief in white victimhood, which 
Dixon attempts to codify in the assumed stability of the law. But as the legal history of 
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the nineteenth century demonstrates, this was an especially challenging endeavor. Amy 
Kaplan’s work illustrates the ways that citizenship and the incorporation of racial others 
was a provocative issue at the turn of the century, just as it had been after the Civil War. 
Dixon used this historical analogue to articulate the importance of citizenship to a 
distinctly Anglo Saxon future for the United States. And that historical reference point 
allowed white supremacists to put their own citizenship status, in an existential sense, 
under specific threat. Walter Benn Michaels observes that “Reconstruction not only 
enables white men to imagine themselves as victims of imperialism, it enables them to 
imagine the imperial power as their own government” (187). And an opportunity for 
national reunion embodied by the imperial success of the United States at the turn of the 
century created an equal opportunity to couch that reunion in stabilized white identity 
defined against black suffering. In Reconstructing the World, Harilaos Stecopoulos 
states, “Although President McKinley imagined imperial reunion in exclusively 
fraternal terms,” Thomas Dixon “seize[s] on the question of biological reproduction of 
the nation and use[s] that question to redefine the South as pivotal to the American 
future” (24). Michael Rogin points out that this moment inspired Dixon’s new 
galvanized focus on African Americans, whereas before his sermons “had been more 
concerned with immigrant mobs than with Negroes” (194). Dixon’s strategy to wed 
these historical events to the issues of race and citizenship, and the overwhelming 
response he received from his reading public, indicates the opportunism of white 
supremacist fervor at this moment in history.25 
                                                
25 David Blight’s Race and Reunion is an essential source on the cultural consequences 
of Reconstruction history. Blight avers that Civil War memory became constituted on 
the issue of slavery as well as on the ways Reconstruction defined the Constitution; 
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According to Melvyn Stokes, Dixon’s recognition that the American imperial 
war was a white supremacist war changed Dixon’s mind about race relations at home 
and redirected his efforts from the dangers posed by new immigrants to the nation 
toward the threat of African American success (40). In his novels, Dixon expresses this 
anxiety by co-opting black suffering for white victimhood, and as Cathy Boeckmann 
explains in A Question of Character, Dixon believes that the inner life or “character” of 
a person is inextricably linked to their racial identity. Boeckmann argues that for Dixon, 
the “white character that suffering builds forms alongside a racial unity that would deny 
character to any other racial group, regardless of commensurate suffering” (77). A white 
identity forged this way—at a moment of national unity and through the suffering of 
African Americans—ties national identity to the suffering of the racial other. 
 
Dixon and the Problem of Habeas Corpus 
With this language in mind as a frame for my argument in this chapter about 
Dixon’s notions of “biopolitical citizenship,” a particular image from Giorgio 
Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life brings together the issues of 
biological identity and political agency so important to Dixon. Agamben identifies 
habeas corpus as an ideological center for biopolitics, subverting assumptions about 
                                                                                                                                          
what the war, a New York Herald editorial had wondered, “had written into the 
Constitution” or “which Constitution” now obtained. As Reconstruction began to be 
litigated in cultural memory as soon as the 1868 Democratic Presidential campaign, a 
counter-narrative to Republican success emerged. According to Blight, “Republican 
misrule, went the argument, had stolen the rights of whites and disrupted the natural 
place of blacks in society” (101). Thus, from the beginning Reconstruction offered a 
narrative of white persecution grounded in political identity. White supremacists like 




modern democratic political theory and its purportedly virtuous roots. Agamben’s 
theoretical formulation of “bare life”—life that has been stripped of its political agency 
and identity—as “the new political subject” of biopolitics in modernity finds a referent, 
in fact its “first recording,” according to Agamben, in the 1679 writ of habeas corpus 
(123).26 The “bearer of rights” in modern democracy, according to Agamben, can only 
be constructed as a subject when bare life—corpus—is isolated by the sovereign power 
of the state. Therefore, the vulnerability of life itself is at the heart of the notion of 
liberty enshrined in the sovereign subject. I explore Agamben’s more detailed argument 
in Homo Sacer in a subsequent chapter. But the idea that life stripped of its political 
status potentially lies at the center of a symbol of democracy resonates in the history of 
the nineteenth century and is at the center of Dixon’s white supremacist logic.27 The 
doubleness of the subject, the supposed bearer of rights but always and already power’s 
potential victim, perhaps explains a fear shared by Dixon and his African American 
targets. Of course, African Americans’ lived experience of that fear invalidates Dixon’s 
                                                
26 Black’s Law Dictionary defines habeas corpus (in Latin, “that you have the body”) as 
“[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the 
person's imprisonment or detention is not illegal (habeas corpus ad subjiciendum). In 
addition to being used to test the legality of an arrest or commitment, the writ may be 
used to obtain judicial review of (1) the regularity of the extradition process, (2) the 
right to or amount of bail, or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has imposed a criminal 
sentence.” In the entry, Charles Alan Wright, quoting Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs v. O'Brien, traces the codification of habeas corpus to the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1679 (1923, A.C. 603, 609), just as Agamben does. 
27 It is also important to note that I am treating Agamben’s assertion as a metaphor for 
the existence of democratic political life at the locus of contradiction. I am not 
suggesting that Agamben’s formulation can withstand the full weight of the legal 
history of habeas corpus, not only because of the multiplicity of its applications in that 
legal history, but also because the writ of habeas corpus is as much a procedural act as a 
philosophical assertion in its modern usage. 
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exploitation of it, but a structural connection regarding the subject’s relationship to the 
law remains. The vulnerability of life as the subject of politics is amplified when race is 
the designator of political identity, and in the nineteenth century, racial identity and the 
apparent rights of citizenship were often coterminous. 
Agamben’s work helps articulate a theory of citizenship as a vector of power 
that is grounded in Foucault’s exploration of biopolitics. In “From Zoēpolitics to 
Biopolitics: Citizenship and the Construction of ‘Society,’” Willem Schinkel explains 
the role of citizenship in creating bare life. He states that “formal citizenship”—as 
opposed to what he calls “moral citizenship,” a judgment of one’s engagement with 
their citizenship rights—“separates citizens from non-citizens who are thereby 
zoēpolitically reduced to bare life” (156).28 Citizenship allows for the creation of a 
“social schizophrenic, a Janus-faced person who does and at the same time doesn’t 
‘belong,’” rather than of Agamben’s homo sacer. According to Schinkel, “Unlike the 
homo sacer, this person belongs to the nation/state, but he or she is biopolitically 
excluded from the bios of society” (164). For Schinkel, Agamben’s work is instructive 
in the way it illustrates the state’s primary control mechanisms, like citizenship, 
operating as social control, sorting citizens and non-citizens and creating bare life in the 
process. A central conclusion from Agamben that informs Schinkel’s argument about 
the “zoēpolitical aspect of citizenship” is that “[e]ach citizen is potentially reduced to 
bare life” (166). Thomas Dixon’s hysteria that white rights are under threat by the very 
                                                
28 For Schinkel, zoēpolitics is power directed “primarily externally … toward persons 
outside the state,” while biopolitics “is internally directed and aims at the control of 
populations occupying the state’s territory but which are discursively placed outside the 
domain of hegemony marked as ‘society’” (156). Schinkel argues that citizenship 
reflects both of these aspects as a form of social control. 
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existence of black rights becomes even more provocative when we consider it in the 
context of nineteenth-century citizenship. For Dixon, all white citizens are potentially 
black citizens, slaves to their government and threatened by the overreach of federal 
power. The two-faced aspect of citizenship in a republican democracy—that it can 
create and deny subjectivity—gives Dixon’s white supremacy fertile ground for 
exploitation. 
Agamben’s description of the “polar” character of democracy could describe 
Dixon’s work, which is grounded in the ironies of the nineteenth-century legal history 
of citizenship.29 Agamben states that the “ambiguous … character of democracy” exists 
in the concept of habeas corpus “if one considers the fact that the same legal procedure 
that was originally intended to assure the presence of the accused at the trial and, 
therefore, to keep the accused from avoiding judgment, turns—in its new and definitive 
form—into grounds for the sheriff to detain and exhibit the body of the accused.” 
Agamben describes habeas corpus as “a two-faced being, the bearer of both subjection 
to sovereign power and of individual liberties” (125, italics in original). As Schinkel 
observes, the body as the basis for politics—for biopolitics—means that all men are 
potentially subject to the power of the sovereign.30 In the context of African American 
                                                
29 Perhaps the central example is the persistence of the Fugitive Slave Law as a referent 
and precedent for increased federal power. After the Civil War, it persisted as an ironic 
justification or reference point for civil rights legislation. Charles Lofgren explains in 
The Plessy Case that initial Fourteenth Amendment appeals usually did not concern 
racial discrimination. Lofgren states, “between Slaughter-house and Plessy, of the 150 
cases the United States Supreme Court decided under the Amendment, only fifteen 
involved discrimination against blacks” (70). 
30 In The Power of Life: Agamben and the Coming Politics, David Kishik explains, 
“The true political subject reveals itself for the first time to be neither a free man nor a 
citizen but just an anonymous body.” Kishik notes that this body is both “the substance 
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rights and the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, when black freedoms were 
proscribed and the black body was in constant danger, Dixon’s allusions to habeas 
corpus and the Magna Carta as centers of Anglo Saxon citizenship that require its denial 
to African Americans are especially resonant.31 As a center for Dixon’s exploration of a 
biopolitical definition of citizenship, habeas corpus and the texts that codified it—most 
notably the 14th Amendment—serve as central signs in Dixon’s fiction and sermons. 
His ideal Anglo Saxon citizen remains inextricably tied to the suffering of African 
Americans, and biopolitical citizenship illustrates the opportunism of white supremacy 
that seeks to unite political and biological identity in the law as a protection against both 
federal overreach and the intrusion of black Americans into white spaces.32 
                                                                                                                                          
that is the bearer of liberties and rights (and thus it is ordinarily cared for and protected 
from peril)” and “also the ultimate target of power and law (and thus it can potentially 
be forsaken and harmed)” (74). This is the body—and the subject—that is the object of 
habeas corpus. 
31  Two of the Habeas Corpus Acts and the Enforcement Acts, both of which tried to 
protect the rights of former slaves as articulated in the 14th Amendment by suspending 
the rights of white racists, are relevant to this chapter. 
32 The “fantasies” to which the title of this chapter refers recalls Lauren Berlant’s The 
Anatomy of National Fantasy. Her analysis focuses on the ways that citizenship gets 
constructed and enacted in the national imaginary. According to Berlant, central to the 
American experience is a crisis of identity, one that pits the local and regional against 
the global and gets mapped onto the historical conflict between state citizenship and 
national citizenship. Given the centrality of the Civil War in this history, it is no 
surprise, and yet no less remarkable, that Berlant points to the nation’s racial history as 
central to its notion of citizenship. She argues that “modern American citizenship is 
derived primarily not from Enlightenment Constitutional dicta but rather from the 
enfranchisement of African Americans” and, accordingly, “it is possible to see the 
history of the Constitution as a record of the nation’s gradual recognition that it needs 
officially to theorize an ideal relation between its abstract ‘citizens’ and the person who 
lives, embodied, an everyday life” (13). If the benefit of hindsight allows such a 
conclusion now, Berlant does not contend that these ideas were not contested. The 
friction of these two political identities—the idealized citizen subject and the lived 
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Returning to the epigraph that began this chapter, the plea for white rights 
embodied in the character’s appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment represents and 
dictates a specific ideology of racial thinking that structures various forms of political 
and cultural thought at the turn of the century. It reveals the racial anxiety of post-
Reconstruction society in which the history of the Civil War and subsequent attempts to 
integrate black Americans into free society became the ideological battleground for the 
nation’s hearts and minds. And the epigraph is grounded in nineteenth-century legal 
developments that theorized enduring questions about civil rights, individual liberties, 
and national identity. Dixon’s sermons and speeches in the late 1890s motivated by a 
moment of patriotism evinced by the Spanish American War as well as his trilogy of 
hugely popular novels in the first decade of the twentieth century address these 
questions. In both genres he reflects an ideology of citizenship galvanized both by 
American imperialism and the legal and social consequences of Reconstruction, which 
continue to resonate through literary representation and public discourse long after the 
rights of African Americans have been proscribed. Dixon shows us that a fundamental 
fact of white supremacy is its commitment to occluding its antidemocratic logic. By 
shrouding his analysis and historical revisionism in the language of individual rights, 
                                                                                                                                          
experience of that construct (and, in the case of African Americans, a more poignant 
notion of subjection)—and the new attention to rights-based discourse that resulted 
from Emancipation—imbued the concept of citizenship with a new complexity. This 
conflict—between ideal, free citizen and embodied, lived reality most poignantly 
represented by the enduring presence of inequality for African Americans in the United 
States—comprises a series of literary images and philosophical and legal debates. 
Berlant’s thesis also articulates the intimate relationship between exclusive and 
idealized American citizenship and the lived experience of the African American 
“other” that Dixon exploits in his fantasy of white supremacist national citizenship. 
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Dixon attempts to naturalize white supremacy into the history of American citizenship, 
and within the history of citizenship more broadly.33 
In this chapter, I analyze some of Dixon’s sermons from the Spanish American 
War and two novels from his Reconstruction Trilogy—The Leopard’s Spots (1902) and 
The Clansman (1905)—to demonstrate how Dixon constructs a doctrine of American 
citizenship that excludes African Americans while defining the parameters of white 
citizenship against African American suffering.34 A central strategy Dixon uses when 
theorizing citizenship in his novels is to cloak black suffering in white victimhood, 
making African Americans responsible for their own subjugation and for any supposed 
injustices visited upon white Americans. An unintended and ironic consequence is that 
this strategy prevents Dixon from writing African Americans out of both the United 
States and his works because his theory of citizenship fundamentally requires their 
presence to define Anglo Saxon citizenship. Nevertheless, Dixon conflates imperialism 
and Reconstruction to articulate a model of white supremacist American citizenship that 
                                                
33 In Civic Ideals, Rogers Smith argues that the history of American citizenship is also 
the history of racial and gender oppression. He reads the history of American 
citizenship as an interaction of “liberal,” “republican,” and “ascriptive” structuring 
tendencies, especially through the experiences of African Americans, Native 
Americans, and women. According to Smith, his “multiple traditions thesis holds that 
American political actors have always promoted civic ideologies that blend liberal, 
democratic republican, and inegalitarian ascriptive elements in various combinations 
designed to be politically popular” (6). Smith states, “Citizenship laws also literally 
constitute—they create with legal words—a collective civic identity. They proclaim the 
existence of a political ‘people’ and designate who those persons are as a people, in 
ways that often become integral to individuals’ senses of personal identity as well” (31). 
This complex identity of citizenship as both legal construct and personal identity, 
coupled with its history of egalitarian and inegalitarian principles and practices, creates 
a fertile if complicated object for Dixon’s analysis. 
34 The third novel in the trilogy, The Traitor, was published in 1907. 
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rejects the Reconstruction Amendments’ protections for African Americans and 
identifies the Amendments as threatening to white citizenship.35 The roots of those 
anxieties are grounded in a particularly complex history of citizenship and white 
supremacy in the United States, and these historical antecedents and consequences 
inform Dixon’s work. 
 
Revising Reconstruction and Citizenship 
The Fourteenth Amendment and the more forceful Civil Rights Act represent 
perhaps the most revolutionary legal developments in the aftermath of the Civil War.36 
In “To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights,” Robert J. 
Kaczorowski explains the significance of changes in nineteenth-century federalism, 
specifically the fact that after the war Republicans “explained that sovereignty resided 
in the national government and included the primary authority to determine the status 
                                                
35 Through the attempted exclusion of African Americans, Dixon defines a model of 
citizenship in line with what Brook Thomas has identified as a key paradox of 
citizenship in general, that “although citizenship as a concept helps to bring out the 
good in people, it is also defined by exclusions” (“The Clansman’s” 320). Dixon’s 
“ethnic” rather than “civic” citizenship, to borrow Thomas’s designations, represents in 
my project a locus of biopolitics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, specifically 
in terms of how the construct of citizenship attempts to manage racial pluralism in white 
supremacist terms. Dixonian citizenship ultimately reveals the ways white supremacist 
ideology incorporates possibilities for resistance by hijacking discourses of natural 
rights, national belonging, and individual freedom. In the process, however, white 
supremacist ideology creates new opportunities for resistance, which make up the focus 
of my remaining chapters. 
36 A close analysis of the Civil Rights Act is beyond the scope of this chapter. I mention 
it here because Kaczorowski takes it on in his article, and because it correlates with the 
Fourteenth Amendment in terms of the rights enumerated there. A more expansive 
project could take the fascinating history of the Civil Rights Act as another important 
aspect of the genealogy of nineteenth-century citizenship. 
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and secure the rights of all Americans, white as well as black” (47).37 The Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 assumed that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments “gave to all 
Americans the fundamental rights of citizenship and delegated to Congress the authority 
to protect citizens in their enjoyment of these rights” (49). Democrats rejected this 
constitutional theory because of its implication for states’ rights, as they were concerned 
that national law could “supplant” state law (50). As an abiding site of conflict after the 
war, loss of sovereignty was a powerfully influential issue and metaphor for 
Southerners like Dixon. If natural rights are not only available to all, but are understood 
as “constitutionally recognized rights of American citizenship,” they are independent of 
state law (54). They empower the federal government to enforce their protection at 
times in opposition to state government—a prospect that Dixon and other Southern 
Redeemers likened to an imperialistic power grab.  
 These anxieties were not completely unfounded. The Enforcement Acts, passed 
to ensure the Amendments and Civil Rights Act protected African Americans in the 
South, particularly by targeting the actions of the Ku Klux Klan, extended federal 
power in ways reminiscent of Lincoln’s war powers.38 In The Colfax Massacre, which 
                                                
37 According to the Republicans that acted as framers for the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery was the “guarantee of the status and 
rights of citizenship” (48). The Fourteenth Amendment secured those rights through the 
instrument of the federal government. Deak Nabers further contends in Victory of Law 
that there is a “balance” in the Reconstruction Amendments between an appeal to 
“higher law” and positive law. The aim of the Amendments is to “locate higher law 
within the Constitution and to codify and enforce the higher law that already inhabits it” 
(17). Such a motive for the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would, for Dixon, 
represent exactly the kind of moral and political agenda he saw as especially dangerous 
to Anglo Saxon political identity in the American future. 
38 The application of those powers included suspending habeas corpus, a symbol for 
Southerners that the Civil War was an imperialist war that first required the 
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describes the violent insurrection in Louisiana that resisted the Enforcement Act of 
1871, LeeAnna Keith explains that what was known as the “Klan Act empowered the 
president to designate a state of insurrection in territory hostile to the government of the 
United States, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and to impose other elements of 
martial law” (75-6). In a further irony representative of much of the complexity of 
nineteenth-century legal theorizing about race, civil rights, and civil liberties, Keith also 
notes that the Enforcement Acts “took as their model the immense grant of power to 
federal officials in the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, which created special federal tribunals 
to investigate charges against African Americans outside the slave states” (74). Dixon’s 
reappraisal of Reconstruction and its consequences at the turn of the century 
emphasized and exploited these anxieties and their historical roots by welding civil 
rights to civil liberties, as Thomas has argued, and by identifying habeas corpus as a 
theoretical center and particular vulnerability of that tension.39 
If two emblematic pieces of legislation—the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 
1863 and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867—represent to Southerners like Dixon the 
dangers of federal overreach into the realm of nineteenth-century racial politics, an 
                                                                                                                                          
fundamental denial of individual rights. The Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863 
and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 both represent for Democrats like Dixon the gross 
overreach of federal power. In the first case, President Lincoln suspended the privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War to expand executive power. In the 
second, Congress expanded federal jurisdiction for judicial review, in part to assure that 
litigants subject to unfair state laws had recourse to federal review (Foner 277). The 
Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863 was a particular source of Southern ire because 
it allowed President Lincoln to subject suspected Confederate operatives and 
sympathizers to military tribunals, violating their right to due process in service of the 
extraordinary circumstances of the Civil War. In this way, it embodies Dixon’s fears 
regarding federal overreach. 




attempt to legislate against the abiding principles of what he saw as a divinely ordained 
Anglo Saxon state, habeas corpus and the Magna Carta represented the kind of stable 
and lasting concepts of individual freedom upon which the future must be built. Dixon 
memorializes both legal and cultural texts in his narratives as the operative signs of 
white supremacy. Further, the fundamental principle of habeas corpus is a levy to 
protect the Southern individual from the exact sort of federal overreach that granted 
African Americans citizenship, an exhibition of unchecked power that threatens the 
individual rights of Southerners. The symbolic status of habeas corpus as the center of 
individual liberty is a useful sign for white supremacist arguments like Dixon’s, which 
are underwritten by beliefs in white persecution, including at the hands of the federal 
government. As perhaps the most valorized guarantee of citizenship—one’s right to 
one’s own body—habeas corpus also reveals the sovereign subject’s vulnerability to the 
power of the state. In the narrative of the Civil War, Reconstruction represents the 
primary example of such an overreach, and Dixon suggests that unless Southern 
sympathizers are willing to reject the principles codified in legislation like the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act, and lay claim to the civil liberties and 
protections from executive overreach the Magna Carta and the writ of habeas corpus 
embodied, the threat to a white man’s rights will continue.40 Dixon seizes upon habeas 
corpus’s complex and often contradictory history and then valorizes those principles in 
an historical document other than the Declaration of Independence to implement an 
                                                
40 In his defense of Homer Plessy, Albion Tourgee even argued that the first section of 




argument about biologically defined citizenship rights. This strategy reflects the irony 
embodied in the epigraph that began this chapter. 
 
The Ironies of Habeas Corpus 
Rather than embodying the ideological solid ground on which Dixon wishes to 
build a foundation for biopolitical citizenship, however, the history of habeas corpus 
reflects the complex relationship between race and citizenship in the United States. In 
Habeas Corpus in America, Justin Wert notes the use of the writ of habeas corpus “both 
to deprive and protect individual rights” (15). One notable initial use in the postbellum 
period was the protection of fugitive slaves from the newly broadened reach of federal 
power ensconced in the Fugitive Slave Act. In “Thinking About Habeas Corpus,” Erwin 
Chemerinsky analyzes a passage from the Congressional Committee on Reconstruction 
Report that “concluded that former slaves were victims of ‘cruelty, oppression and 
murder, which the local authorities are at no pains to prevent or punish’” (752-3).41 In 
the original debate on the Senate floor in 1863, prior to Lincoln’s suspension of habeas 
corpus in the 1863 Act, Senator John Carlile from Virginia, a Unionist during the war, 
evoked the history of the fugitive slave in his opposition to Lincoln’s plans:42 
                                                
41 Immediately after the Civil War, criminal defendants were constrained in terms of 
how they could appeal to habeas corpus rights, and Chemerinsky notes that “the 
application of habeas corpus was limited to circumstances in which the defendant 
alleged that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction” (754). Toward the end of the 
century, the Supreme Court gradually expanded these limitations, which coincided with 
the deteriorating legal and social conditions for African Americans. 
42 That this particular debate took place during a national insurrection gave the issue the 
“exceptional” context Lincoln needed to justify himself, and it guaranteed the fluidity of 
the concept of habeas corpus and its protections going forward. In a direct message to 
Congress on July 5, 1861, Lincoln justified his suspension of habeas corpus in 
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And can it be that the Congress of the United States will 
deprive the loyal white citizen of those rights and those 
constitutional securities which the members of this 
Congress, or at least the controlling majority of it, has 
contended should be afforded to the fugitive slave, when 
claimed by virtue and authority of a constitutional law by 
his owner? Is the liberty of the white citizen of less value 
than that of the fugitive slave? (Congressional Globe 
1091) 
This is a complex reference that evokes Republican opposition to the Fugitive Slave 
Act, insists upon the ideological power of the Constitution and the rule of law, and ties 
the liberty of the “loyal white citizen” to the experience of soon-to-be former slaves. 
For Carlile, the “virtue and authority” of a constitutional law that enables a slaveowner 
to lay claim to his property serves as the foundation to, ironically, “those rights and 
those securities … afforded to the fugitive slave.” The passage demonstrates the ways 
nineteenth-century notions of the rights of citizenship are complexly tied to the 
experiences of the races and, specifically, in the shadow cast upon that history by the 
fact of slavery and its aftermath. 
 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 also illustrates the ironies created by white 
supremacist citizenship, as the Democrats appealed to that sacred right in response to 
                                                                                                                                          
Maryland by pointing out the exceptional circumstances in which they lived: “as the 
provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the 
framers of the instrument intended that, in every case, the danger should run its course, 
until Congress could be called together…” (10). 
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Governor Holden’s use of the state militia in North Carolina to investigate and put 
down the Klan. Holden declared martial law and refused to honor a writ of habeas 
corpus. Foner explains that the Act, “originally enacted to protect blacks and white 
Unionists,” forced Holden to release the captives and the anti-Klan campaign ended 
(440-1). The legislative elections of 1870 seized on the “furor over habeas corpus,” and 
Democrats “swept to victory” (441). The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, an additional 
measure to root out Klan activity to protect African Americans, also gave Congress the 
ability to suspend habeas corpus as a necessary power. Foner notes that even 
Republicans “were troubled by the provision authorizing the suspension of habeas 
corpus” to a degree that the clause “was subsequently amended so as to lapse the 
following year” (456). In October 1871, President Grant brought the Enforcement Acts 
to bear in South Carolina by proclaiming a “condition of lawlessness” and suspending 
the writ of habeas corpus (457). In each of these cases, Reconstruction and its aims 
were saved through what Albert T. Morgan called “steady, unswerving power from 
without,” and as Foner traces in his book, the issue of federal enforcement and 
overreach continued to be a key issue going forward for the United States and for 
Dixon’s work at the turn of the century (459, italics in original). For Dixon, the 
historical moment of the Spanish American War proved to be the opportunistic event 
that brought nationalistic power to bear on racial identity in ways reminiscent of 
Reconstruction, distilling the complexities of nineteenth-century history into an 
existential conflict about racial identity. 
Critics agree that the Spanish American War motivated Dixon to reappraise 
Reconstruction, providing him with the opportunity to consider the “white man’s 
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burden” abroad in terms of the unique racial scene of the United States. In 
Reconstructing the World, Harilaos Stecopoulos notes that Dixon understood that white 
Southerners “wanted both to claim a part of the nation’s imperial success and to accuse 
the North of colonization—both to revel in Anglo-Saxon triumphalism and to indulge in 
white sectional ressentiment” (26). Jeremy Wells states that Dixon worried “that the 
spirit of white reunion and sectional reconciliation that had exploded at the outset of the 
Spanish-American War might already be passing away” (139). Amy Kaplan’s work on 
this period and its consequences is crucial, and in The Anarchy of Empire in the Making 
of U. S. Culture she explains how the American imperial mission abroad affected racial 
feeling at home. She argues that “[t]he pursuit of imperial desire risked absorbing aliens 
into the domestic sphere, and the resulting racial and cultural intermixing threatened 
ultimately to make the United States internally foreign to itself” (6). For Dixon, 
according to Kaplan, this anxiety targets African Americans as “the medium of 
exchange to pay the cost of national reunion” (124). Through their “expulsion and 
subordination,” African Americans in Dixon’s works ensure national unity around the 
issue of threatened white American identity, either through race war or imperial war. 
Dixon exploits this patriotic fervor as an opportunity to relitigate the Civil War and 
Reconstruction in his novels, but he first prepares for that process in the sermons he 
delivered at the height of the American imperial moment. Less popular to critics than 
Dixon’s novels, these sermons provide the pretext for Dixon’s fantasies about white 




Dixon’s sermons articulate a notion of American citizenship derived from his 
ideas about Anglo Saxonism and white supremacy. In this way, Dixon articulates the 
views common to many Americans at the turn of the century. Though it reached a 
crescendo in the final decades, Anglo Saxonism enjoyed popularity throughout the 
nineteenth century. According to Reginald Horsman’s Race and Manifest Destiny, 
“Anglo Saxon” proved to be an especially imprecise term, particularly in the United 
States. In the early decades of the century, a “new Romantic image of the past was 
beginning to emerge, and the idea of the Anglo-Saxons as adventurous, brave, and 
respectful toward women took its place alongside that of the Anglo-Saxons as 
originators of trial by jury and parliamentary institutions” (30). Both ideas appealed to 
Dixon. Further, Horsman argues that the “acceptance of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ as the 
prevailing type in America” near the end of the nineteenth century was “made easier by 
the continuing confusion over race, language, culture, and nationality” regarding what 
Anglo Saxonism was and who belonged (302).43 Dixon’s sermons are historical indices 
                                                
43 In Shadowing the White Man’s Burden, Gretchen Murphy attributes a “newly felt 
Anglo-Saxonism” to this nationalist moment, which further primed an already receptive 
audience (65). In The Romance of Reunion, Nina Silber observes that a persistent 
discourse of sentimentalism and sympathy for the South present since the end of the 
Civil War proved useful for Dixon. Further, a resurgence of the popularity of Anglo 
Saxonism at the end of the century motivated white Americans, who, in the 1890s, 
“often define their sense of national will, no longer seen as a legalistic entity, as the 
working out of the Anglo-Saxon destiny” (137). Dana Nelson argues in National 
Manhood that utilizing the difference of Others by “recognizing, diagnosing, and 
managing ... ‘difference’ ... promised white men a unifying standpoint for national 
identity.” According to Nelson, “[t]his rationalist model promised men an experience of 
citizenship as fraternity in the abstracted spaces of universalizing authority over others” 
(11). In a moment of resurgence for Anglo Saxonism and an opportunity for national 
expansion and all of the implications it entailed in a society that increasingly saw 
citizenship as a matter of national belonging in racial terms, Dixon’s sermons 
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of the progression of these ideas and are a literary record of how they spread. During 
the Spanish American War and its aftermath, Dixon seized a newly revitalized but 
persistent presence of Anglo Saxon energy and contributed to that history through his 
sermons the he delivered before capacity crowds in New York City. 
Dixon’s sermon “The Battle Cry of Freedom” is indicative of the triumphant 
tone and nationalist ideological content of many of his other sermons, and it expresses 
the importance of biopolitical citizenship to the American imperial mission. Dixon 
imbues this national project with the language of divine destiny and Christian charity 
that echoes the redemption narrative of the post-Reconstruction South. His rhetoric, 
directed eventually at the Civil War and Reconstruction, suggests a divine moment but 
laments a missed opportunity. His justification of American imperialism proceeds from 
his claim to citizenship and his insistence that American citizenship enjoys special 
status. It differs from what a character in The Leopard’s Spots calls “the dish-water of 
modern world citizenship,” which Dixon associates with Europe (445). The imperial 
roots of Dixonian citizenship are important insofar as they define his biopolitical logic 
of exclusion and demonstrate the opportunism of white supremacy. For these reasons, 
my analysis of his sermons focuses on their status as ideological proving grounds for 
Dixon, as he sorts through the vicissitudes of rights and citizenship in order to posit a 
biopolitical citizenship grounded in the law and entitled to the language and guarantees 
of rights at the expense of racial others. 
                                                                                                                                          
articulated a vision for biopolitical citizenship that defined itself against African 
Americans. His language of rights, as well as divine inspiration, claimed legitimacy for 
his white supremacist positions, both ideologically and legally, in language that would 
prove useful for his immensely popular novels. 
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In “The Battle Cry of Freedom,” Dixon lays out the genealogy of a “new 
nation,” which relies upon a particular reading of American history that would have 
resonated with many of his readers. These principles later served as the structuring logic 
for his novels; therefore, his most powerful metaphor is worth quoting in full: 
We are in fact witnessing the birth pangs of a new giant 
nation. The conception of this new nation was 
accomplished at Appomattox, in 1865, when General Lee 
surrendered to General Grant. The South fought for the 
old Constitution. The South’s interpretation of that 
Constitution is now acknowledged to be absolutely 
correct. But we had outgrown the Constitution, and we 
had to write a new one in the blood of heroes. The South 
fought for the principles of State Sovereignty, 
Individualism, Local Government. The North fought for 
the greater, newer principles of Nationality, Solidarity, 
Unity. The South collided with the sweep of the 
Nineteenth Century and was crushed … The new 
Constitution proclaimed in the fall of Lee’s army at 
Appomattox found its first logical act of life in the order 
for our fleet to sail against Spain. We have entered our 
new life. (5) 
This complex, if convoluted, explanation of the Civil War and its aftermath articulates 
the logic of a Dixonian conception of American political identity, a unifying idea in 
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Dixon’s estimation based on a national destiny grounded in white supremacy. This 
national allegory redeems the South, and advocates the policies consistent with “New 
South” principles of national unity and Southern acceptance of a new industrialized 
economic order. Economic success will be defined by the new American imperial 
mission, and new subjects will be incorporated by the inevitable spread of American 
business and culture.44 Dixon’s claim about the “South’s interpretation of [the old] 
                                                
44 Dixon’s view of the American future allows for the incorporation of new foreign 
citizens, but he dismisses any notion that African Americans could or should be 
considered for this inclusion. Such a belief is not unique to Dixon. But the startling 
disparity between Dixon’s ideals of citizenship and his rhetoric is almost comical at 
times. For instance, in “The New Thanksgiving Day,” Dixon lauds “the Anglo-Saxon 
federation” to come, noting that the “great nations who have the same blood, read the 
same Bible, worship the same God and hold the same ideals, henceforth in spirit, will be 
one people, with one divine purpose” (52). Here Dixon exhibits his commitment to 
1890s Anglo Saxonism as national destiny. Silber notes that by the 1890s, this 
particular connection was a popular one for white Americans, as they “define[d] their 
sense of national will, no longer seen as a legalistic entity, as the working out of the 
Anglo-Saxon national destiny.” Further, the “equation of nationalism and international 
greatness with Anglo-Saxonism thus made it difficult to define any non-white group, 
whether Filipino or Mexican or southern black, as anything but ‘foreign’” (137). 
Dixon’s choice to focus his ire almost entirely on African Americans denotes a unique 
obsession with American identity through American history, and it leaves behind his 
previous (relative) racial conservatism when it came to African Americans in the United 
States. The passage also demonstrates the utility of inclusive language, no matter how 
ironic, to Dixon, as his beliefs about national destiny remain entrenched in fantasies 
about retaining a commitment to individual liberty and freedom defined against its 
denial to others. In a most egregious example in his sermon “Destiny of America,” 
Dixon announces, “Personally, I count myself free from the prejudices and hatreds of 
races and nationalities. I recognize as an Anglo-Saxon what I owe to the Latin; I 
recognize my debt to the Chinaman, whose cunningly devised toys bring to my children 
the joys of the Fourth of July and Christmas holidays; to the ‘unspeakable Turk’ I 
concede my obligations for the patterns of my carpets and rugs; and, to the naked 
African, who bears from the interior his treasures of ivory, I likewise acknowledge my 
debt” (76). In Dixon’s version of a cosmopolitan world, all other races exist in support 
60 
 
Constitution ... now acknowledged to be absolutely correct” illustrates the Southern 
Redeemer narrative by critiquing the constitutional interpretation created by the Civil 
Rights Amendments and insisting that the Civil War was justified.45 Dixon tries to 
revise and recover what he sees as the most important moment of nineteenth-century 
history and a logical precursor to the moment of American imperial power he celebrates 
in 1898 in order to inscribe his fantasy about citizenship, the law, and white 
persecution. Dixon recognizes the moment of national pride surrounding the Spanish 
American War as an opportunity to refocus and articulate an ideology of American 
citizenship that would bury the principles of Reconstruction once and for all and usher 
in a new American century of white supremacy rooted in the story of America itself. 
The power of historical events as reference points for ideological work found special 
resonance in Lost Cause narratives such as Dixon’s at the turn of the century. 
According to Blight, former Confederates saw the Civil War as “merely the 
continuation of [the revolution] of 1776.” By tapping into this nationalist revolutionary 
spirit, Southerners like Dixon could further entrench their perceptions of themselves as 
                                                                                                                                          
of the Anglo Saxon, and therefore he can utter these lines without any hesitation 
provoked by irony. 
45 Dixon also participates in the Southern Redeemers’ task of revising the history of the 
Civil War, specifically its causes, by shifting attention toward states’ rights and away 
from slavery. At the same time, these approaches were committed to a white 
supremacist message of Republican “misrule.” As Foner explains, the work of history 
scholars like Burgess, Dunning, and their protégés at Columbia University early in the 
twentieth century rewrote Reconstruction history by casting African Americans as 
“children” that were “utterly incapable of appreciating the freedom that had been thrust 
upon them” (609). 
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national romantic (Anglo Saxon) heroes. It was an ideology that appealed to moderates 
who were intent on putting the tragedy of the war behind them.46  
Central to the message of national healing was an opportunity to solidify racial 
identity. The “new life” of the nation was to be an Anglo Saxon life. Nevertheless, an 
American citizenship defined by blood isolates a central tension of blood identity, and 
socially constructed ideals purportedly based on consensus and legally defined political 
identity. At times Dixon tries to circumvent this problem by appealing to the imperial 
power of Anglo Saxon blood as a way to conflate biology and politics. In “The Anglo-
Saxon Alliance,” Dixon even employs a scriptural allusion commonly associated with 
turn of the century antiracist activists and supporters of monogenesis.47 He claims that 
he and his fellow white citizens across the globe “are of one blood.” He claims that the 
“Anglo-Saxon race has the peculiar power of absorbing into consistent unity all races 
that flow into its life.” So-called “foreign streams” of blood “disappear in the second 
generation and emerge with scarcely a trace of their national origin” (11). 
                                                
46 Blight explains, “By the 1890s, secession had become a sacred act, even to many who 
had opposed it at the moment of truth” (257). 
47 The belief in monogenesis—that the peoples of the world are descended from one 
genetic source—as opposed to polygenesis, which allows for multiple sources of origin 
and therefore underwrites arguments about essential racial difference, became an 
important political identifier for nineteenth-century arguments about race and 
anthropology. For more about monogenesis and polygenesis in the context of scientific 
racism, see Louis Menand’s The Metaphysical Club. The scriptural allusion concerns 
the phrase “of one blood” and refers to Acts 17:26: “And hath made of one blood all 
nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times 
before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation.” 
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In this passage while Dixon evokes the notion of “one blood,” he does so in service to 
the idea of the imperial domination of Anglo Saxon blood itself.48 Regardless of the 
racial origins of its targets, Anglo Saxon blood will inevitably assimilate new 
immigrants. Dixon seems to allow for racial amalgamation and national inclusion 
regarding the Anglo Saxon imperial mission, but African Americans remain his one 
exception, despite the inclusive “we” in the above passage.49 At various times in his 
career, Dixon advocated deportation for African Americans, eventually deciding that if 
African Americans were to coexist with white Americans they would need to defer to 
white southern “expertise” about white Southerners’ national destiny. He saw African 
Americans as “a vanishing quantity in our national life” (114).50 Dixon’s fantasy of an 
Anglo Saxon future relies appropriately on the supposed imperial power of Anglo 
Saxon blood. He articulates an ideological vision in conflict with the politics of the 
nineteenth century and Reconstruction, which Dixon believed too often tried to ignore 
                                                
48 Also of note is Pauline Hopkins’s usage of the trope in her most famous novel, Of 
One Blood. The reference in both Hopkins and Dixon recalls the ubiquity of the theory 
of hypodescence in the nineteenth century, and its attendant assumptions about the 
“imperializing” quality of so-called “black blood.” In a stark reversal of Dixon’s 
triumphant imperialism, this anxiety about black dominance and white race suicide 
through miscegenation find reference through Dixon’s passage, acting as a kind of 
specter behind the surface of Dixon’s proclamations. 
49 What stands out especially is that this is a sexless fantasy of genetic racial 
assimilation, allowing incorporation into the national body without the politically 
problematic issue of race mixing. 
50 Part of this “vanishing” thesis was literal. Victor Thompson explains the “black 
disappearance hypothesis” as well as the blending of racial science and social science in 
the 1890 Census in “The Strange Career of Racial Science, Racial Categories, and 
African American Identity” (142). Additionally, Ralph Luker notes in The Social 
Gospel in Black and White that “Dixon’s logic suggested that the only alternative to 
race war and black extermination was to send all black Americans back to Africa” 
(300). In both cases, Dixon sought black disappearance as the goal to social and 
national harmony for the future. 
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biological identity in favor of socially defined identity embodied in the notion of 
citizenship. For Dixon, despite liberal Northerners’ efforts in their civil rights 
legislation that would bestow citizenship onto benighted others, citizenship is a 
birthright, biologically defined and ordained by God.51  
Dixon’s novels provide a frightening picture of the turn-of-the-century United 
States. The racist ideas Dixon espoused, the gross inaccuracies in his portrayal of 
historical events, and the terrible caricatures of African Americans that he helped 
perpetuate are perhaps even overshadowed by the zeal with which a hungry American 
public consumed these works. For historians and literary scholars, Dixon’s novels are a 
convenient litmus test for thinking about race at the turn of the twentieth century 
because they register the white supremacist ideas characteristic at the “nadir” of race 
relations. Dixon’s overgeneralizations, his hypermasculine characters and his tin ear for 
their development, and his preposterous plot devices suggest an author both committed 
to the political project of his work and intent on expressing the anxiety his audience felt 
through a medium that required dramatic expression. The results were often light on 
literary merit and heavy on dramatic passion and hysteria.52 
                                                
51 In Shadowing the White Man’s Burden, Gretchen Murphy explains that for Dixon, 
liberty becomes a sacred trust to be hoarded by whites, not a light unto the benighted 
world. In her analysis of his sermons, she contends that Dixon’s notion of liberty at the 
heart of the white man’s burden must be protected from the “savagery” of racial others 
(71). 
52 Attempts at managing complex discourses of history, politics, racial identity and 
suspicion result in polarized renderings that eschew nuanced thinking. In fact, critics 
agree that much of Dixon’s thinking seemed to be distinctly “Manichean” (Williams, 
Playing the Race Card, 33). Scott Romine affirms this belief in “Thomas Dixon and the 
Literary Production of Whiteness,” though he notes that Dixon’s novels are more in line 
with the epic or historical romance, as the melodrama—the form many critics ascribe to 
Dixon’s trilogy—depicts radical polarities with an attempt at some sort of reconciliation 
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In Race, Rape and Lynching, Sandra Gunning sees Dixon’s novels as “less a 
register of popular white supremacy’s triumph over African Americans, than an 
expression of a profound anxiety over the maintenance of a stable white identity” (28). 
Susan Gillman expresses a similar position in Blood Talk, but she highlights Dixon’s 
chosen literary form of what she calls the “racial melodrama” and positions his works 
among examples of black literary resistance to his racist ideas. According to Gillman, 
“the melodramatic Manichaeism exposes much of what is unsettling, and unsettled, 
about race relations in the post-Reconstruction period” (20). Yet these anxieties result 
not only from nebulous definitions of racial identity and paranoia about miscegenation 
and black “domination”—though they certainly do register these concerns. They are 
also anxieties grounded in the law. The legal machinations of the nineteenth century 
regarding attempts to litigate a stable notion of racial identity through citizenship and its 
protections underwrite his dramatic renderings of white persecution and black threat, 
and the resulting tension between the promised stability of the law and the lived 
experience of racial uncertainty animates works like The Leopard’s Spots and The 
Clansman. 
In both novels, politics and the “right to life” itself are at issue (The Leopard’s 
Spots 96). Both novels share common anxieties about false imprisonment, unfair trials, 
and the loss of due process associated with a denial of habeas corpus, dramatizations of 
the intrusion of the state that also imposed supposed black rule on the South. Uncertain 
                                                                                                                                          
that Dixon never attempts. For Romine, most important in Dixon’s fiction is an image 
of whiteness constantly under threat and therefore necessarily performed and produced 
as the novel moves forward. Common among scholarship focused on Dixon’s novels is 
the observation that his novels function, on the surface at least, as ideology—vehicles to 
promote his visions of the American future.  
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and shifting notions of race identity, codified in decisions like Plessy and enacted in the 
“one-drop rule,” indicate for Dixon the problematic conditions and the moment of 
urgency into which his work must intervene. While Dixon makes unsurprising 
accusations of black inferiority, criminality, and overall unfitness for citizenship, his 
continued appeals to legal principles represent an attempt to manage contingent issues 
of identity with the supposedly enduring truths of the law, and he conflates Anglo 
Saxon biological identity with American political identity to do so.  
One particularly provocative example occurs near the beginning of The 
Leopard’s Spots. As the novel opens, Dixon’s narrator describes the beginning of 
radical Reconstruction in 1867 when “Thaddeus Stevens passed through Congress his 
famous bill destroying the governments of the Southern states and dividing them into 
military districts, enfranchising the whole Negro race and disfranchising one-fourth of 
the whites,” and Dixon notes, “the spirit of anarchy was in the air” (91, 94).53 Crime 
immediately increases, and the fictional town of Hambright is terrorized by roving 
gangs of black men who are now “backed by a million bayonets” (93).54 The Reverend 
John Durham, making his usual “rounds among the poor,” notices a young African 
American boy who has been abandoned by his drunken and indolent parents. The 
                                                
53 Here Dixon alludes directly to the Reconstruction Acts as symbols of federal 
overreach. 
54 The name of the town certainly refers to Col. Frederick Hambright, a hero of the 
Revolutionary War and the Battle of King’s Mountain and an ancestor of Thomas 
Dixon on his mother’s side. A particular record of this genealogy is found in Register of 
the Empire State Society of the Sons of the American Revolution (1899). The reference 
to “bayonets” as a metonymy for Reconstruction is an enduring symbol. Blight cites this 
language in an 1870 editorial from the Louisville Courier-Journal that is “taking stock 
of the decade of the 1860s.” According to Blight, “The suffering South, [the editor] 
said, was ruled by bayonets and ‘obnoxious constitutional amendments’” (106). 
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Freedmen's Bureau, a central target of Dixon’s anger in this and other works, orders that 
the boy be given to his mother and her sister so that they can care for him. The 
following day the child disappears, and a search reveals “the charred bones … found in 
an old ash-heap in the woods” (93). The mother committed the murder “in a drunken 
orgy with dissolute companions” (93). While this terrifying scene illustrates Dixon’s 
beliefs about black criminality and dissolution without the “civilizing” influence of 
slavery, it also traffics in the imagery of lynching through the burning of the black 
body. Here, the “lynching” is committed by black citizens of Hambright, despite the 
attempts of the white Reverend and his search party to save the child. The spectacle of 
this tragedy reveals Dixon’s central justification for the denial of black rights. 
According to Dixon, African Americans are undeserving of the rights of citizenship 
because they are incapable of embracing the responsibilities of citizenship. Ironically, 
the right to due process enshrined in the concept of habeas corpus and denied by Dixon 
to African Americans is embodied in the imagery of lynching in this scene, which is the 
ultimate act of annihilation of the Fourteenth Amendment as its victims are executed 
without facing trial by their peers. 
On the one hand, this scene embodies a simplistic argument about citizenship 
that dehumanizes African Americans. On the other, Dixon’s choice to stage a lynching 
with African Americans as perpetrators and victim implicates African Americans as 
responsible for their own destruction and makes them complicit in white suffering. As 
witnesses to this tragedy, Reverend Durham and Dixon’s white readers are made to feel 
the fear of the “impending disaster” of federal rule in the South. According to the 
narrator, after the body was found the “thoughtful and serious” white citizens spent the 
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day in fasting and prayer for their deliverance, and it as “a memorable day in the history 
of the people.” The churches were filled with “white-faced women and sorrowful men” 
(94). Dixon hijacks the language of lynching and racist violence and uses it to establish 
a unified white community suffering directly as a consequence of black freedom, as he 
claims the violence only occurs because the African American citizens are not capable 
of the responsibilities of freedom. In highlighting and then co-opting black suffering as 
evidence of black inferiority and white vulnerability, and therefore the threat of the 
black menace, Dixon articulates his strategy for all his novels, which grounds a fantasy 
of Anglo Saxon citizenship in a discourse of rights and liberties. 
In The Clansman, habeas corpus, including its suspension during the Civil War 
and the threat of its subsequent suspension during Reconstruction, signifies what is at 
stake in the battle for hearts and minds concerning race relations in the United States at 
the turn of the century. As in The Leopard’s Spots, Dixon imagines the threat to white 
male citizenship supposedly created by black empowerment through the foundational 
requirement of liberty for the individual versus the state, the right to due process as 
signified by one’s own literal body. The political rights of fair trial and freedom from 
state harassment are the central tenets of Dixon’s Anglo Saxon political identity. And, 
to Dixon, the history of the nineteenth century indicates that it is constantly under 
threat. Because habeas corpus appeals were used as the basis to expand federal power in 
service to African Americans, the continued presence of African Americans represents 
the risk of a return to that state of affairs. African Americans and Anglo Saxons 
represent two poles in an existential battle for survival, and it becomes Dixon’s central 
obsession and the way he understands citizenship and its stakes. In both the lynching 
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episode from The Leopard’s Spots and in repeated appeals to basic liberties for white 
citizens in The Clansman, Dixon positions two historical texts at the center of his 
narratives—the Fourteenth Amendment and the Magna Carta—in order to deny the 
notion that the protections of American citizenship belong to black Americans as well 
as white. If the Fourteenth Amendment is an example of federal intrusion and the 
attempt to subvert the natural fact of biological citizenship through the imposition of 
legal constructs like equal citizenship and protection, the Magna Carta represents 
enshrined Anglo Saxon identity that endures through history. As a distillation of the 
Anglo Saxon ideology laid out in his sermons, Dixon’s strategy in his novels exploits 
emotional and legal uncertainty to attempt to solidify biopolitical citizenship as a 
historical fact. 
In The Clansman, Dixon articulates the threat to (white) American citizenship 
through the mouthpiece of Lincoln himself, a clear allusion to Lincoln’s problematic 
history regarding civil liberties. The reference also proves useful as a way for Dixon to 
authorize his view of white civil liberties under threat. The President states that there “is 
no room for two distinct races of white men in America, much less for two distinct 
races of whites and blacks.” He argues that the United States “can have no inferior 
servile class, peon or peasant” and therefore “must assimilate or expel” African 
Americans. The President says, “The American is a citizen king or nothing. I can 
conceive of no greater calamity than the assimilation of the Negro into our social and 
political life as our equal. A mulatto citizenship would be too dear a price to pay even 
for emancipation” (46). Dixon’s Lincoln makes white American citizenship dependent 
on the denial of black American citizenship, and he embodies Dixon’s fears of racial 
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mixing in the construct of the citizen. This is perhaps the most powerful ultimatum 
possible, as the President of the United States expresses a desire for a racially defined 
citizenship that Dixon sees as shared by all Anglo Saxon citizens. In this scenario, 
freedom for African Americans means a “mulatto citizenship,” an obvious reference to 
the supposed threat embodied by African American men to the innocence of white 
womanhood and, by extension, to the purity of the white race. Further, Dixon’s Lincoln 
insists on the embodied sovereignty of each American citizen—the “citizen king”—who 
can only exist through the denial of the other. Returning to Agamben’s ideas, Dixon’s 
citizenship defines itself as sovereign and free through an act of denial. In a reversal of 
his previous insistence on the imperialistic quality of Anglo Saxon blood, able to absorb 
and assimilate other races, Dixon chooses in this instance to emphasize the relationship 
between the “two distinct races” in America. National citizenship requires national 
unity, which can only be expressed for Dixon through biological identity. Dixon’s 
reversal illustrates the logical inconsistency of securing racial identity along uncertain 
lines, but it also reveals that even in his attempted denial of black existence to cement 
white identity, Dixon requires the threat of black agency. And that threat in part exists, 
ironically, because of the risk, and not only security, that citizenship imposes on the 
body of the subject. Threat and danger are for Dixonian citizenship as important as 
idealized security, as the mark of citizenship is not only the power to include the similar 
but the power to exclude the other. 
Lincoln’s words in The Clansman have a metaphorical and instructive quality, 
as Dixon constructs them nearly a half century after their fictional context, and they 
continue to warn Dixon’s audience of the dangers to citizenship of a racially plural 
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society. Further, in Dixon’s fantasy of citizenship, these dangers are not merely 
theoretical. Because they bridge the apparent divide between biological (racial) identity 
and civil rights and liberties, the threats to white Americans that African Americans and 
their supporters posed represent nothing short of an existential and legal crisis. Dixon’s 
Lincoln makes clear that even nineteenth-century anxieties about social equality 
following from the bestowal of political rights do not apply, as the disaster that results 
from Reconstruction is not merely a threat to white political rights or white racial 
identity. Social and political anxieties are intertwined, and the Republican mistake was 
to believe they could be undone and differentiated. Only by convincing his audience of 
the particular character of this threat can Dixon face down the enemy while shoring up 
white identity for the future. 
A few key scenes in The Clansman reveal these dangers and Dixon’s claim to 
white victimhood and find further resonance given the history of habeas corpus and the 
rights of citizenship. The most dramatic scene takes place when Dr. Cameron, Ben’s 
and Margaret’s father and a representative of the Old South, is arrested.55 A gang of 
henchmen, former slaves now endowed with the political rights of citizens and the 
power to make arrests, has entered Dr. Cameron’s office, and when they begin to put 
iron shackles on him, he exhorts them to consider his rights and liberties: “‘I appeal to 
the Magna Charta [sic] rights of every man who speaks the English tongue—no man 
shall be arrested or imprisoned or deprived of his own household, or of his liberties, 
                                                
55 Dixon usually employs at least one older character to represent the generational 
divide between antebellum and postbellum politics. This is designed to signify the 
change in the South from an agrarian to an industrial economy, a change that Dixon 
welcomes, while still retaining the romantic attachments to the aristocracy of the old 




unless by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land!’” (230).56 Cameron 
actually makes two appeals here, an explicit appeal to the Magna Carta and an implicit 
appeal to habeas corpus by claiming his unlawful detention. Given the nineteenth-
century history of Anglo Saxonism rehearsed here, Dixon’s allusions attempt to confirm 
white citizenship’s special status as uniquely representative of democratic principles as 
well as to ground American citizenship in that specific racial identity. His references to 
the Magna Carta and habeas corpus also implicitly work to undermine Reconstruction 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, as Dixon’s fantasy of Anglo Saxon citizenship 
responds to the Reconstruction-era assertion of federal power. By doing so, Dixon can 
claim both white supremacy and victimhood and attempt to ground both in the security 
of law. 
Dixon’s direct citation of the Magna Carta deserves more attention given the 
context of his ideological work on citizenship that privileges the principles of habeas 
corpus and the individual liberties guaranteed by that foundational document. In 
“Slavery and the Magna Carta in the Development of Anglo-American 
Constitutionalism,” Justin Buckley Dyer examines the relationship between the Magna 
Carta and habeas corpus in the context of American slavery. The Magna Carta 
represents the limitation of executive power in the interest of individual liberty, and 
habeas corpus enshrines this principle, allowing an individual through the writ of 
habeas corpus the chance to “challenge the grounds of his detention or molestation” 
                                                
56 In other words, these men are now empowered to manage the rights of white men. It 
is the nightmare scenario for Dixon. They can acknowledge his rights to habeas corpus 
and due process, or they can enslave him the way he had formerly enslaved them. It is 
white ressentiment brought to life. 
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(479). In this scene, Dr. Cameron quotes Article 39 of the Magna Carta directly. Article 
39 reads:  
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of 
his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived 
of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed with force 
against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful 
judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.57  
The African American henchmen and their white Republican enablers represent for 
Dixon an illegitimate exertion of power that challenges the document at the root of 
American democracy. It is notably not the Constitution. Cameron’s individual liberties 
are enshrined, he claims, in the Magna Carta, and he elects to appeal to that document 
rather than the Constitution. For Dixon, the Constitution as revised by Reconstruction 
no longer has legitimacy, and his character is forced to circumvent that document to 
retain any hope of securing his rights. Further, the iron shackles, representative of the 
slave regime, are now being put on Cameron by the very men he formerly enslaved. For 
Dixon, Reconstruction represents the enslavement of white men. And Dr. Cameron 
appeals to the supposed universal applicability of the most famous political document 
while retaining a belief that African Americans should not enjoy the same rights. 
Cameron’s appeal to “every man who speaks the English tongue” signals such 
an Anglo Saxon political history. Returning briefly to Reginald Horsman’s Race and 
Manifest Destiny, nineteenth-century white supremacists advocated a version of 
European history popularized by seventeenth-century British historians resistant to the 
                                                




English monarchy. According to Horsman, in their version of history, the Anglo 
Saxons, prior to their corruption by the Norman invasion, enjoyed a society devoted to 
the principles of individual liberty and good, efficient government. This unique talent 
for political success comprised a narrative of Anglo Saxonism that appealed to 
nineteenth-century Americans tasked with the justification for westward expansion and 
slavery.58 As Dixon says in his sermon “The Battle Cry of Freedom,” “God has 
endowed the Anglo-Saxon with the supreme genius for self-government” (5). If Anglo 
Saxons possessed a unique gift and talent for fairness and political equality, nineteenth-
century race “science” could fill the gaps created by the existence of African Americans 
and Native Americans in terms of their individual rights. The distinct race of Anglo 
Saxons reserved their rights of citizenship and individual liberty as their own, and 
deficient races, those behind on the scale of racial progress, need not apply.59 
                                                
58 Cameron’s later appeal for the greatness of the white nation sounds like it could have 
been lifted directly from one of Horsman’s examples: “‘This Republic is great, not by 
reason of the amount of dirt we possess, the size of our census roll, or our voting 
register—we are great because of the genius of the race of pioneer white freemen who 
settled this continent, dared the might of kings, and made a wilderness the home of 
Freedom. Our future depends on the purity of this racial stock. The grant of the ballot to 
these millions of semi-savages and the riot of debauchery which has followed are 
crimes against human progress’” (291). 
59 According to Cathy Boeckmann, Dixon figured his rationale for white supremacy 
through popular notions of social Darwinism, though he rejected the notion of 
deterministic natural selection without the benefit of Anglo Saxon will. Boeckmann 
states, “According to Dixon, survival of the fittest is only possible with human 
participation in the selection process. In this sense, man makes himself ‘fit’ and thereby 
creates himself and his race through self-guided evolution” (75). Such an insistence on 
human intervention through the force of what Boeckmann describes as racially defined 




Additionally, Dr. Cameron appeals to habeas corpus, locating it at the heart of 
individual liberty as codified by the sacrosanct Magna Carta. For Cameron and Dixon, 
the Magna Carta is a distinctly Anglo Saxon document, and by shrouding this appeal in 
the imagery of both slavery—as represented by the shackles—and Reconstruction, 
Dixon enshrines white dependence on black suffering within the sacred texts of 
republicanism. Doing so takes a legal claim and conflates it with the biological 
assumptions of Anglo Saxonism. This scene represents Dixon’s recognition that the 
nineteenth-century discourse on rights as reflected in its legal history often found 
meaning through issues of race. Legal arguments about rights and constitutional 
interpretation frequently turned on issues of African American personhood and 
citizenship. Racial discourses raise fundamental questions about political identity and 
individual liberty and illustrate the flexibility of legal arguments in this context. Dixon 
exploits this fact by making fundamental questions about racism—the denial of the 
franchise to African Americans, the denial of citizenship in Dred Scott v. Sanford, the 
limitation of rights enumerated in Slaughterhouse and Cruikshank, the denial of the 
privileges of citizenship in Plessy v. Ferguson—into questions about white rights. 
Mirroring this legal history, Dixon’s texts pose legal questions in terms of race and 
animate the relationship between black and white in his works, as the more African 
American rights seem to be the subject of reform, the more white characters shriek 
about their own persecution. 
If it is true that Dixon’s work “said in a total way what his audience had been 
thinking in fragments,” as Joel Williamson writes, then Dixon’s work and its reception 
should have very specific things to tell us about race in America, especially for Dixon’s 
75 
 
assumed white audience (141). At risk of considering white supremacist thought as an 
aberration disconnected from the idea of American citizenship, careful attention must be 
paid to both the parallels between popularized racist assumptions about citizenship and 
the ways white supremacy rejected or reified the construct of citizenship.60 As Dixon’s 
popular work demonstrates, white supremacist thought is endemic to a broader white 
American population via the visible contradictions of habeas corpus in liberal 
democracies, but as particularly illuminated in relation to the history of slavery in the 
United States, which in and of itself contradicts the founding ideals of liberal 
democracy. Additionally, the legal history of the nineteenth century and the ways it 
influenced discourses of rights explains Dixon’s interest in citizenship and his 
interpretation of the turn-of-the-century moment as consonant with the struggles of 
racial politics after the Civil War.  
The broader theoretical implications of Dixon’s biopolitical model of white 
supremacist citizenship illustrate his influence on racist thinking at the turn of the 
century, as well as his ability to focus various strands of racial thinking into a coherent 
whole backed by popular discourses of the nineteenth century. His focus on the 
                                                
60 That this reception also included concerned black readers is too often ignored by 
those analyzing Dixon’s cultural impact, and the responses of African American 
writers, either specifically to Thomas Dixon or more broadly to his persistent and 
popular ideas, comprises my focus in the remaining chapters. As one example of a 
direct contemporary response to Dixon’s work, Kelly Miller, the African American 
sociologist and intellectual, responded multiple times in print. His most notable 
response is his “Open Letter to Thomas Dixon,” published in 1905. In this document, 
Miller responds directly to Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots, as well as to an article Dixon 
had written that year for the Saturday Evening Post. I should also take this moment to 
point out that these responses foment in a period of dynamic African American activism 
and resistance to every attempt at proscribing African American rights. See R. Volney 




importance of citizenship as an intersection of political and biological life invites direct, 
resistant responses. Discourses on citizenship at the turn of the twentieth century 
indicate the importance of race—a biopolitical construct that orders societies and serves 
as justification for social conflict—to the construction of the ostensibly free citizen. 
Dixon’s fantasy of an Anglo Saxon American citizenship free from the adulteration of 
blackness contributes to assumptions about black pathology, which structures much 
racist belief about African Americans, by opposing white worthiness for freedom 
through citizenship to black criminality and incapacity. African American responses to 
these assumptions both precede and follow Dixon, and by seizing on the foundational 
white supremacist beliefs about black pathology that are embodied in beliefs about 
hierarchical races and biological citizenship, these authors provide convincing resistant 
responses. 
The African American authors I analyze in the following chapters respond 
directly to Dixon’s fantasies of white supremacist citizenship and white victimization in 
important and consistent ways. They seize on the conventions of white supremacy that 
naturalize its contours and the extent of its reach and target black people of pathological 
examples of racial inferiority. They note the opportunism of white supremacist ideology 
that takes advantage of the historical moment of the “nadir” and the danger it creates for 
African Americans through technologies of violence including lynching, and they bring 
to the surface those instances of discursive as well as physical violence against African 
Americans to illustrate the ways pervasive white supremacist discourse enables and 
emboldens violence. These authors often express ambivalence about appropriate 
political responses in such a world, and the remainder of my project examines the ways 
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that literature serves as a vehicle for targeting and subverting white supremacist 




The “heart of the home life”: Critical Histories and Black Pathology in Pauline 
Hopkins’s Contending Forces 
In an important scene from Pauline Hopkins’s 1900 novel Contending Forces, 
Will Smith, the ostensible hero, responds to a range of political speeches at a meeting of 
the “Colored American League” after a brutal lynching. He reminds his audience of the 
danger African Americans faced at the turn of the century. He proclaims,  
“Lynching was instituted to crush the manhood of the 
enfranchised black. Rape is the crime which appeals most 
strongly to the heart of the home life. Merciful God! Irony 
of ironies! The men who created the mulatto race, who 
recruit its ranks year after year by the very means which 
they invoked lynch law to suppress, bewailing the sorrows 
of violated womanhood!” (270-1, italics in original).  
Smith’s thoughts embody Hopkins’s central concern in the novel: the sources of racist 
violence and the consequences for its African American victims. Smith articulates the 
logic of lynching and white supremacy in the clearest possible terms. While white 
supremacists justified lynching by alleging sexual violence, in fact they used it as a 
technology to intimidate and terrorize African Americans. Lynching was a technology 
of power, moreover, explicitly expressed in gendered terms and focused on the potential 
threats of African American “manhood”: economic success, interracial relationships, 
and any perceived form of social equality.  African American men are victims, but, as 
Will Smith explains, the targets of white violence also include African American 
women, and their “violated womanhood” destroys families and perpetuates a social ill. 
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In that regard lynching, like white supremacy, targets the home life as the nexus of 
moral and political ideology. Moreover, the relationship between lynching and rape that 
Smith describes represents the largely occluded history of its victims. 
Hopkins uses the domestic novel to explore how white supremacist thought 
targets the “home life” in a racist discourse of black pathology. As another instance of 
the opportunism and adaptability I describe in my analysis of Thomas Dixon, white 
supremacist ideology focuses in the late nineteenth century on the character and 
domestic lives of African Americans to sustain racial hierarchy. Hopkins responds by 
challenging increasingly naturalized assumptions of white supremacist thought, 
identifying its historical adaptability, and putting Sappho Clark, a “fallen woman” and 
victim of white supremacist violence, at the forefront of her novel. Francesca Sawaya 
explains that Sappho “is the book’s heroine because she decides to insist upon her 
history despite the powerfully silencing and ahistorical myths of nationalism” that 
pervade turn-of-the-century political culture (53). I argue in this chapter that white 
supremacist myths of racial identity as evident in a discourse of black pathology serve 
as a focus for Hopkins’s resistant response precisely because they attempt to occlude 
history. Hopkins systematically rejects assumptions of black pathology that enable 
racist violence, and she challenges political discourses that fail to acknowledge the 
individual suffering of African American women.61 
                                                
61 I use “black pathology” to mean a focused site of white supremacist discourse that 
channels belief about supposed black racial identity and weakness through stereotypes 
about sexual lasciviousness and violence, dissipation and susceptibility to disease, and 
consequent racial “degeneration.” These threats to the “white race” are supposedly 
innate aspects of black physiology and identity, and are therefore pathologized. A 
notable contemporaneous historical example of this sort of thinking can be found in 
Frederick Hoffman’s Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro, which I 
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In Contending Forces, Hopkins analyzes the discourse of black pathology 
specifically focused on black women. Hopkins scrutinizes various political discourses, 
both supremacist and resistant, that fail to explain Sappho’s presence in the text. And as 
Sappho navigates her way through the political cultures and social circles of turn-of-the-
century Boston, her personal identity and her relationship to history evolve. As a kind of 
bildungsroman of political identity for Sappho, Contending Forces depicts Sappho as 
she changes her relation to the fixed identities of prefabricated political positions and 
ideologies and comes to a nuanced understanding of why history matters. 
In Hopkins’s novel, inheritance signifies white supremacist assumptions about 
white racial superiority and the perpetuation of racist power as well as an opportunity 
for a counter-discourse that challenges those assumptions. Specifically, Hopkins offers 
a counter-politicization of the family as a site of resistance that is not constrained by 
white supremacist domestic economies, and she uses inheritance to challenge these 
assumptions by insisting on self-selected affiliations outside the white supremacist 
system of inheritance. Additionally, Hopkins challenges the reductive nature of 
conventional political categories like progressive, accommodationist, radical, and 
supremacist by privileging Sappho’s voice and insisting upon the importance of history 
over the ahistoricism and abstraction in which staid political discourses thrive. In 
particular, provocative and supposedly politically representative characters like Mrs. 
Willis and the speakers at the Colored American League allow Hopkins to explore the 
ways that political ideologies are blind to the needs of individuals. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
discussed in the Introduction to this project, and I return to an analysis of this discourse 
in subsequent chapters. 
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Black Pathology and Turn-of-the-Century Domestic Fiction 
In Contending Forces white supremacy claims black pathology as the putative 
center of black inferiority, and in this way the novel reflects its historical context. 
Similar to how white supremacist thought exploited turn-of-the-century nationalism to 
revise Reconstruction and its influence on citizenship, as I discussed in my analysis of 
Thomas Dixon, domestic politics at the turn of the century allowed white supremacists 
opportunities to target black families and further a discourse of racial inferiority. In each 
instance, white supremacist thought inscribes identity in racial terms on open signifiers 
like “citizen” and “family” and thus entrenches white supremacist assumptions. In To 
Wake the Nations, Eric Sundquist explains turn-of-the-century race discourse in terms 
of fears of black pathology, arguing that the black family, “a nebulous, overly 
politicized concept,” was proclaimed by both academic and popular sociology to be 
“inherently and environmentally corrupt.” The “failure” of the black family became “a 
sign of racial degradation,” and this perception still persists. According to Sundquist, 
assumptions about the consequences of slavery, “the archetype of the black rapist,” the 
supposed licentiousness of black women, “and the charge that black families were 
‘naturally’ at home in squalor and filth were all common pronouncements in the post-
Reconstruction interpretation of so-called black family pathology” (394). Sundquist 
identifies this depiction of the black family as a product of white supremacist anxiety 
about racial boundaries, and he characterizes the family as a central site on which white 
supremacists projected fears about changing national demographics and economic 
challenge. Within the overdetermined signifier of the black family, Sundquist observes 
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the collision of racial discourses of whiteness, black criminality, slavery, and the 
supposed immorality of African Americans, especially women.  
 Domestic fiction presented one avenue for black-authored resistance to white 
supremacists’ account of the pathological black family, and critics observe that African 
American female authors rejected such accounts and the assumptions that undergirded 
them that specifically targeted women. For instance, in Domestic Allegories of Political 
Desire, Claudia Tate argues that post-Reconstruction texts by African American women 
“offered the recently emancipated an occasion for exercising political self-definition in 
fiction at a time when the civil rights of African Americans were constitutionally 
sanctioned but socially prohibited” (7). These responses took the form of sentimental 
and domestic novels of the period, but they also strained at those conventions by 
drawing attention to the political implications of the “Cult of True Womanhood” for 
black women. Hazel Carby identifies the ways True Womanhood, both in lived reality 
and in African American authored fiction, interpolated African American women 
according to their perceived differences from white women. African American women 
authors reckoned with representations of black women as property and as victims in 
mid nineteenth-century texts but their exclusion from the class of “women” (38). Later 
in the century, African American women authors would respond to attacks on black 
women’s morality. 
Carby argues that, because the ideological work of the Cult of True Womanhood 
involves “resolv[ing] contradictions” and attempting to “bring coherence and order to 
the contradictory material circumstances of the lives of women,” careful readers must 
recognize “the dialectical relationship with the alternative sexual code associated with 
83 
 
the black woman” (24, 30). While this sexual code assigned African American women 
no agency over their bodies, and despite their actual exclusion from the Cult of True 
Womanhood, African American women’s sexuality—monolithic and based on racist 
stereotyping—was used to define its boundaries (30). Carby illustrates how this history 
of representation relies on the codependence of white and black experiences of the 
domestic, and she charts the codification of white supremacy from slavery to Jim Crow. 
According to Carby, “Ideologies of white womanhood coalesced and became more rigid 
at the same historical moment that the miscegenation laws were extended, laws which, 
in practice, were primarily directed towards relationships between black men and white 
women” (30). In other words, ideologies like those essential to nineteenth-century 
domestic fiction regarding white women had at their core an anxiety about black 
women’s sexuality. They were ideologies of black pathology. 
Patricia Hill Collins traces nineteenth-century power dynamics that provide 
particular opportunities for resistance, and her analysis both parallels and extends 
Carby’s analysis in important ways. In Black Feminist Thought, Collins explains the 
centrality of the family in white supremacist discourse of the period. She examines the 
fundamental features of racism focused on black pathology in the nineteenth century 
and how they migrate from biological to  “cultural” spheres and are frequently figured 
through the image of the African American family. Collins shows how the history of 
black female resistance locates the family as a central site of power in response to white 
supremacist oppression that isolates black female sexuality. She focuses on resistance 
grounded in cultural values that reject white supremacist bourgeois assumptions 
because the domestic conventions of the Cult of True Womanhood define them. What 
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Collins calls “Black female spheres of influence,” including but not limited to domestic 
economies, “constitute political sanctuaries where individual Black women and men are 
nurtured in order to confront oppressive social institutions.” According to Collins, 
“Power from this perspective is a creative power used for the good of the community, 
whether that community is conceptualized as one’s family, church community, or the 
next generation of the community’s children” (223). She calls this female-authored 
power an alternative to power-as-domination, and she asserts that it is “based on a 
humanist vision of self-actualization, self-definition, and self-determination” (224). By 
prioritizing power-as-resistance in the context of domestic economies of black cultural 
values, Collins challenges assumptions about black pathology directly by reclaiming 
authorship of the black family. Collins’s “humanist vision” encompasses Hopkins’s 
attempts to transcend political divisions in Contending Forces and ascribe particular 
community values to the family. For Hopkins, the family is not a static structure for 
encapsulating moral values. It is a dynamic political unit meant to enact and perpetuate 
political values, and it often works against the premise that the family must be defined 
biologically. Furthermore, the family as political unit stands in stark contrast to the 
predetermined political ideologies that Sappho encounters throughout the novel. 
 Both Collins and Hopkins recognize that assumptions about the pathologized 
black family lead to racial violence. Consequently, they contextualize its nineteenth-
century history to counter white supremacist attempts to erase or ignore this history. 
Collins sees sexual violence particularly as a logical and inevitable consequence of 
nineteenth-century biological racism and gender inequality, when “the animalistic icon 
of Black female sexuality [is] joined by the appearance of a racist biology incorporating 
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the concept of degeneracy” (171). Parallel cultural images of black male violence 
contribute to the emergence of lynching as politicized sexual violence against black 
men and women, “with the myth of the Black rapist as its ideological justification” 
(177). According to Collins, resistance in this context requires intervention upon the 
“controlling images” that create and justify these conditions of black pathology (71). By 
placing Sappho’s story at the center of the novel, Hopkins ensures that the subject of the 
novel is an illustration of the destructive effects of white racial obsession, an insidious 
pathology itself. This white pathology projects onto African Americans the 
responsibility for the continuing violence of racism, no matter how incoherent that logic 
is. For Hopkins, the operative question is how white supremacy can claim moral 
superiority despite its need to manipulate the facts of history to serve its ends, not 
whether African Americans can or have assimilated bourgeois cultural values. 
 
Contending Forces and Hopkins’s Critical Histories 
Hopkins’s nuanced portrayal of Sappho and her attention to the relationship 
between sexual violence and lynching, as well as to the conventions of the domestic 
novel, have prompted varied critical responses to her work. Early critics like Robert 
Bone emphasized the political nature of Hopkins’s novels, and, in the process, 
committed to reductive assessments of her work and her politics. In The Negro Novel in 
America, Bone describes black-authored responses to stereotypes as “characteristically 
ambivalent.” According to Bone, early African American authors, including Hopkins, 
“simultaneously accommodated to the stereotype” embodied by minstrel-like 
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exaggerated depictions of African Americans in popular literature and culture 
“(assimilationism) and attempted to refute it (Negro nationalism)” (26). 
More recent responses recognize Hopkins’s radical potential and reject such 
politically reductive readings. Elizabeth Ammons cites the “diversity of Hopkins’s 
literary production,” noting that “in particular the volatile, unstable, long fiction that she 
wrote as a consciously political, marginalized, experimental author stand as crucially 
important paradigms” (“Afterword” 214). Kristina Brooks echoes Ammons on the 
resistant potential of Hopkins but observes that Hopkins’s radical identification of the 
constructed nature of racial borders “is a strategy that, nearly one hundred years later, 
ironically leaves her open to charges of elitism and accommodation” (“Mammies” 124-
5). Nellie McKay warns that some modern readers might label Hopkins’s mission to 
illustrate African American literary merit while editor of Colored American Magazine 
as “emblematic of the effects of racism and white paternalism,” but McKay insists that 
Hopkins “employed [her editorial position] subversively by grounding the literature 
[published in Colored American Magazine] in a radical black nationalism that promoted 
the superiority of people of African descent” (“Introduction” 5).62 These more recent 
critics illustrate the complexity of Hopkins’s work and the centrality of political 
discourse itself as a subject of her fiction while also justifying the need for analysis that 
further illuminates her examination of politics. 
Historically focused critics like Sundquist, Carby, and Tate attempt 
nonreductive readings, but they neglect to explore in detail the ways Hopkins renders 
                                                
62 Thomas Cassidy argues that Hopkins develops a frequently “self-contradictory” 
narrator in her fictional works to construct a double-voiced position that can reach black 
and white audiences (661). 
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political agency as nonstatic. Hopkins focuses her novel on Sappho’s story in part to 
illustrate a specific danger in occluding the past, which is dangerous in part because it is 
a strategy of white supremacist thought. And Sappho’s journey to political agency and 
empowerment succeeds only insofar as she is able to reckon with and ultimately lay 
claim to her past. My argument extends the historically focused work of these critics by 
addressing Sappho’s central role in the novel and the way her journey to political 
understanding challenges principles of white supremacist thought, most notably its 
desire to erase history in order to perpetuate white power structures. Hopkins rewrites 
inheritance as a sign resistant to white supremacy that extends beyond a biological 
definition to encompass a created community.63 Hopkins’s affiliative politics links her 
concern with history to her efforts to move Sappho toward political agency and 
responds directly to white supremacist assumptions about black pathology. 
By first calling attention to the ways history informs a critical worldview, 
Hopkins demonstrates in Contending Forces that those opposed to white supremacy can 
avoid reductive political categories or ideologies only if they recognize the ways the 
past informs the present.64 Because white supremacy operates in part by refusing to 
                                                
63 In “‘So Strangely Interwoven’: The Property of Inheritance, Race, and Sexual 
Morality in Pauline E. Hopkins’s Contending Forces,” Julie Cary Nerad analyzes 
Hopkins’s use of inheritance to problematize racial and sexual discourses through the 
sign of property. Similarly, I claim that inheritance in the novel ecompasses multiple 
significations, including racial identity and character, because Hopkins seeks to 
challenge pervading discourses of race and gender. I focus specifically on how Hopkins 
challenges white supremacist discourses regarding black pathology and rejects 
simplistic political categories. Nerad’s essay explores whiteness as a heritable property 
in ways that extend Hopkins’s work beyond the limits of the Washington-DuBois 
debate, which benefits my analysis as well (361). 
64 In Blood Talk: American Race Melodrama and the Culture of the Occult, Susan 
Gillman notes the centrality of history as a site for Hopkins’s inquiry and as a generic 
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acknowledge responsibility for the past, or for the fact that the past creates conditions of 
structural racism that persist in the present, history in Contending Forces is a political 
tool. In particular, Sappho’s past and the larger history of white supremacist violence 
against black women haunts the novel as an example of what cannot be spoken: the fact 
of white supremacist sexual violence in a society that frantically polices racial borders 
and obsesses over miscegenation, refusing to speak of sexuality generally and claiming 
the moral high ground in a hierarchy of racial difference. Sappho’s initial inability to 
find a political voice for her suffering represents Hopkins’s desire to draw attention to 
these silenced experiences and put further pressure on political ideology that avoids 
reckoning with this past.65 To draw attention to this fact, Hopkins employs a double 
structure in Contending Forces that makes the present inseparable from the past, and as 
a result, romanticized notions of racial progress and political abstraction cannot survive 
the real scrutiny of history. 
As a result, Contending Forces reflects the complex way race discourse 
structures lived experience through a plot that absorbs the key political issues of the day 
while refusing the useful fiction of social progress and reconciliation, insisting instead 
that the turn of the century showed little progress regarding racism and white 
                                                                                                                                          
convention for turn-of-the-century race novels. She explains that many “post-
Reconstruction texts focus more on constructing comparative histories of slavery and 
freedom that analyze and assess present race relations in the context of the past, 
condensing those temporal relations in the locus of the family” (36).  
65 In her biography of Hopkins, Lois Brown notes the importance of silence in 
Contending Forces. She says that Hopkins “uses naming and an evident investment in 
confessional discourse to call her readers’ attention to the enduring issues of silence and 
articulation, exile and inclusion, which so often are at the heart of women’s 
experiences” (207). While my argument does not focus on Hopkins’s use of the 
confessional mode, Brown’s observations about the relationship between silenced 
voices and the gender politics of the novel are useful. 
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supremacy. The novel relates the multigenerational story of a turn-of-the-century 
mixed-race family in Boston first by tracing their lineage to their white forbears in 
North Carolina in the eighteenth century. Part one of the novel focuses on the white 
Montfort family, originally Bermudan and later North Carolina planters, whom the 
Pollock family terrorizes in part for their liberal attitudes about race. In the second part 
of the novel, John Langley visits the consequences of this historical conflict on the 
Smith family in his pursuit of Sappho Clark, and she is the animating force that brings 
the intergenerational conflict of the novel to a head.66 This double structure, coupled 
with the narrator’s overt statements on American racial politics, invites readers to 
connect slavery and its post-emancipation consequences directly. Moreover, within a 
context of conflicting and contradictory political ideologies that often privilege the 
abstract over the concrete, Hopkins’s refusal to adhere to comfortable categories for 
political thought is a constant. 
In Contending Forces, Hopkins immediately introduces history as a contested 
space. She explains in the preface the historical sources for key scenes in her novel. She 
uses the alleged texts of a speech by the governor of Georgia in 1899 and, for another 
character’s speech, “a combination of the best points made by well-known public 
speakers in the United States—white and black—in defense of the Negro” to emphasize 
historical accuracy. Hopkins observes, “I feel my own deficiencies too strongly to 
attempt original composition on this subject at this crisis in the history of the Negro in 
the United States” (16). Her deference reflects a generic convention as well as a more 
                                                
66 The origins of their mixed-race family represents another often silenced story, and 
when a character late in the novel observes the “strangely tangled threads” of the black 
family in America, she alludes to this occluded past (373).  
90 
 
subtle indictment of politicized history, as she implies that at a moment of historical 
crisis, the truth is in high demand. She indicates outright that her novel reflects material 
realities, specifically the white supremacist views of a state governor, and she 
emphasizes the novel’s importance in tracking this history. She claims urgency in 
addressing the historical conditions of 1900 in terms of its eighteenth-century history, 
countering common conciliatory narratives regarding national progress, and she insists 
that African Americans face increasing threats of violence. She warns her readers of the 
continued threat of mob violence because “lynch law is raising its head like a venomous 
monster,” and she says that “the retrospective mind will dwell upon the history of the 
past, seeking there a solution of these monstrous outbreaks under a government founded 
upon the greatest and brightest of principles for the elevation of mankind.” Hopkins 
continues that, while “we ponder the philosophy of cause and effect, the world is 
horrified by a fresh outbreak, and the shocked mind wonders that in this—the brightest 
epoch of the Christian era—such things are” (14, italics in original). This passage 
emphasizes the importance of a historically focused “retrospective” mind. And in this 
way, the novel’s preface anticipates that her attention will be on the practical analysis of 
the motivating features of lynching, which will lead her to a nuanced understanding of 
white supremacy and a focused critique of political ideologies that lack explanatory 
power and concrete application necessary to oppose white supremacy. Her approach 
will privilege the revelatory power of connecting the past and the present as she 





Inheritance, White Supremacy, and Black Pathology 
To exercise her own practical analysis of white supremacy and lynching, 
Hopkins focuses on a specific sign of race discourse: inheritance and its relationship to 
black pathology. Ordering the complex discourses of white supremacy and racial 
politics through the sign of inheritance allows Hopkins to claim and subvert a white 
supremacist logic that identifies black pathology with African Americans and 
perpetuates white power, and it allows her to emphasize the importance of an historicist 
point of view. Inheritance in Contending Forces has at least three forms: the biological, 
the legal-historical, and the economic. On the surface, inheritance signifies the transfer 
of traits across generations, whether genetic/physiological, character or moral qualities, 
or the consequences of past actions (either by the individual or the “sins of the father”). 
Inheritance also means the transfer of property to bona fide descendants, a process that 
cements identity and family legacy. Both iterations open a range of possible 
applications and contexts, and neither represents distinct or discrete meanings. More 
often than not, meaning crosses the apparent line of distinction, as metaphors and other 
examples of figurative language bring multiple meanings into conversation with one 
another. The consequences of the sins of the father, for example, result in a lasting 
negative legacy for his child, and that child is the recipient of the very character flaws 
that made the sin possible in the first place. In Contending Forces, inheritance 
represents the propagation of power through the structures of white supremacy, 
including definitions of racial identity and beliefs about how that identity transfers 
across generations. It also represents the threat of the contamination of race and the 
danger such contamination poses to white power as represented by miscegenation. 
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Inheritance is also the means by which economic power, another structure of white 
supremacy, transfers to the future. Finally, inheritance represents an opportunity for 
resistance, as political ideologies and strategies become the birthright of future 
generations of activists. Inheritance resonates as a signifier for Hopkins because it 
connects history-as-resistance to white supremacist power structures insistent on 
ignoring that history. 
Hopkins’s eighteenth-century origin story for the more lengthy turn-of-the-
century plot in part two of the novel signifies on the theme of inheritance as a center of 
white supremacist power. By tracing white supremacist assumptions about racial 
difference to the slave trade in Bermuda, Hopkins draws a direct line between the 
violence in the second part of the novel and the horrors of slavery. As Contending 
Forces opens, Charles Montfort, head of a wealthy planter family in Bermuda, decides 
he will free his slaves gradually, granting each a parcel of land when he moves to 
Newbern, North Carolina, but only as a result of his morally vacant motivation to flee 
recently imposed British anti-slavery laws. When the Montforts—Charles, his wife 
Grace, and their two sons, Charles Jr. and Jesse—arrive in Newbern, they immediately 
come under the suspicion of the community, represented by Anson Pollock, a rival 
plantation owner, and his henchmen, Bill Sampson and Hank Davis. As Pollock’s men 
watch the family’s arrival from the dock, Sampson immediately suspects that Grace 
Montfort is not white, based solely on her appearance. The men argue about her beauty, 
as Hank Davis says he had “never seed” such a beautiful woman, and Bill Sampson 
argues that she has “got a black streak in her somewhar.” Sampson begins to catalogue 
her anatomical features and notes that there is “too much cream color in the face and too 
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little blud seen under the skin fer a genooine white ’ooman” (41). Sampson and Davis 
target Charles Montfort for his progressive stance on slavery and for his wife’s 
questionable identity, which represents—whether in the 1790s or 1890s—the ultimate 
sin, miscegenation, and embodies paranoid race fantasies. While Pollock fears the effect 
of emancipation on his own slaves, reflecting a historically persistent anti-abolitionist 
anxiety, he also sexually desires Montfort’s wife and wants to claim Montfort’s children 
as his own.67 By taking Montfort’s patriarchal power and position by force, Pollock 
effectively neuters the “liberal” slave owner’s abolitionist attitude. After killing Charles 
and confronting Grace, Pollock stands by as his men whip her in front of her children. 
Hazel Carby likens this violation to a rape, and this sexualized conquest signals 
Hopkins’s desire to connect white sexual desire and violence to white supremacy 
generally.68 It also draws a parallel between the sexual violence Pollock and his men 
perpetrate and the threat of lynching that Hopkins emphasizes in the novel’s preface, 
because both acts rely on assumptions about racial identity and consequent beliefs about 
black pathology.69 Grace is targeted for her supposed blackness and her representation 
                                                
67 Pollock’s anti-abolitionism anticipates his descendant John Langley’s racial 
conservatism, establishing the interdependence of slavery and Jim Crow and structuring 
the coming resistant responses in abolitionist terms. It also emphasizes conservatism’s 
complicity with white supremacy. 
68 Carby states: “In a graphic and tortured two-page scene, Hopkins represents the brutal 
rape of Grace in the displaced form of a whipping by two of the vigilantes” (132). 
69 While Pollock does not whip Grace or order it directly, the novel implies he is 
culpable for the attack. When the narrator first describes Pollock’s desire for Grace, she 
takes pains to point out Pollock’s propensity for violence and his henchmen’s role in 
acting out his desires. Pollock’s late wife “had died mysteriously,” and “[r]umor said 
his ill treatment and infidelity had driven her to suicide.” The rumors also suggested 
that Pollock “had not hesitated to whip her by proxy through his overseer, Bill 
Sampson, in the same way he did his slaves” (50). These conditions inform Grace’s 
whipping and eventual suicide, figuring Pollock as primarily, if indirectly, responsible. 
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of the contaminant of miscegenation and porous racial borders. The irony in her beating 
echoes the concern introduced at the beginning of this chapter. The “men who created 
the mulatto race, who recruit its ranks year after year by the very means which they 
invoked lynch law to suppress … [bewail] the sorrows of violated womanhood” (270-
1). When the novel shifts to the late-nineteenth century in the second part, the 
characters, who are descendants of Pollock and Montfort, experience the consequences 
of this primal scene. Their experience parallels the abandonment of African Americans 
after Reconstruction and the entrenchment of Jim Crow and racial terrorism, including 
sexual violence. This trauma also sets the stage for the violence Sappho suffers because 
the sexualized violence of slavery and that of Reconstruction, most represented by 
lynching, share no clear distinction, and the present inherits the past. 
Hopkins also uses the sign of inheritance to subvert reader expectations and 
challenge assumptions of racial thinking. In the second part of the novel, Pollock’s sins 
manifest in his descendant, John Langley, defined as African American by Jim Crow 
ideas of racial identity. As the chief antagonist in the second part of the novel, Langley 
tries to undermine Sappho and siblings Will and Dora Smith at every step. In fact, 
Langley’s pursuit of Sappho despite her protests recalls the sexual predation of his 
ancestor.70 Hopkins implicates Langley and his white supremacist assumptions by using 
a deterministic notion of character as inherited by blood to demonstrate the generational 
consequences of slavery and to subvert the already unstable discourse of racial identity. 
                                                
70 The evil foil to Sappho’s suitor and eventual fiancé Will Smith, John Langley is the 
direct descendant of Anson Pollock. The Smiths—Will, Dora, and Ma—are 
descendants of Charles Montfort. Further, John Langley is the offspring of Lucy, the 
Montfort’s slave whom Anson Pollock raped. John Langley therefore represents the 
family’s original sin, and he suffers the consequences of this shame. 
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Regarding John Langley, the narrator explains that a “[n]atural instinct for good had 
been perverted by a mixture of ‘cracker’ blood of the lowest type on his father’s side 
with whatever God-saving quality that might have been loaned the Negro by pitying 
nature.” His blood “vitiated his moral nature and left it stranded high and dry on the 
shore of blind ignorance” (221). Moral inheritance challenges the advantages 
supposedly attributable to his whiteness. Hopkins directly counters white supremacist 
assumptions of black pathology that assert moral failure to African Americans as a 
product of their supposedly biological race identity. By suggesting the lighter skinned 
man’s moral failures to the presence of “cracker blood,” she disrupts the usual operation 
of the sign of racial inheritance to attack white supremacy. 
As the novel progresses and Langley’s quest for political power and possession 
of Dora and then Sappho falls apart, he becomes more and more dissolute, eventually 
dying penniless and alone. Again the behaviors stereotypically associated by white 
supremacy with his “Negro blood”—sexual predation and a general lack of morality—
reflect Langley’s “cracker blood,” and Hopkins overturns common assumptions of 
black pathology. Further, Hopkins centers violence in both parts of the novel as an 
obvious outcome of racial thinking and positions the black family as its target. Black 
women are targets for white resentment and ironically become signs of white pathology 
because their mixed-race presence represents white racial anxiety. Their mixed-race 
children serve as a constant reminder of that original sin. This literal example solidifies 
the connection in racial discourse between beliefs about black pathology and white 
supremacy as white anxiety and accountability is displaced onto black people. Further, 
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investigating the construction of black pathology allows Hopkins to explore the 
ineffectiveness of abstract political philosophies disconnected from victims like Sappho. 
 
Sappho Clark and Affiliative Politics 
Sappho’s status as a “fallen woman” challenges the credibility of mere political 
ideology by confronting it with her real lived experience as a single mother directly 
harmed by white supremacist violence. She navigates the liberal political culture of 
Boston and learns the limits of readymade political categories and the importance of her 
own self-definition. Upon her initial introduction in the novel, her beauty and the 
mystery associated with her past inspire reaction.71 While Sappho’s introduction results 
for Will Smith in the attraction familiar to the genre conventions—their meeting ignites 
the subplot of conflict and resolution that ends in their marriage—Sappho also 
represents something more. Dora is immediately fascinated when she meets Sappho. 
The narrator notes Dora’s general hesitance regarding “girl friendships,” as Dora 
believed that a “close intimacy between two of the same sex was more than likely to 
end disastrously for one or the other.” But Sappho is different, and from the beginning 
she “seemed to fill a long-felt want in [Dora’s] life, and [Dora] had from the first a 
perfect trust in the beautiful girl” (97-8).  This idea of affiliation, in this case through 
friendship, subverts cultural expectations about female relationships and provides the 
precepts for a more overt political strategy that Hopkins depicts later in the novel. Dora 
implies that friendships with women might traditionally end in competition over male 
                                                
71 Sappho’s absent past further emphasizes the dangers of an ahistorical political 
ideology. As will be clear, it is only through making a personal connection with others 
and by claiming the past that an affiliative politics is possible. Avoiding or occluding 
the past results in isolation and disempowerment. 
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suitors, for example, or any other stereotypical expectations for young women as 
reflected through bourgeois family conventions. Her change of heart regarding Sappho 
anticipates Hopkins’s challenge to the conventions of the bourgeois family by 
presenting the possibility for a female-authored, same-sex friendship that does not “end 
disastrously.” At the same time, this challenge does not represent an outright rejection 
of the family. In fact, the family eventually proves to be the ground from which 
Hopkins situates a resistant response to white supremacy, but the definition and identity 
of family is key to her challenge to conventional assumptions regarding both political 
strategies and the construction of the family. Sappho’s relative isolation as a stranger in 
a new community means that she has to create her own relationships, at least initially, 
outside of the determinism of the biological family. 
The novel indicates that familial and platonic relationships are potential sources 
of political empowerment, and the possibilities of political engagement quickly occupy 
Sappho and her friends. In a chapter titled “Friendship,” the narrator begins by 
describing Sappho’s new experience with a society of African Americans in the North, 
noting that “truth demanded her to recognize the superiority of the vigorous activity in 
the life all about her” (114). Sappho is an outsider in multiple ways, including the fact 
that she comes from the South, so Hopkins suggests she has a different, if perhaps 
naive, perspective from which to witness the political culture of Boston. At this point in 
the novel, Dora does not know that Sappho has been a victim of sexual violence, and 
the tension in the chapter manifests through this dramatic irony. Emboldened by the 
freedom and sense of community she observes in others, Sappho also recognizes that 
Boston society is likely to reject her. At the same time, Dora and Sappho’s friendship 
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provides Sappho the opportunity to explore her own political views. Dora shares a 
number of surprising opinions with Sappho, inspiring Sappho in her own political 
thinking, and Dora proves trustworthy to Sappho by refusing to assign blame to the 
victims of sexual violence. Dora notes that she is “sick of loud professions and constant 
hypocrisy” from religious people who claim moral superiority and create the conditions 
of judgment for the less fortunate, an assertion that comforts Sappho and indicates 
Dora’s willingness to eschew the popular in favor of a principled stand (100). 
Consequently, the women’s relationship becomes the ground for their informed political 
positions that do not eschew personal relationships in favor of political abstractions. 
They stay grounded in the world. 
Sappho eventually prods Dora to test whether she can assimilate Sappho’s story 
into her political outlook, and the scene combines Hopkins’s strategy of affiliation with 
her critique of inheritance as a white supremacist power strategy. In response to 
Sappho’s asking if Dora would hold a “fallen woman” responsible for her own fate, 
Dora states, “I believe we would hang our heads in shame at having the temerity to 
judge a fallen sister, could we but know the circumstances attending many such cases” 
(101). The last clause of her response alludes to the actual cause of many of these cases, 
white sexual violence, and not the character of African American women. Sappho 
recognizes Dora for the independence of her thinking and observes, “You are like a dear 
little preacher…and if our race ever amounts to anything in this world, it will be 
because such women as you are raised up to save us” (101). Likewise, Sappho fulfills a 
“long-felt want” in Dora’s life by providing her with an equal partner with whom to 
pursue solutions to these social conditions, and this friendship therefore initiates an 
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affiliation of like-minded people who will ultimately create a family outside the bounds 
of biological inheritance, focused instead on the principles of empathy and compassion 
that unite them. These traits must be passed down to future generations of activists, and 
Hopkins emphasizes this theme of inheritance throughout the novel to distinguish 
inheritance as an oppressive force—it is the primary metaphor for race identity—from 
inheritance as a political act. In the latter case, African American parents and their 
children transmit political virtues, both to biological family members and beyond, to 
resist white supremacy. Moreover, these interactions between Sappho and Dora reveal 
the unstable nature of political categories or ideologies when brought into contact with 
lived experience, highlighting the need for careful consideration of what kinds of 
political ideologies are worth perpetuating. 
Part of the purpose of Sappho’s journey through the novel is to show that 
political agency is not static, while the political strategies to assure it often are. Because 
political agency cannot be reduced to the static postures of reified political positions, 
Hopkins appeals to applied family traits that supersede political clichés. These traits can 
be inherited or acquired, but they must be actively cultivated. And if they are inherited, 
Hopkins suggests, we must not lose sight that this occurred through the active efforts of 
forebears, not through passive biological transfer of features. After Sappho comes to 
view Dora as an ally, she finds new challenges among the sewing circles in Boston, 
which are ostensibly domestic gatherings that actually serve as important spaces of 
political activism. Mrs. Willis, an African American suffragist, lecturer, and popular 
political voice around Boston, explains to an audience of young women the 
responsibility they bear: “Shortly, you must fill the positions now occupied by your 
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mothers, and it will rest with you and your children to refute the charges brought against 
us as to our moral irresponsibility, and the low moral standard maintained by us in 
comparison with other races” (148). Mrs. Willis urges these potential activists to 
recognize the debt they owe their own mothers—their literal mothers as well as their 
political forbears—whose activism created the opportunity for their current 
contributions. It is an activism focused in part on resisting white supremacist 
assumptions about black pathology, the lasciviousness of African American women and 
their responsibility for miscegenation. By joining these two notions—intergenerational 
black activism in contrast to the belief in the sexual immorality of African American 
women—Hopkins revises the trope of deterministic racial inheritance expressed in the 
one-drop rule and other racist technologies of power in favor of an activist politics of 
affiliation modeled on the family. Moreover, if bourgeois family values are not 
available to African Americans, as white supremacy insists, Hopkins will reclaim these 
values, in part by dissolving the claim to a deterministic family identity. Mrs. Willis’s 
statement can be read literally and metaphorically, as these women will ally themselves 
as family both within and without its biological strictures. In the process, they reject the 
racial determinism that underwrites white supremacy. The fact that Mrs. Willis 
advocates such a position within a discourse of relative conservatism—uplift ideology 
in the Boston sewing circles—suggests a complex character and even more complex 
political positions. 
Mrs. Willis’s role in Contending Forces has been the source of much critical 
disagreement, and a close analysis of the character and the responses she engenders 
solidifies the importance of Hopkins’s attention to the white supremacist discourse of 
101 
 
black pathology and her insistence on a complex political critique. At their first 
meeting, Sappho asks Mrs. Willis the same question she asked Dora, and Mrs. Willis’s 
response suggests that she might be sympathetic to Sappho and her story. Sappho asks, 
“Do you think, then, that Negro women will be held responsible for all the lack of virtue 
that is being laid to their charge today? I mean, do you think that God will hold us 
responsible for the illegitimacy with which our race has been obliged, as it were, to 
flood the world?” (149, italics in original). The question illustrates the ways African 
Americans—specifically African American women—are forced to shoulder the burden 
of institutional and social inequality and racism as well as the moral and physical 
consequences of sexual violence. The question also speaks to Sappho’s assumption that 
her illegitimate child defines the possibilities for her future. At least initially, Mrs. 
Willis represents Sappho’s chance to be embraced by the sewing circle and the larger 
community of Boston, and Sappho has the chance to break from her past and take her 
opinions beyond conversations with Dora into the activist community. 
But Mrs. Willis’s potentially supportive position coexists with the narrator’s 
suggestion that her motivations might not be sincere. This juxtaposition highlights 
dramatic irony in the scene that increases the pressure on Sappho to make the right 
choice about whether she can trust Mrs. Willis. On a small scale, this scene dramatizes 
Sappho’s central problem of inclusion: Will this activist community accept or reject her, 
thereby freeing her from the political consequences of her past trauma or demonstrating 
that this trauma is inescapable and will continue to represent a blind spot in black 
political action? The narrator describes Mrs. Willis’s history and explains that she was 
largely without financial standing after her husband’s death. After taking stock of her 
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situation, Mrs. Willis assessed that “[t]he best opening … was in the great cause of the 
evolution of true womanhood in the work of the ‘Woman Question’ as embodied in 
marriage and suffrage.” Mrs. Willis recognizes the opportunity afforded by this now-
popular political concern, and she sees that it “should float her upon its tide into the 
prosperity she desired” (146-7). She seems to be the embodiment of venality and 
political expediency, and yet Hopkins insists on making her character more complex. 
Because she possesses multiple contradictory registers, Mrs. Willis plays the perfect foil 
for Sappho’s journey to political identity. 
In her conversation with Sappho and Dora about sexual illegitimacy, Mrs. Willis 
seems to embody a more progressive and politically passionate stance. Dora asks Mrs. 
Willis if fallen women should be held responsible for their victimization. Mrs. Willis 
says African American women “shall not be held responsible for wrongs which we have 
unconsciously committed, or which we have committed under compulsion.” She 
explains, “We are virtuous or non-virtuous only when we have a choice under 
temptation” (149, italics in original). Mrs. Willis says that for the “African brought to 
these shores against his will—the state of morality which implies will-power on his part 
does not exist, therefore he is not a responsible being,” and consequently the women in 
Sappho’s hypothetical cannot be held responsible for their fate. In this formulation, 
women are passive agents and victims of their circumstances—the perpetrators, in these 
passive voice constructions, are noticeably absent. And yet the italicized portions of 
Mrs. Willis’s statement hail these perpetrators. The “compulsion” she speaks of was 
often white men compelling African American women and exploiting a power 
differential, a reversal of the white supremacist argument that the supposed 
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lasciviousness of black women was to blame. Mrs. Willis effectively accuses these 
absent white men of rape and the propagation of illegitimate children. 
At the same time Mrs. Willis’s response must seem repugnant to Sappho, if not 
at least confusing. It is unclear exactly what wrongs might be “unconsciously” 
committed by victims of sexual violence, and in this moment Mrs. Willis risks 
perpetuating the very white supremacist assumptions about black pathology that Sappho 
seeks to escape. Further, with the narrator’s initial description of Mrs. Willis in mind, 
the reader recoils at this qualification in her argument. Sappho responds by rejecting 
Mrs. Willis’s offer of a potentially sympathetic ear. The narrator explains that “[j]ust as 
the barriers of Sappho’s reserve seemed about to be swept away, there followed, almost 
instantly, a wave of repulsion toward this woman and her effectiveness, so forced and 
insincere.” Sappho then “drew back as from an abyss suddenly beheld stretching before 
her” (155). Whereas Dora and Sappho established an immediate connection, Mrs. 
Willis’s political opportunism and her inconsistent logic regarding Sappho’s culpability 
for her own suffering are an impassable barrier. At the same time, this scene spans 
multiple pages and walks through Mrs. Willis’s ostensibly sympathetic position so 
carefully that it suggests her position and Sappho’s response might not be so simple. 
Instead, this scene between Sappho and Mrs. Willis represents a crucial point for 
reading Hopkins’s novel. Consistent with the complex narrative position that Hopkins 
cultivates throughout the novel, this scene creates multiple opportunities for 
interpretation and resists scripted readings within political or generic conventions. 
Mrs. Willis plays an important role in Sappho’s empowerment, and her complex 
character reveals Hopkins’s valuable critique of political ideology. While Mrs. Willis 
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unwittingly helps move Sappho toward an awakened political identity, Sappho’s 
rejection of her suggests more than a rejection of a particular political philosophy and 
instead asserts an affiliative politics grounded in community. Lois Lamphere Brown 
reads Mrs. Willis as representative of an uplift ideology that cannot incorporate Sappho 
and her story because it is propagated by a community figured as “highly autocratic, 
militaristic, and disinclined to debate the moral issues facing its young women” (60). 
Brown’s analysis of the scene between Sappho and Mrs. Willis derives from Claudia 
Tate’s notion of “mother’s law,” a term that asserts a model of virtue not based solely 
on overdetermined notions of sexual chastity and purity often articulated in the 
sentimental genre. Mrs. Willis fails to reach Sappho, however, and “it seems that this 
new mother’s law, through a radical replacement of patriarchal law, is limited and not 
necessarily its accommodating, liberating antithesis” (60). Further, “[t]he way in which 
Mrs. Willis answers Sappho thrusts the onus of self-examination upon Sappho” (60). 
This moment illustrates the importance Hopkins places on Sappho’s development 
through the novel as well as how Sappho’s disagreement with Mrs. Willis demonstrates 
the dangers of the temptation to be politically reductive of historical circumstance. At 
the same time, Mrs. Willis represents a liberatory potential in Hopkins’s larger critique 
of political opportunism, ahistoricism, and family as a site of resistance. Mrs. Willis is 
more than a mere a cypher for uplift ideology or racial conservatism. 
Hopkins announces the central importance of Mrs. Willis’s complex character, 
as her narrator notes that “[t]here was evidently more in this woman than appeared upon 
the surface” (157). The narrator opposes Mrs. Willis’s more problematic aspects—her 
appeal to gradualism, for instance (152) or her “effusiveness, so forced and insincere” 
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(155)—to her apparent sympathetic stance toward Sappho and her progressive ideas 
regarding African American women’s suffering in a racist society. The narrator 
privileges this complexity while emphasizing Sappho’s difficult task of negotiating this 
confusing political terrain. The narrator points to the difficulty of “trac[ing] the 
windings of God’s inscrutable ways.” Characters like Mrs. Willis represent those “men 
and women whose seeming uselessness fits perfectly into the warp and woof of 
Destiny’s web” (157). Both the reader and Sappho, then, should reject the urge to 
dismiss Mrs. Willis. 
Sappho’s response to Mrs. Willis represents a thoughtful and measured reply to 
a complex character and circumstances. Sappho primarily rejects Mrs. Willis because 
she is insincere and venal, and Sappho refuses the opportunity to confess her secret 
when she suddenly realizes that she has almost been bewitched by Mrs. Willis’s force 
of personality. When male characters in the novel give their speeches at the meeting of 
the Colored American League, Hopkins brings leadership itself under analysis. Mrs. 
Willis may enjoy success and command respect as leader of the sewing circle, but if she 
is driven by self-advancement over community advancement, she can only fail. Beyond 
this conclusion, Sappho also realizes that Mrs. Willis is intelligent, informed, and, most 
importantly, complicated. Her ideology is not one of simple moral uplift that rejects 
Sappho’s experience or that labels her complicit in her abuse. This is not to deny the 
problematic aspects of Mrs. Willis’s position, as her moral politics seem to both liberate 
and constrain possibilities for Sappho’s agency, often in the same moment. But Mrs. 
Willis’s complexity also indicates that Hopkins is interested in more than a critique of 
one political philosophy and instead draws all political abstraction under her critical 
106 
 
lens. Furthermore, to oversimplify Sappho’s encounter with Mrs. Willis is to miss the 
ways Hopkins lays the groundwork for a resistant position. A reductive reading of Mrs. 
Willis also scripts a reading of the conclusion of the novel that finds Sappho unable or 
unwilling to serve her own leadership role and agitate for freedom and opportunities for 
African Americans. To do so, Sappho must continue to sort through questions of her 
own agency, even while witnessing those ideologies that might try to silence her. 
In the scene involving a meeting of the Colored American League after a 
lynching, Sappho witnesses a tableau of the pervading arguments about race activism, 
and each position fails to integrate her experiences. Her silent presence in this scene and 
her eventual absence emphasize her apparent lack of agency when a group of men 
discuss in general terms the white supremacist violence that victimized her.72 The 
speakers offer various short-and long-term strategies for an African American response 
going forward. Dr. Lewis presents an accommodationist position that resembles the 
strategies of Booker T. Washington, an activist whom Hopkins herself had been at odds 
with at various points in her career.73 The speaker points to the importance of an 
institutional intervention to rescue the children of African American drunkards and 
                                                
72 Luke Sawyer tells the audience about his experiences, including the story of Mabelle 
Beaubean, whom her uncle sold into sexual slavery. No one realizes Mabelle is actually 
Sappho Clark. And as the direct correlation between lynching and sexual violence has 
been established throughout the novel, it is clear that by discussing one the men must 
discuss the other. 
73 Jennie Kassanoff draws a connection between Hopkins’s literary subject matter and 
her ouster from Colored American Magazine and Booker T. Washington’s eventual 
takeover (158). Elizabeth Ammons explains that “certain of [Hopkins’s] literary 
practices, such as the portrayal of racially mixed marriages, were too radical for white 
readers and, even more instrumental, because her refusal to endorse Booker T. 




spendthrifts. Lewis states: “If we cannot reach these men individually, we hope to reach 
their children. Thus we have planned that with the aid of our universities we shall at 
length root out evil and ignorance, and in the future give our race a clean, pure 
citizenship” (250). Lewis explains that if African Americans are “patient, docile, 
harmless,” they might achieve “that prosperity for which we long, in the years to come, 
if not for ourselves then for our children” (250). His lack of urgency makes his position 
a non-starter, but he still retains a commitment to intergenerational action and provides 
another example of Hopkins’s attention to the sign of inheritance. But Lewis insists that 
“if we give them time and do not hurry them, they will grow gradually accustomed to 
the new era,” solidifying the impossibility of this position for the spirit of the novel 
(251).74 John Langley speaks next and echoes this plea for gradualism, asking the 
audience to “await the issue of events with patience, trusting in the fealty of our party 
leaders” (253). Langley takes a bribe from white leadership in exchange for quelling 
any potentially effective black response, so his appeal to faith in “our party leaders” 
rings especially hollow. This appeal to gradualism aligns with the Washingtonian 
position and should not be confused with Hopkins’s insistence on an intergenerational, 
enduring activism that can also respond to the urgency of the moment. At the same 
                                                
74 Dr. Lewis goes on to present an opinion popularly ascribed to Washington: “We 
should strive to obtain the education of the industrial school, seeking there our level, 
content to abide there, leaving to the white man the superiority of brain and intellect 
which hundreds of years have developed” (251). This passage undermines any notion 
that Hopkins herself might be complicit with any accepted belief of white supremacy, 
even one contrived from a model of progressive history and civilization. Her critiques 
are too pointed, and the subject position of her narrator is too clear, for such a 
supposition to hold true. 
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time, by juxtaposing these two approaches, Hopkins assigns Washingtonian gradualism 
the venality and ineffectiveness of Langley’s position. 
Next, Luke Sawyer’s response insists on proactive and even revolutionary 
action, enough that Will Smith will need to temper it as the evening’s final speaker.75 
But Sawyer also identifies problems with white supremacy generally, in particular the 
divide-and-conquer strategy used to entrench power, which does not limit itself only to 
conventional racism of the color line. In doing so, he articulates the possibilities for 
resistance that, ironically, will ultimately eschew revolutionary violence. It is a strategy 
consistent with Hopkins’s appeal to affiliation and intergenerational activism, and the 
strategy affirms Hopkins’s reclamation of the family as a site of resistance. Sawyer tells 
the other speakers and the crowd that “conservatism, lack of brotherly affiliation, lack 
of energy for the right and the power of the almighty dollar” are the “contending forces 
that are dooming this race to despair!” (255-6, italics in original). The economic 
motivations here stand at odds with the notion of affiliation that Hopkins’s character 
asserts; they also reveal another shade to white supremacy. It finds expression in 
venality, which John Langley’s appeal for trust in black and white politicians 
represents. It also finds expression in the lack of empathy that a predatory capitalist 
economy champions. Such an economy can find racism useful insofar as it keeps power 
entrenched and consistent. “[L]ack of brotherly affiliation” is equated with 
“conservatism,” and both are charged with isolating and elevating individual goals 
above those of the community. Sawyer’s attack on conservatism provokes a fascinating 
                                                
75 Will Smith clearly represents the Du Boisian position. His early description in the 
novel notes his concern with the possibility of a liberal arts education for African 
Americans. For Smith, “Latin and Greek represented the tools which he used to unlock 
the storehouse of knowledge” (167). 
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response from Will Smith, who anticipates the endgame of Sawyer’s appeal to a 
revolutionary spirit and unwittingly uses Sappho’s secret past as evidence of white 
supremacy’s strategy to target the family.  
Will Smith explicates lynching as a sign of white supremacist violence 
dependent on assumptions of black pathology, and in doing so he galvanizes Sappho’s 
role as the political center of the novel. Smith uses Sappho’s story to illuminate the true 
motivations of lynching, and, broadly, white supremacy, for his audience. In short, 
lynching is about white resentment and sexual desire, and for the reader Sappho’s story 
is the perfect embodiment of this notorious crime of white supremacy. Smith explains 
that miscegenation in particular is a uniquely white obsession, as “[t]he Negro dwells 
less on such a social cataclysm than any other race among us” (264). There is white 
anxiety about the potential for “Negro domination,” the other side of a pervading fear of 
race suicide—similarly projected at times on the black race, as miscegenation 
purportedly spelled race extinction for African Americans—and this resentment is 
ultimately a product of emancipation and potential black empowerment. While Smith is 
willing, only “for the sake of argument,” to allow that “in one case out of a hundred” 
the accused might be guilty of the crime, the evidence suggests that in the other ninety-
nine cases “the white man gratifies his lust, either of passion or vengeance” (269). As a 
projection of white resentment, lynching represents for white supremacists a justified 
response to the threat of purported black criminality in the form of sexual predation on 
white womanhood. Indeed, in the lynching story Luke Sawyer relates, Sawyer’s father 
was a target for violence due to his economic success only (256). Ultimately, Will 
Smith focuses his analysis on rape because it is the locus of white resentment and 
110 
 
sexual obsession as applied to black womanhood (virtue) and male empowerment, 
which are also the subjects of Sappho’s story.  
Sappho, in her former life as Mabelle Beaubean, embodied the features of this 
white sexual obsession. She was the daughter of “a quadroon woman of great beauty” 
and a target for her white uncle’s desires (258-9). For Smith, her victimization 
represents the central example of his political call to action, a reminder that white 
supremacy targets the “heart of the home life.” Lynching as punishment for rape is an 
especially resonant signifier because it simultaneously defines black pathology in the 
past and utilizes it in the present to perpetuate itself. In this way, the theme repeats the 
double historical structure of Hopkins’s novel, reaching into the past of slavery to show 
that little has changed in the Jim Crow era. But when Smith relays this argument, 
Sappho is absent; she had been “borne from the auditorium in a fainting condition” 
when Luke Sawyer explained the Beaubean tragedy. She never hears Smith speak. Her 
absence restricts her role as an example for Smith. She is an anecdote, not a political 
actor, and the narrator’s unimpassioned tone at the end of this section suggests this fact. 
The narrator reports that the “papers said next day that a very interesting meeting 
occurred the night before at the church on X Street” (273). The paper’s passive 
description, that events merely “occurred,” suggests that because of Sappho’s absence, 
these debates had no real effect. Thus, Hopkins reorients the novel around Sappho’s 
story. With the exception of Luke Sawyer, whose story introduces Sappho’s past 
without naming it as such, the men’s political arguments failed in part because they 
focused on the “philosophy” of white supremacy while failing to recognize its concrete 
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consequences. Sappho’s story rejects political abstractions in favor of a politics of 
affiliation derived through direct human engagement. 
The fact that Sappho’s suffering originates in family betrayal challenges the 
premise that deterministic family inheritance defines her prospects. This conflict 
connects the notion of black pathology and its focus on family to Sappho’s story. When 
she first meets Dora and the Smiths, they immediately take her in, and with them she 
thrives in the love and protection of the family and in the way it empowers her to learn 
from politically active matriarchs. In a key scene with Sappho, Will Smith explains how 
powerful this connection is: “I have family enough for both of us ... [m]y mother loves 
you, my sister adores you; what more is there to be desired?” (311-2).76 Even when 
John Langley deceives her, he appeals to Will Smith’s family as the wedge that will 
isolate her. He explains, “Will Smith is a very proud man as well as a very just man. His 
pride of family is his besetting sin. Do you think that it will be for his best interest to 
marry you?” (317). Finally, when Sappho flees and isolates herself from the Smiths, she 
finds and creates adjunct family relationships in the the Smiths’ absence. She finds 
solace in the Sisters of the Holy Family, who represent the perfect holy family and 
model for all others. They place Sappho with Monsieur Louis of Opelausas: “a man of 
color [who] has lost all of his family but … [his] two children” (352). Monsieur Louis 
feels “this beautiful girl-widow will bring peace and joy to my poor motherless girls” 
(353). Sappho is both beneficiary and provider of family until the novel’s final 
                                                
76  In this same moment, as Sappho warns Will that there are details from her personal 
history that might impede their relationship, he again silences her by declaring that he 
“does not care for the past” (312). It is a moment of attempted understanding from Will, 
but it reminds Sappho, much like in her encounter with Mrs. Willis, that her past can 
only impede her future. 
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resolution, when she officially joins the Smiths. An appeal to family unites the theme of 
inheritance with the critical histories of the novel’s structure, and Sappho’s story 
illustrates how a response focused on the dominant strategies of white supremacy 
resonates more effectively than rehearsed political conventions. 
At the end of the novel when Sappho finally confronts her secret “shame” 
directly, she realizes that connection with another, in this case her own child, is an 
ultimate step toward empowerment. She came to her political identity through suffering 
and decides to reclaim her life by reclaiming her child. In Contending Forces, 
motherhood is powerful enough to respond to white supremacist lies and to overcome 
disagreement about effective political strategies. Motherhood transcends the domestic 
realm and lives firmly in the world of political activism. Given Hopkins’s careful 
development of the traditional political themes in the novel, the novel values domestic 
ideologies only in service to larger political principles without dismissing the political 
implications of the domestic or drawing a distinction from the domestic and the 
political.77 When Sappho finally claims her child and her own independence and rejects 
the judgment of the society that assigns her shame for her past and deems her unworthy 
for marriage to Will Smith, Sappho recognizes “mother-love” as transcendent: “She 
held him closely folded against her throbbing heart, and something holy passed from the 
sweet contact of the soft, warm body into the cold chilliness of her broken heart. The 
mother-love chased out all the anguish that she had felt over his birth” (346). Her “pride 
                                                
77 Sawaya observes the complex depiction of home in Contending Forces as not merely 
a domestic space but as a place “involved in the very conflicts that structure the public 
sphere” (48). Sawaya’s description of the political valence of Ma Smith’s boarding 
house can extend across the novel, as Hopkins complicates domestic spaces so that they 
serve political functions. 
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of possession in her child” sweeps away the “feeling of degradation [that] had made her 
ashamed of the joys of motherhood” (345). Sappho’s son, Alphonse, is no longer 
representative of her secret shame as victim of racist violence and now represents 
possibilities for her future.  
Motherhood and the power of affiliation enacted through family—whether 
through biological inheritance or by choice and circumstance—assuages shame by 
countering a system of morality laden with hypocrisy, racism, and lies. In fact, a key 
aspect to the family that completes the novel is its self-selected, not inherited, feature. 
Although Alphonse is Sappho’s biological inheritance, she must choose him as her son 
and acknowledge him by reclaiming him from her aunt.78 The end of the novel draws to 
a close the persistent theme of inheritance that at once haunts the text as representative 
of racial identity and white supremacist obsession and represents a resistant way 
forward as new activists are created through passed-down knowledge. And in the 
novel’s final movement, Hopkins makes this emphasis on family apparent as she 
reveals to the reader that Sappho has been searching for the empowerment of family—
not merely security—all along.  
The end of the novel focuses on family as an opportunity for political 
empowerment and represents the final stage of Sappho’s political development. As 
opposed to critics like Tate and Carby, Brown observes that the end of the novel does 
not seem promising for Sappho’s possibilities for integrating into African American 
                                                
78 Allison Berg argues that Sappho’s suffering in the novel enables “her future as a race 
mother” and her ability to claim her son. Sappho’s expression of her ultimately 
“inviolable” maternal rights allow Sappho to gain “a measure of self-possession that 
allows her to own her child” (143-4). Berg suggests that Hopkins emphasizes this power 
in the context of the history of denied maternal rights for slave mothers. 
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political culture or for serving as an activist for the cause. After being blackmailed by 
John Langley, Sappho admits her past to Will Smith and enters self-imposed exile. 
When the couple reunites in the final pages of the novel, Will Smith accepts Sappho and 
her child, and they are married, bringing closure to Sappho’s history and the novel. 
Brown states, “As Contending Forces comes to a close, Sappho does not embrace the 
African American condition and move on to perform the type of mediatory functions 
that critics such as Hazel Carby have outlined as one of the traditional routes for female 
mulatto characters in sentimental fiction” (63).79 The suffering that Sappho has 
experienced, according to this reading, is distinctly individual, and the resulting 
redemption she experiences is also individual. Brown’s reading acknowledges 
Hopkins’s diverse representations of race in the novel—specifically her desire to make 
the supposed borders between racial identities ambiguous—but it does so in service to 
the idea that the suffering Hopkins’s characters face provides escape but not redemption 
and results in further alienation. Cut off from the community in Boston, Sappho can do 
nothing but escape to Europe with the Smith family. 
According to Brown, these characters, via their “flexible racial histories and 
personas,” are able “to escape America’s rigid racial codes and avoid being constrained 
within the limited sociopolitical and educational circles of the American Negro” (68). 
For Brown, geography mirrors the distance created by Sappho’s rejection by the “black 
                                                
79 Carby explains the mediating function of the mulatto character in literature as an 
historical consequence of race conditions after Reconstruction, when whites 
institutionalized racial segregation through Jim Crow. According to Carby, “In 
response, the mulatto figure in literature became a more frequently used literary 
convention for an exploration and expression of what was increasingly socially 
proscribed” (89). See also Werner Sollor’s Neither Black nor White yet Both for an 
analysis of the “tragic mulatto” character in American fiction. 
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community,” Smith’s white Montfort heritage, and Will Smith’s supposed refusal to 
play the role of black leader as evidenced by his desire to leave the country. According 
to Brown, as a result of the Montfort-Smith family identity, “the whiteness and the 
promise of renewed family bonds begin to overwhelm the already tenuous links that 
Will Smith has had with the African American community, as well as temper the central 
roles that Ma Smith and Dora have played in the community” (68).80 But these family 
bonds are precisely the point—endurance through racist violence and social oppression 
is inseparable from the ideals of community; they help define that community. After 
Sappho claims Alphonse, the narrator makes clear that her suffering will enable her 
political activity in the future, “fitting her perfectly for the place she was to occupy in 
carrying comfort and hope to the women of her race” (347). Mrs. Willis recognizes the 
importance of affiliative community when she appeals to “fill the positions now 
occupied by [their] mothers,” and this sentiment returns at the end of the novel. The 
affiliation this family finds is in shared suffering and effort and not necessarily through 
the accident of biology. Far from ending in a rejection of community, Contending 
Forces revises the notion of family that defines itself through community. 
Ultimately, resistance operates in this text through the female-authored power of 
affiliation that rejects the deterministic limits of inheritance and their origins in white 
                                                
80 Brown argues that the revelation of the Smiths’ European ancestry as descendants of 
Charles Montfort undercuts much of the work Hopkins accomplishes in her novel. The 
move abroad—a literary device common to literature of this period—is certainly an 
indictment of racist America, but it is not evidence of a rejection of black activism or 
outright abandonment of the black community. In fact, the narrator lays out Sappho’s 
and Will’s plans quite clearly in the final chapter: “United by love, chastened by sorrow 




supremacist beliefs about black pathology. By rescuing the sign of the black family 
from racist assumptions but refusing to limit that response to an insistence upon black 
virtue, Hopkins rejects the premises of white supremacy and articulates in greater detail 
how it operates. Hopkins guides her inquiry through the subject of history as political 
intervention, and connecting her work to historically focused scholars like Patricia Hill 
Collins reveals how persistent beliefs about black pathology must be recognized as 
central to white supremacist assumptions in present-day conditions. In Hopkins’s case, 
the sign of inheritance, coupled with the relationship between lynching and domestic 
economies of black women’s sexuality and the black family, signifies the ways that the 
racial past structures the present. 
Ultimately, white supremacy’s endgame is violence that reinscribes economic 
and legal power, and Hopkins and other black authors at the turn of the century like 
Sutton Griggs and Charles Chesnutt recognize that responses must exceed the limits of 
political abstraction to try to face that danger. Because these authors recognize that 
discourses of racial pathology enable white supremacist violence, their privileging of 
that violence as a subject for literary inquiry resists white supremacy by drawing 
attention to white supremacy as its own insidious pathology. Hopkins illuminates the 
adaptive and opportunistic nature of white supremacy I described in my analysis of 
Thomas Dixon in part by challenging its naturalized assumptions. In the next chapter, 
Sutton Griggs’s work indicates both the discursive and especially the material effects of 
racial pathology, as he seeks to return the responsibility for black pathology and racist 





“The Virus of Race Prejudice”: Violence and White Pathology in Sutton Griggs’s 
Imperium in Imperio and The Hindered Hand 
A frightening scene takes place in Sutton Griggs’s 1899 novel Imperium in 
Imperio. Belton Piedmont, one of the two African American protagonists, is laid out on 
a dissecting table, unconscious and vulnerable to the whims of Dr. Zackland, a white 
doctor intent on taking advantage of what could be “one of the greatest boons of his 
medical career” (106). Dr. Zackland had appealed to the men who kidnapped Belton to 
take care of his body. He asks them to avoid “any burning or riddling with bullets” 
because Dr. Zackland wants Belton “whole in the interest of society” (105). Belton 
somehow survives the ordeal and kills Dr. Zackland, and before he leaves, Belton 
places Dr. Zackland “on the dissecting board and cover[s] him over with a sheet” (107). 
The scene is unusual because of the modern medical horror it describes and Belton’s 
resistance to it. This image of medicalized violence draws from a long history of 
scientific racism directed at African Americans that benefits from the discourse of black 
pathology, which communicates white supremacist beliefs about black inferiority.81 
This discourse obsessively depicts black physiology and depends on the purported 
objectivity of scientific racism to legitimize its conclusions about black inferiority. In 
                                                
81 Characterizations of black people throughout the nineteenth century contribute to this 
discourse. In Exorcising Blackness, Trudier Harris describes the extreme depictions of 
African Americans in the literary imagination specifically. According to Harris, “The 
black man became the harmless eunuch who could be tolerated if he accepted that role, 
or the raging beast who could be killed without conscience if he did not.” Likewise, 
African American women “became the lascivious slut when her sexual favors were 
desired and the matronly mammy when whites needed someone to care for their 
children” (29). These polarized caricatures contributed to a discourse of racial 
pathology that described black people as dangerous, whether in terms of their 
susceptibility to disease, potential for violence, or uncivilizing moral turpitude. 
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Imperium in Imperio Griggs connects black pathology and the history of dissection, 
medical experimentation, and other threats to black people because contemporary 
assumptions and conclusions about black inferiority enable the violence and 
exploitation depicted in this scene. In this moment, however, Griggs also replaces the 
black body with the white body, symbolically supplanting black pathology with white 
pathology. According to Griggs, the object of inquiry in this scene should not be the 
purported disease at the heart of blackness but the motivating influences and real 
disease of white supremacy. 
In this chapter, I examine the ways Griggs explores a discourse of racial 
pathology to define the essential connection between white supremacist beliefs about 
black physiology and violence committed against African Americans and to resist that 
discourse by appropriating its language. I define “racial pathology” as a broader 
discourse of racial thinking that includes attitudes and assumptions about pathological 
blackness as well as Griggs’s counter-discourse of white pathology that resists white 
supremacist thinking and rejects its assumptions and conclusions.82 Specifically, I 
                                                
82 I am focused on the metaphorical usage of pathology that makes comparisons 
between ideologies and disease in terms of the dangers they pose, their 
communicability, and their explanatory power regarding the complex abstractions of 
race. Black pathology discourse posits that black people suffer from physiological 
deficiencies derived from their distinct racial identity, and the assumptions attendant to 
this idea underwrite white supremacy and justify violence against black people. 
Conversely, pathological white supremacy locates an insidious pathology at the heart of 
white supremacist racial thinking. In this chapter, I am offering a critical usage of 
pathology that describes what might more accurately be called the discursive formation 
of racial pathology—a set of ideas, assumptions, images, and language that makes 
unfounded or dubiously conceived statements about black physiology, racial identity, 
and the violence supposedly justified by these conclusions, as well as a set of parallel 
assumptions used to describe white supremacy. This parallelism results not from any 
ethical or logical equivalency between the two discourses, but through Griggs’s 
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analyze Griggs’s use of the language of disease in two of his most important novels, 
Imperium in Imperio and The Hindered Hand, and I contextualize the image of the 
black man on the dissection board within a history of white supremacist violence that 
relies on beliefs in pathological blackness.83 Most notably in The Hindered Hand and 
the “supplement” that accompanies it, Griggs describes the “virus of race prejudice” 
white supremacy represents. He depicts the pathological nature of race hatred through 
white supremacists’ paranoid fantasies, which threaten an all-out race war, as well as 
the pathological nature of white supremacist racial thinking—its circular logic and 
appeals to the authority of science mark it as particularly dangerous. In both of these 
novels, white supremacy and race hatred lie dormant in all whites, no matter their 
political leanings, waiting to be activated and to wreak destruction. In addition to the 
“disease” of blackness, black pathology discourse in Griggs’s novels targets black 
political empowerment that threatens white supremacist power and fuels paranoia, and 
Griggs explores the limitations of violent resistance in this context. 
The ideology of white supremacy locates black political agency as particularly 
dangerous. For white characters in Imperium, potential black political empowerment is 
a disease that even the most politically conservative African Americans might catch. In 
addition, blackness as disease diminishes supposed differences between political 
attitudes among blacks and emphasizes their common racial identity. For white 
                                                                                                                                          
insistence to analyze white supremacy by way of a kind of immanent critique; by using 
the language of racial pathology discourse, Griggs hopes to subvert it. 
83 Dickson Bruce explains that while white supremacy’s “message” of assumed black 
pathology “was not entirely new,” it “undoubtedly came into its own during the 1890s, 
when it was used to great effect in support of disfranchisement and Jim Crow” (4). The 




supremacists in the novel, blackness is a pathogen that evacuates the potential for 
political identity, leaving only biological identity, which is incapable of reasoned 
political discourse and prone to violence. Associations of blackness with violence and 
criminality likewise infect the thinking of liberal whites in Griggs’s novels and drive 
paranoid fears of black political success, impeding any political progress Griggs and his 
readers might wish for. Accordingly, white characters in both novels view blackness as 
a potentially contagious pathogen borne by the blood that represents a menacing threat 
to white racial identity.84 All of these tropes and assumptions contribute to a discourse 
of racial pathology that demands Griggs’s scrutiny. For Griggs, in a world defined by 
racial thinking in these paranoid terms, all are potential victims of “the virus,” either of 
blackness or of race prejudice. As a result, even well-intentioned white liberals think in 
pathological terms and are limited in the help they can offer African Americans. Griggs 
therefore suggests instead that African Americans must offer their own resistant 
response. 
Griggs’s use of metaphors of pathology is a discursive intervention with two 
direct effects. First, the metaphors indicate Griggs’s political strategy to prevent violent 
resistance. Frequently in both novels, black characters struggle to morally justify 
revolutionary violence in response to genocidal white supremacist violence. For many 
critics, this impossible choice between violence and passive resistance, between 
                                                
84 In Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century 
America, Saidiya Hartman observes the ways that relations of power changed after 
Emancipation to enable “the control and domination of the free black population, and 
the persistent production of blackness as abject, threatening, servile, dangerous, 
dependent, irrational, and infectious” (116). See specifically chapter 6, “Instinct and 
Injury: Bodily Integrity, Natural Affinities, and the Constitution of Equality,” to see 
how she examines in part the trope of blackness as contagion that supports oppression.  
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militancy and accommodationism, represents the political center of the novels. I argue, 
however, that focusing on Griggs’s notion of white supremacist racial pathology reveals 
his struggle between viewing the problem optimistically or hopelessly and avoids the 
trap of trying to divine a particular political identity for Griggs or his protagonists. 
Griggs’s ambivalence is apparent in the debates he sets up between opposed characters 
about resistance strategies, which are always situated within this larger context of 
pathological white supremacy. If white supremacy proves to be incurable, genocidal or 
self-annihilating violence is the only outcome for blacks. If it is curable, Griggs’s 
discursive intervention could represent hope for the future. Ironically, reading Griggs’s 
novels according to a binary logic that attempts to pin down his political position, as 
critics often do, enacts the very phenomenon that Griggs criticizes. Labels like 
“conservative” or “liberal” matter little when white supremacists are intent on black 
genocide and when white supremacist ideology targets language to validate and 
naturalize itself.85 
Second, Griggs’s use of the language of pathology represents another resistant 
strategy by creating the opportunity to subvert this discourse. He ultimately casts white 
supremacy, rather than blackness, as the dangerous virus. He taps into a history of racial 
                                                
85 I use the term “genocide” to refer to white supremacists’ attempts to exterminate 
African Americans in Griggs’s novels. These moments coincide with apocalyptic 
imagery and warnings from white characters about the survival of the black race. I 
distinguish this usage from other pervasive acts of violence against black people that are 
not explicitly directed toward the destruction of the future of the race. Other acts of 
violence of course coincide with attempts at genocide, and there is an expansive 
theoretical literature about the implications of genocide in African American literature, 
but for my purposes in this chapter I limit my usage to this particular way of 
distinguishing discrete acts of violence from a large-scale strategy by white 
supremacists to exterminate the black race. 
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pathology discourse through the language of disease and contagion, as well as through 
his use of the image of dissection, to delineate the ways this discourse justifies violence 
against black people and to hold white supremacy accountable. He rejects both the logic 
and the conclusions of racial thinking, and in his novels he dramatizes its immediate 
and long-term effects, as well as its abstract and more concrete consequences. In 
exploring all of the ways that Griggs casts both race and racism as threatening, 
contagious, and deadly, I note the complexity of his thinking as he considers different 
possibilities and often comes to necessarily contrary conclusions. 
Like the scientific discourse from which it often borrows, racial pathology 
discourse is both theoretical and clinical, and its history reveals attempts to concretize 
irrational beliefs about racial identity. In Difference and Pathology Sander Gilman 
explains the function and consequences of a discourse of race-based pathology. He 
argues “disorder” and “loss of control” are characteristically associated with 
“pathology,” and he asserts that designations of the other as pathological “are an 
efficient way of displacing the consciousness that the self, as a biological entity subject 
to the inexorable rules of aging and decay, ultimately cannot be controlled” (24). 
Consequently, the pathological becomes a site onto which to cathect social anxieties 
and to label others “as potentially corrupting the body politic” (131).86 Furthermore, in 
                                                
86 Nancy Tomes echoes these observations in The Gospel of Germs. In a concerted 
movement of “aggressive health campaigns” around the turn of the century, a wide 
variety of Americans were acculturated to the scientific development around the spread 
of disease and contagions. Social conditions as cause, as well as supposedly risky 
behaviors and cultural practices, contributed to prejudices toward others in terms of 
class, race, and ethnicity. According to Tomes, “For many middle-class Americans in 
the early 1900s, the association of poor, immigrant, and non-white citizens with disease 
germs only deepened their feelings of class prejudice, nativism, and racism.” Further, 
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Race: The History of an Idea in America, Thomas Gossett explores the variable and 
surprising ways racial discourse developed in the United States through clinical 
attempts to justify racist assumptions. He explains that Benjamin Rush, “the friend of 
[Thomas] Jefferson and one of the eminent scientists and philanthropists of his time,” 
who also believed in the “innate equality of the races,” saw “Blackness in Negroes” as 
“a mild and apparently uncontagious form of a disease.” According to Gossett, Rush 
saw the disease as “derived” from leprosy (41).87 Even innate racial equality, in Rush’s 
case, did not have to ignore the supposed fact of racial difference, and these differences 
fueled assumptions about their causes and consequences. These assumptions, 
supposedly verified by the objectivity of science in some cases, contributed to a 
discourse of black racial pathology that persistently denigrated black people in terms of 
their physiology and supported white supremacist justifications for racial categories and 
the violence used to manage them. 
The metaphor of dissection in the Zackland scene illustrates the clinical 
application of racial pathology by spotlighting a long history of medicalized violence on 
the part of white supremacists, spurred on by the supposed objectivity of scientific 
racism. It is a discourse that attempts to justify violence against black bodies by clinical 
observation and in some cases enacts that violence by clinical means. As Harriet 
Washington explains in Medical Apartheid, medical experimentation in the nineteenth 
century affirmed the expendability of black bodies and retroactively justified oppression 
                                                                                                                                          
the “specter of infection served nativists and racists well in their efforts to legitimate 
immigration restriction and racial segregation” (11). 
87 In Epidemics and History: Disease, Power, and Imperialism, Sheldon Watts observes 
that in “the antebellum American South, plantation doctors tended to regard leprosy as 
yet another disease of black people” (43).  
124 
 
by observing supposed black physiological inferiority. For instance, revelations about 
poor health for free blacks as compared to slaves in the 1840 census, including higher 
rates of disease, higher rates of miscarriage and infant mortality, and worse mental 
health served to cast African Americans as helpless and to emphasize the particular 
dangers freedmen faced.88 Slave owners argued that slavery provided health protections 
for slaves that, when removed, would contribute to the health crisis for freedmen. 
Specifically, slave owners explained to northerners the dangers freedom posed for “the 
‘sickly freedmen’ of the North, who sank into debilitating insanity when faced with 
having to provide for themselves or indeed to undergo any of the pressures of daily life 
that whites managed as a matter of course” (146). Defenders of slavery further 
attributed the “probable doom” of African Americans to insanity, lower intelligence, 
and to other physiological dangers “because their profoundly defective bodies were 
prey to a host of diseases that never plagued whites” (147). Washington notes that 
slavery “was also thought necessary to protect whites, because freely roaming sick 
blacks were perceived as vectors of infectious disease.” This belief justified slavery and 
“draconian public-health methods such as racial segregation to contain the contagion of 
freed blacks” (147).89 Much like earlier accusations that freedom after emancipation 
would prove untenable for freedmen, who continued to face economic and social 
                                                
88 As I explain in the Introduction with the example of the 1890 census, the data 
supporting these claims were flawed and, according to Washington, “a mixture of 
accidental and intentional falsehoods” (148). 
89 In “Race, Gender, and the Political Conflation of Biological and Social Issues,” 
Dorothy E. Roberts parallels Washington’s analysis and notes the postbellum tendency 
for scientists to blame “the deteriorating health of the American Negro on a biological 
incapacity to adjust to freedom,” and she observes that “[l]ocating Blacks’ inferior 
status in their diseased bodies provided a reason for retaining White supremacy and 
discredited the need for radical social transformation” (239). 
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oppression, Reconstruction-era white supremacist logic utilized assumptions of black 
inferiority to guide conclusions about black inferiority, supported by a discourse of 
black physiological and mental pathology. 
Additionally, the historical record of the objectification, analysis, and 
exploitation of black bodies through dissection demonstrates how a particularly 
medicalized violence like the scene in Dr. Zackland’s laboratory might resonate with 
Griggs’s readers, especially African American ones.90 In Race and Medicine, Todd 
Savitt examines the use of black cadavers especially for dissection and medical 
experimentation performed on African Americans in the nineteenth century. Savitt 
notes that there was “extensive use” of black bodies—both living and dead—“in 
Southern medical schools and in research activities” (77). Both slaves and “free persons 
of color” were vulnerable targets “in a society sensitive to and separated by race” (77).91 
Such an environment provoked fear of medical schools and hospitals, as both African 
Americans and vulnerable poor whites feared that “experiments might be performed on 
them and that they would be permitted to die so autopsies could be undertaken” (80).92 
                                                
90 The editors of the Modern Library edition of Imperium in Imperio affirm in the 
Introduction that Griggs self-published the novel and sold it door to door in part to 
target black readers. 
91 David Humphrey makes similar claims in “Dissection and Discrimination: the Social 
Origins of Cadavers in America, 1760–1915.” He observes that “[m]any Americans 
considered dissection a degrading and sacrilegious practice, an act to be inflicted on an 
outcast as punishment—much like the medieval rite of drawing and quartering a 
criminal” (819). Consequently, “dissection remained a humiliation imposed on social 
outcasts” (824). 
92 Washington draws a parallel between this particular medical racial history and the 
history of lynching, and she echoes Savitt’s analysis of the centrality of medical 
dissection to this history. She traces a history of medicalized terror and fear over three 
centuries, and she notes that in the nineteenth century an increased need for cadavers, 
coupled with the general cultural abhorrence of dissection, influenced the exploitation 
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Savitt further observes that these instances extended into the postbellum period, 
galvanized by the proliferation of the Ku Klux Klan and white rumors of “night-
doctors” who “stole, killed, and then dissected African Americans” (83). Much like 
lynching, both the murders and the environment of fear and terror they perpetuated 
made clear to African American citizens that their lives were expendable and under 
constant threat. And while the true motives of lynching often receded behind claims of 
divine justice or appeals to atavistic human drives, this history of medical violence was 
enacted with the legitimacy of science.93  
Griggs’s novels join the theoretical aspect of racial pathology to this history of 
its clinical execution. Dr. Zackland observes the utility of Belton’s anatomy and notes 
that Belton was “a fine specimen of physical manhood” and that his “limbs were well 
                                                                                                                                          
of black bodies (121). Moreover, Washington asserts this exploitation in terms of 
slavery, as “anatomical dissection … represented a profound level of control over 
[black] bodies, illustrating that [African Americans] were not even free in death” (125). 
She describes rare cases of legalized “execution and dissection” sentences for violent 
criminals, and she points out that the description of a black man first hanged and then 
dissected around 1800 “evokes an appallingly circus-like atmosphere, one hard to 
distinguish from that characterizing a lynching” (124). Whether through these rare legal 
cases or from the illegal traffic of bodies stolen by grave robbers—ironically dubbed 
“resurrectionists”—white fascination with and abuse of black bodies contributed to and 
depended on a discourse of racial pathology. For Washington, this context of 
medicalized exploitation and violence, extending well beyond the twentieth century, 
animates persistent fears about medical intervention in African American communities. 
In Griggs’s novels, this history of exploitation and fear provides the ground from which 
Griggs launches his critique of pathological white supremacy and racist violence. 
93 Savitt cites Gladys-Marie Fry’s Night Riders in Black Folk History, which devotes a 
chapter to the Ku Klux Klan’s exploitation of these fears. As Savitt and Washington 
note, these claims of legitimacy increased as wanton acts of violence became less 
acceptable in the broader society. Slave owners saw no problem with treating their 
property as they pleased, which often included medical experimentation. See chapter 2 
of Washington’s Medical Apartheid. 
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formed, well proportioned and seemed as strong as oak” (99). Dr. Zackland’s 
fascination with Belton’s physique and his appeal to a higher purpose for this torture 
and murder—for the betterment of society through scientific research—belie his true 
motivations, which mirror those of lynching. According to Dr. Zackland and his men, 
Belton looked “a little tony” and was “getting too high” (100, 104). While Dr. Zackland 
claims that Belton’s dissection will benefit the interest of society, no reader, especially 
one familiar with the nineteenth-century history of dissection of African Americans, 
believes that this act will result in anything but the destruction of a black body in 
another instance of white supremacist violence. Examples from dissection history 
reflect the ways that objectification and exploitation of black bodies and their assumed 
pathologies perpetuated the genocidal violence of white supremacy and demonstrate 
how these acts are interdependent with the discourse of racial pathology. In Imperium 
and The Hindered Hand, as well as in the “supplement” he appends to his novel, Griggs 
explores the ways that white supremacist thinking enacts violence, and he cautions 
readers about the limits of violent resistance. 
Critics register a relatively wide range of readings of Griggs’s novels, due to 
their expansiveness and complexity but also to Griggs’s commitment to exploring the 
contours of what Tess Chakkalakal and Kenneth Warren call “his political present” 
(12). As a black writer at the “nadir of African American race relations,” as Rayford 
Logan has famously labeled the period in which Griggs was writing, Griggs depicts a 
complex and urgent political and social environment for African Americans.94 His 
novels often create the expectation of a coherent political strategy in response to such 
                                                
94 See Rayford Logan’s The Negro in American life and thought: the nadir, 1877–1901. 
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conditions by exploring the relationship between the two ends of a polarized 
approach—one suggesting violent resistance and the other passive accommodation.95 In 
many cases, though, critical responses derive first from this seemingly binary structure, 
if only to result in critics rejecting it, with a preference for “a dualism rather than a 
binary” in Robert Levine’s case, or observing, in the case of John Ernest, “the middle 
ground” Griggs occupies between “the opposing poles of militancy and moderation” 
(189). Dickson Bruce sees Griggs as “unable to come to grips with the ambiguities that 
were so strong in black ideas and concerns during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries” (156). Further, Bruce argues that in the two novels I address in this 
chapter, Griggs “did not clearly endorse either position” in a choice between 
moderation and militancy (162).  Roger Whitlow ascribes the polarity in Griggs’s texts 
to a pervading sense of “ambivalence” in black resistance. John Gruesser observes that 
Griggs’s use of double characters, and the “idiosyncrasies, ambivalences, and 
ambiguities” that accompany it, lead to “widely diverse and in some cases starkly 
discrepant responses to the author” (50-1).96 These critics seek to move beyond 
reductive readings, as the apparent polarity of the political options in Griggs’s novels 
often prove to be much more nuanced than such readings allow. And they are right that 
Griggs does not provide a clear solution; in the two novels I address here, solutions are 
simply not available. To examine Griggs’s ambivalence and his complex analysis of 
resistance, I provide a careful analysis of the pathologies of white supremacist ideology 
                                                
95 In “Literary Garveyism: The Novels of Reverend Sutton E. Griggs,” Wilson J. Moses 
claims that the two protagonists of Imperium in Imperio “represent two antagonistic sets 
of traits commonly associated with the personalities of Afro-Americans” (208). 
96 Harris sees a lack of thematic coherence on Griggs’s part, and she claims that he “has 




and its seemingly intractable and irreducible status among all whites—liberal, 
conservative, radical, Northern as well as Southern. These conditions make resistance 
difficult to theorize because white supremacy is so ubiquitous and genocide is such a 
real possibility. 
Consequently, the extreme violence Griggs so graphically depicts in his novels 
forces one to examine its causes. In his novels, according to Andrea Williams, “Black 
Americans seldom die from old age of proverbial ‘natural causes’” and “nothing could 
be more unnatural than how his characters perish or experience loss” (92). In 
Remapping Citizenship and the Nation in African-American Literature, Stephen 
Knadler notes the “shocking spectacles of sensational violence” in Griggs’s novels and 
argues that “what readers remember about his thrillers are less their convoluted stories 
than particular moments of psychological and emotional shock, or spectacles of 
horror…” (152).97 At times his characters are hopeful and, whether conservative or 
radical, they believe they can effect meaningful change. At other times they are 
pessimistic, as if failure is guaranteed, no matter the political strategy. A white character 
in Imperium implores a black protagonist to remember that “there is a good side to the 
                                                
97 The most discussed spectacle of violence is the graphic description of the lynching of 
Bud and Foresta Harper in The Hindered Hand. They are tortured for three hours, 
including having their bodies bored through with a kind of corkscrew. They are finally 
burned alive, as one of the perpetrators “stood near his mutilated victims until the 
photographer present could take a picture of the scene” (134). For Harris, these 
moments are particularly important for how they reveal historical realities. Through his 
depictions of violence Griggs attempts to “convince his audience of the need for better 
laws and equal justice” (80). Revolutionary violence in this case must be avoided 
through an appeal to institutional protections. In this chapter I avoid the most shocking 
spectacles of violence and focus on Griggs’s investigation of the discourse of racial 
pathology. While examples of physical violence pervade his novels, Griggs’s 
intervention on this discourse illustrates the kinship between language and physical 
violence, including the ways discourse and violence can subsume political rationality. 
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character of the worst class” (37). That same character later defends a gradualist 
position, asserting that if civil rights “had all come when they first belonged” to them, 
African Americans “would have been unprepared” (157). At the same time, this 
position coexists with numerous examples of racist violence driven by white fears and 
racial pathology that show discursive change and gradualism are foolish and ineffectual. 
Characters advocate for violent revolution as a response to the imminent existential 
threat of white supremacy, and in these moments a catastrophic race war seems certain. 
As a result, in both novels Griggs tracks conflicting political positions and their relation 
to realities of racist violence, and he emphasizes the complexity of black resistance in 
this context. 
In Imperium in Imperio, Griggs maps possibilities for black political resistance 
onto a coming-of-age story, and in the process he analyzes how violence imbues racial 
thinking and proscribes possibilities for resistance. Instead of merely tracing the 
political development of the two main characters, Griggs shows them reckoning with 
violence at every step, illustrating how white supremacist fear and paranoia influence 
their lives. Imperium follows the lives of Belton Piedmont and Bernard Belgrave from 
their youth in nineteenth-century Texas, and their beginnings in school together prelude 
different political trajectories for the two men. Belton, who is dark skinned, grows up 
poor with a single mother and represents a gradualist position regarding African 
American political rights and social equality. Bernard, who is light skinned, represents a 
more militant position and eventually becomes president of the “Imperium,” the 
underground political organization committed to establishing an independent African 
American state within Texas. Griggs illustrates the ways that racial thinking and its 
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relationship to violence affects political outcomes particularly by focusing on their 
childhood as a crucible for their political development and by examining the ways that 
both characters are guilty of romanticizing violence. 
Griggs demonstrates the extreme nature of white supremacist violence first by 
elucidating the temptation of a violent resistant response. According to Griggs, because 
of the ways white supremacists see the world in terms of racial pathology—with 
blackness cast as a contagion and black empowerment an essential danger and a 
communicative disease itself—resistant responses cannot romanticize revolutionary 
violence. Doing so will only lead to death, not an effective revolution. As both boys 
attend the same high school, Griggs uses their parallel development to show their 
common ideological origins. Both boys romanticize and lay claim to an American 
revolutionary spirit as the part of history “that charmed them most was the story of 
rebellion against the yoke of England” (25). But as the novel progresses and the boys 
begin to experience the realities of living in the United States as black men in the 1890s, 
their strategies for survival begin to diverge. Griggs does not, however, allow the reader 
to forget their common roots.  
Griggs’s references to their origins suggest a nostalgia for childhood innocence 
isolated from racist violence and prejudice and united with a common national history 
that illustrates the productive use of violence to make political gains. But the 
romanticized revolutionary violence the boys idolize in their youth shares no similarity 
with what they will have to endure as black men in America, despite the different paths 
their lives take, because pathological white supremacy is committed to ensuring that 
black men cannot resist in the same way white men resisted other white men in the 
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Revolutionary War. Further, white supremacist violence against black men lacks the 
moral clarity of revolutionary violence, and Griggs emphasizes an apparent disease at 
the heart of white supremacist thinking as a result. While Belton endures an attempted 
“scientific” dissection/murder by Dr. Zackland and more scrutiny due to his 
complexion, Bernard is rejected by Viola, his love interest, because she has inculcated 
white supremacist beliefs about the dangers of the mulatto to race “vitality.”98 Though 
Bernard experiences class privilege because of his father, a white senator, and Belton 
has fewer opportunities because of his humble roots, both of their opportunities are 
limited by their racial identities in a white supremacist world. They both must face the 
realities of white supremacist violence and its pathological nature, regardless of the 
tenor of their political strategies. 
 The men’s paths first diverge after high school graduation, as Bernard’s 
connections in the white world gain him admission to Harvard while Belton attends a 
black college in the South, but both men continue their education about the 
pervasiveness of pathological racial thinking. Both men witness how white supremacy 
operates during their collegiate experience, and Belton in particular recognizes the 
threat he poses to whites, regardless of what he believes or what actions he takes. Mr. 
King, Belton’s white benefactor, whose views on “the Negro problem” are “regarded by 
the white people of the South as ultraliberal,” fears the dangers Belton will face because 
                                                
98 This strain of my argument will become clear later in this chapter when I focus on a 
character in The Hindered Hand who is similarly affected by white supremacist 
thought. In Imperium, Viola Martin reads a book titled “White Supremacy and Negro 
Subordination” that argues against the “intermingling of races” and warns against race 
suicide. A common critique of miscegenation, this argument also privileges the 
“vitality” of Anglo Saxon blood as being a threat to “Negro blood,” overtaking it and 
diluting “the vitality of the Negro race” (118-9). 
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he is black, and Mr. King has the same concerns about all educated African American 
men, regardless of their backgrounds or political affiliations (33). King’s fear is 
grounded in his belief that educated black men, specifically those with a notion of 
liberty, agitate the fears of white supremacists. Thus, his assumptions of black racial 
pathology militate against any “liberal” attitudes he might hold. King is particularly 
upset by educated African Americans’ access to the history of revolutionary 
accomplishments—the opportunity “to read history and learn what real liberty was”—, 
and King “foresaw that the rising, educated negro would allow his eye to linger long on 
this bloody but glorious page until that most contagious of diseases, devotion to liberty, 
infected his soul” (33, italics mine). In this moment, the reader recalls the description of 
both boys’ primary education, and their attraction to the history of the Revolution. 
According to King’s formulation, both boys have already contracted the disease.99 In 
this context, the metaphor of liberty as disease or infection articulates the fear of 
African American men as dangerous, with a propensity for revolutionary violence. But 
the metaphor also engages broader fears of African American men as social contagion 
and threat.  
The “disease of liberty” threatens political action represented by white fear of 
black revolution, the outcome of which King sees as a “foregone conclusion in favor of 
his own race.” King “shuddered at the awful carnage that would of necessity ensue if 
                                                
99 King’s name suggests the problematic nature of his status as “ultraliberal.” In the 
context of the American Revolution, King represents the Old World that justifies a 
revolutionary break toward freedom and individual sovereignty. Ironically, the 
revolutionary spirit that identifies King’s problematic position is available to both white 
supremacists and African Americans, which runs counter to white supremacists’ beliefs. 




two races … equally disdainful of life, fighting with the rancor always attendant upon a 
struggle between two races that mutually despise and detest each other,” came into 
violent conflict (34). The narrator’s designation of liberty as a contagion, the broader 
context of the belief in the sexual and criminal threat African American men posed that 
the discourse of black pathology codifies, and the description of the violence resulting 
from two races “disdainful of life” and the “rancor” that always attends the struggle 
between two such races suggests a catastrophic race war instead of a politically 
motivated rebellion.100 And the language of pathology enables that vision. In this 
moment, Belton’s white benefactor is both liberal pragmatist and unwitting white 
supremacist. King simultaneously fears a clash between the races that must end terribly 
for African Americans. But as is also evident through the metaphor of the “disease of 
liberty,” he is equally fearful that the African American desire for freedom poses an 
existential threat to whites. These metaphors of disease and contagion, when considered 
alongside the central threat to whites that animates the novel—the existence of a secret 
black state lying in wait—manifest the white anxiety at the heart of white supremacy. 
Furthermore, King paints the conservative character of the conservative/radical dyad in 
terms usually reserved for the obvious radical threat because he sees Belton’s existence 
itself as representative of violence and danger, regardless of Belton’s particular politics. 
In the context of white supremacist discourses of black pathology, any black man is 
only one decision (or action) away from violence. 
                                                
100 Griggs addresses this fear in more detail in The Hindered Hand. Anxiety about a 
final conflict between the races, one in which the Anglo Saxon will prevail, brings 
together white supremacist anxiety about social equality with turn-of-the-century 
fascination with Anglo Saxonism. See Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace. 
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 Griggs follows this instance with another example of the metaphor of black 
political activity as disease, but this time he complicates the metaphor by including the 
white supremacist fear of miscegenation more explicitly. In this example, black political 
empowerment is particularly dangerous because any notion of social equality leads to 
race mixing. Belton creates a skirmish at his university when he notices that the sole 
black teacher does not eat lunch with the white teachers. He proposes to his classmates 
that he aims to “coerce” the white teachers into “allowing the colored teacher to eat 
with them.” The classmates agree, as this had been a persistent conversation among 
them, and are surprised that in the past “no one dared to suggest a combination.” The 
narrator explains, “During slavery all combinations of slaves were sedulously guarded 
against, and a fear of combinations seems to have been injected into the Negro’s very 
blood” (44-5). Griggs’s pun on “combinations”—as both political organizing and racial 
mixing—conflates fear of black political action with fear of social equality and calls 
attention to the way white supremacy animates African American “fear of 
combinations” in pathological terms. The narrator’s image of inoculation conveys white 
fears about black political activity. Much like King’s reference to the disease of 
“devotion to liberty,” whites must be protected from black political activity and the risk 
of insurrection. Additionally, in terms contemporaneous to the novel’s post-slavery plot, 
the new “fear of combinations” finds its form in attempts at social equality, including 
miscegenation. 
Griggs seizes on this white anxiety as a recurring motif in this novel and in The 
Hindered Hand, as miscegenation represents the ultimate violation of racial borders and 
is likely to provoke white supremacist violence. In the case of the teachers’ dining 
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arrangements, even Belton’s most innocuous actions are revolutionary because of his 
racial identity. Further, Griggs’s use of metaphors of disease demonstrates that white 
supremacy depends on a discourse of racial pathology to operate. And he exploits white 
anxiety by depicting its paranoid and disordered nature. The more he investigates this 
discourse, the more its grounding in fear and violence alarms him. At the same time, 
Belton’s strategy ultimately works, and the teachers “felt like hens who had lost their 
broods.” For them, the “cringing, fawning, sniffling, cowardly Negro which slavery left, 
had disappeared, and a New Negro, self-respecting, fearless, and determined in the 
assertion of his rights was at hand” (46). The moment allows the “future leaders of their 
race” to learn “the power of combinations, and that white men could be made to 
capitulate to colored men under certain circumstances” (47).101 The “certain 
circumstances” in this case are unclear—they are, after all, at a black university 
committed to educating future race leaders—which qualifies their success. While the 
event motivates Belton’s continued political activity, it is also cautionary. Griggs 
reminds readers that there are circumstances in which resistance will not be tolerated. 
Eventually, these variable applications of pathological language come together 
in a white character’s bizarre speech. Belton attends Stowe University, named after the 
author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and therefore suggestive of non-radical politics. Upon 
                                                
101 Eric Curry highlights this moment of success in “‘The Power of Combinations’: 
Sutton Griggs’ Imperium in Imperio and the Science of Collective Efficiency.” He 
couples Griggs’s novel with a later sociological work by Griggs to argue that this scene, 
as well as the novel’s “ambiguous ending,” presents “combinations” as productive of a 
collective strategy for resistance. As a result, the ending of Imperium “should be read as 
a call to collective action on the part of the audience and an abdication of authorial 
control” (24). As I make clear in this chapter, I agree that the novel advocates a resistant 
position, but focusing on Griggs’s pathological language complicates that strategy. 
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Belton’s graduation, the university president, Dr. Lovejoy, “a venerable white minister 
from the North,” addresses the graduates. While his overall message is about black 
leadership and humility, which greatly influences Belton, the metaphors in the speech 
draw from the discourse of racial pathology, and they risk delivering problematic and 
conflicting messages.102 Dr. Lovejoy expresses white supremacist anxiety about 
blackness as contagion in an effort to protect black students from a racially defined 
world. In the process, he unwittingly reveals that he can only understand the world in 
pathological terms, and he, a white liberal, is therefore complicit in the construction and 
maintenance of the racial caste system. As the rest of the novel explores strategies of 
resistance, Griggs implores his audience in this section to know their enemy. White 
supremacy is inherent even in supposedly liberal white allies. All whites, in the end, 
think in terms of racial pathology. 
In his speech, Dr. Lovejoy refers to the graduates as “surgeons” who must 
navigate the “body” of the world carefully to advance their lives and avoid falling 
victim to its dangers. Griggs brings together blackness as disease, black physiological 
deficiency, and a view of the racial caste system expressed in pathological terms to 
assert a white supremacist view of the world and to identify white supremacist 
pathology. As this complex metaphor is the central subject of this section, it is worth 
quoting in full: 
“The world is like unto a wounded animal that has run a 
long way and now lies stretched upon the ground, the 
                                                
102 Griggs identifies Lovejoy’s potentially liberal tendencies as soon as he introduces 
him, just as he did with the “ultraliberal” Mr. King. By doing so, Griggs immediately 
signals that Lovejoy’s political status deserves scrutiny. 
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blood oozing forth from gaping wounds and pains darting 
through its entire frame … So, young men, do not look 
upon this dying, decaying world to feed and support you. 
You must feed and support it. Carry fresh, warm, 
invigorating blood in your veins to inject into the veins of 
the world. This is far safer and nobler than sticking the 
lance into the swollen veins of the world, to draw forth its 
putrid blood for your own use. I not only exhort you but I 
warn you. You may go to this dying animal as a surgeon, 
and proceed to cut off the sound portions for your own 
use. You may deceive the world for awhile, but it will, ere 
long, discover whether you are a vandal or a surgeon; and 
if it finds you to be the former, when you are closest to its 
bosom, it will squeeze you tightly and tear your face to 
shreds.” (49) 
The speech contains contradictory registers that reflect Griggs’s ambivalence 
about black resistance and white liberal allies. Griggs recalls the image of the dissection 
table, though he now casts African Americans in the place of the “surgeon.” Dr. 
Lovejoy exhorts the young graduates “to feed and support” the “dying, decaying” world 
by “[c]arry[ing] fresh, warm, invigorating blood in your veins to inject into the veins of 
the world.” He advises that “[t]his is far safer than sticking the lance into the swollen 
veins of the world, to draw forth its putrid blood for your own use” (49). Through Dr. 
Lovejoy’s speech, Griggs recalls the image of injection in the “fear of combinations” 
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passage, though in this case he seems to advocate for black inoculation against the 
dangers of the world, rather than for white protection from blackness.103 The lance 
again transfers blood, this time with positive associations, and the infective quality of 
that blood posits a message of social improvement to these young African American 
men, tasking them with making positive changes in the world and empowering them as 
examples of Du Bois’s “Talented Tenth.” The metaphor anticipates Viola Martin’s 
belief, as well as Eunice Seabright’s in The Hindered Hand, in the dominant quality of 
“Anglo Saxon blood” that can overwhelm “Negro blood” and pose a threat to the future 
of the black race. Dr. Lovejoy seems to suggest that black blood could influence the 
ostensibly white world, “to feed and support it.” But because he presents the 
possibilities for positive social improvement in the language of racial pathology, Dr. 
Lovejoy unwittingly reveals white anxieties about black proliferation and illustrates that 
race can only be understood within this discourse. Like the qualified success of the 
combinations episode, this scene reveals Griggs’s appreciation for the complexities of 
black resistance. Though their cause is just and their influence might be great, the 
                                                
103 The lance as metaphor returns later when Belton, after failing in his romantic pursuit 
of Viola Martin, who loves Bernard instead, uses the self-restraint he learned in school 
to abandon his feelings of jealousy and his desire for revenge. The narrator states, “And 
it was well for the world that this young negro had been trained in a school where there 
was a friendly lance to open his veins and let out this most virulent of poisons” (78-9). 
The narrator responds directly to the discourse of black pathology by affirming the 
danger Belton might pose to society if his anger had no outlet. The “friendly lance” of 
education allowed him to consider the situation rationally instead of acting on his 
passions. In this case rational thought, largely dismissed for black people in black 
pathology discourse, circumvents violence. When Griggs later describes white 
supremacy as a pathology given over to irrational passion, this moment of self-control 
proves more provocative. 
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graduates must be careful about how they encounter a world that is dubious of their 
motives and threatened by any overt displays of political resistance. 
The world’s “putrid” blood that requires new life cannot be divested from the 
larger historical context of this scene, in which African American men are being urged 
into a world that provides moral and physical dangers. And like Mr. King’s advice, Dr. 
Lovejoy’s speech is actually a warning. While he offers sound advice about successful 
leadership avoiding egoism that would threaten the cause, he also manages the border 
between white and black. Behave yourselves, he warns, or face the consequences. Dr. 
Lovejoy ostensibly seeks to empower these black students, but his rhetoric reveals that, 
despite their desire for success, the graduates’ race will always structure the way they, 
and all African Americans, are understood in a white world. Those immediate 
consequences might be to their effectiveness as leaders of their race, or they might be 
more existentially threatening, as the white world will not abide an incautious black 
leader.104 Dr. Lovejoy’s distinct warning about one’s encounters with this world, 
therefore, is shrouded in the conventions of the moment—a white benefactor’s 
paternalistic advice to his black students—that undercut his virtuous intentions. 
Griggs’s image of the dissecting table in this scene casts African Americans as 
the physicians, charged with navigating the metaphorical body—the social body—with 
surgical precision. While the metaphor apparently places African Americans in an 
empowered position, the language of racial pathology reminds readers that they cannot 
ignore the persistence of this discourse. Acting recklessly, as a “vandal,” will result in 
                                                
104 As the novel progresses, Belton’s absorption of this advice both benefits him and 
harms him, which reflects Griggs’s ambivalence. It tempers his resistance strategy, as 
he couches his approach in nonviolence, but it cannot save his life. 
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the kind of fatal “mistakes”—acting “too toney,” to recall Belton’s supposed crime—
that white supremacists point to as justification for racial violence. In the dissection 
scene with Dr. Zackland and Belton, Dr. Zackland’s psychotic desire to dissect Belton 
might recall the image of the vandal, even though Lovejoy’s advice was directed 
specifically toward African Americans. Dr. Zackland is a white supremacist agent 
obsessed with dismantling and destroying the African American body for the benefit of 
whites. The supposed social benefit of dissection only thinly veils the true purpose—to 
annihilate African Americans.105 In contrast, Dr. Lovejoy’s use of the image of 
dissection seeks to motivate future black leaders to navigate the world carefully, but he 
nevertheless indicates how racial pathology discourse grounds his thinking. He warns 
the men not to act as a “burrowing parasite, feasting off of the world’s raw blood,” 
instead directing them to “[l]et the world draw life” from them. He warns them to “[u]se 
not the misfortunes of your people as stones of a monument erected to your name” (50-
1). This language cautions future race leaders to stay true to their beliefs and their 
constituents, but it also repeats the call to inject their blood into the world, an 
articulation of a nightmare scenario for white supremacists. The literal manifestation of 
this metaphor for white supremacists—miscegenation—represents another threat in 
                                                
105 The consequences of Zackland’s supposed desire to learn from his psychotic 
experiments are reflected in a nineteenth-century poem included in Savitt’s Race and 
Medicine, “The Dissecting Table.” The last three stanzas of the poem describe white 
medical students subduing and kidnapping African American victims for medical 
experiments. After they “drag dat poor dead nigger chile / Right een dat ‘sectin hall,” 
they “‘vestigate ‘is liver—lights— / His gizzard and his gall.” The final stanza describes 
the indiscriminate dismantling of the body: “Tek off dat nigger’s han’s an’ feet— / His 
eyes, his head an’ all, / An’ w’en dem stujent finish / Dey was nothin’ left at all” (83). 
Whatever the supposed benefits of such experiments, like Dr. Zackland’s they originate 
in kidnapping and murder, and they result in the literal disintegration of the black body. 
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terms of pathological discourse. Given Griggs’s usage of pathological language at 
moments of white intervention upon potential black resistance, this instance makes clear 
that black responses must account for probable white supremacist responses. Like King, 
Dr. Lovejoy aims to prepare Belton for a “successful” life, not for a socially equal, and 
therefore revolutionary, life. At the heart of Griggs’s depiction of Dr. Lovejoy’s advice, 
then, is that in this moment of white paternalism and black conservatism, the distinction 
between conservative and radical shifts under the weight of white supremacist thinking. 
Belton may as well represent black radicalism, not conservatism, as white paranoia 
about his very existence ascribes to him a potential for violence, regardless of what he 
does. What Griggs makes clear is that Dr. Lovejoy seeks to protect African Americans 
by denying their political agency and that his commitment to white supremacist 
pathological thinking, in addition to his paternalistic worldview, overshadows his 
purported positive motivations. Like Mr. King, Dr. Lovejoy can only read race in 
pathological terms; neither man can escape the pathology of white supremacy. 
 Griggs’s depiction of these two supposedly sympathetic white characters reveals 
his doubt about African Americans’ ability to depend on white liberalism because of its 
relation to white supremacist thought, particularly through its articulation in the latter’s 
language of pathological blackness, and he explores possibilities for black-authored 
resistance. The end of the novel provides possible political choices, pitting Belton’s 
apparent conservatism against Bernard’s militant call for violent resistance.106 Belton 
                                                
106 Bernard’s radicalization takes place because of his love interest Viola Martin’s 
suicide. She refuses to marry him because of his mixed-race identity, and her absorption 
of white supremacist attitudes motivate her commitment to racial separatism. Bernard, 
in a fit of grief after her death, cries out, “By the eternal heavens these abominable 
horrors shall cease. The races, whose union has been fraught with every curse known to 
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calls Bernard to Waco, Texas, and tells him about the Imperium, indicating also that the 
secret members, who have been following Bernard’s progress through Harvard and in 
his political career, want to offer Bernard the presidency of the Imperium. Bernard 
accepts and puts forward his plan for revolution, and Belton responds with a plea for 
patience. From one perspective, this showdown represents the validation of Belton’s 
more conservative approach, as he stands up to Bernard and eventually dies a martyr. 
Griggs’s exploration of violence in this scene, however, is more nuanced than a simple 
endorsement of nonviolence over violent revolution. Griggs recalls the men’s childhood 
romanticization of violence, as well as the pathological nature of white supremacy, to 
assert that the race-based violence of white supremacy is something different, and 
consequently the scene results in the ambiguous ending critics have observed. Both men 
privilege revolutionary violence as justifiable, but only Belton realizes that their white 
supremacist enemy’s violence is an ultimate limit point. Despite the ostensibly opposed 
political positions of the protagonists, the reader cannot come to a consistent and 
coherent conclusion, at least not within the polarized terms of their argument.  
Griggs’s ambivalence at the end of the novel results from his inability to 
abandon hope, even in the face of the genocidal aims of white supremacy. In Bernard’s 
speech to the Imperium, he claims that both the revolutionary spirit of the Anglo Saxon 
and white responsibility for slavery derive from a violent potential defined by force, but 
he fails to recognize the extent of its consequences. The realities of white supremacist 
violence and Belton’s insistence that, although revolutionary violence is the last option, 
                                                                                                                                          
earth and hell, must separate. Viola demands it and Bernard obeys” (120). The moment 
allows Griggs to explain the dangers of white supremacist thinking and to emphasize its 
obsession with miscegenation. 
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it must nevertheless be an option, undercut his gradualist position. Belton suggests 
revealing the existence of the Imperium and demonstrating to whites that an 
oppositional force exists with the potential to fight if necessary. According to Gabriel 
Briggs, “[t]o engage in such action is to expose the sword of hope; a veiled threat that 
reveals the opportunity for action” (169). Belton’s hope for the future resides in his 
belief in the potential for people to change their minds, but his is a temporary hope 
backed by the threat of violence. Further, by giving voice to Bernard’s position, Griggs 
carefully lays out the white supremacist pathology that might justify revolutionary 
violence. In both cases, Belton and Bernard appeal to the possibility of violence as a 
solution, echoing their childhood glorification of violence as a virtuous revolutionary 
act. 
Bernard states, “That same hammer and anvil that forged the steel sword of the 
Anglo-Saxon, with which he fought for freedom from England’s yoke, also forged the 
chain that the Anglo-Saxon used to bind the negro more securely in the thralldom of 
slavery” (141). Despite Bernard’s commitment to a revolutionary response, his parallel 
of the Revolution and slavery for the Anglo Saxon suggests that the Anglo Saxon 
commitment to force is categorically different from what drives Bernard and Belton. 
Bernard effectively treats white supremacy as a political enemy that demands a 
proportionate response. If violence will remain an option for the conservative Belton, 
the Anglo Saxon version of that violence must be an adulteration of the morally 
justified violence of the American Revolution. To misapprehend the pathological nature 
of white supremacist violence is to run headlong toward the apocalyptic future Griggs 
depicts in The Hindered Hand. White supremacy is not a conventional political enemy; 
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it is a global threat. For Bernard, white supremacist violence poses the same threat as it 
did during slavery. Part of what motivates the urgency for his revolutionary response is 
that white supremacy continues to be unchallenged on its own terms, with violence. 
Belton offers a putatively nonviolent alternative, but he ultimately proves just as 
naive as Bernard in his attitudes toward violence. Belton responds to Bernard’s 
argument that violence is the only viable option by saying that there is indeed one more 
weapon, “the pen,” and he pleads with his audience to “let us devote our attention to 
that mightier weapon” if blacks are to be denied the ballot (164). Belton argues for the 
pen as a way to “change the conception which the Anglo-Saxon has formed of our 
character.” The pen will allow them to “pull the veil from before the eyes of the Anglo-
Saxon that he may see the New Negro standing before him humbly, but firmly 
demanding every right granted him by his maker and wrested from him by man” (163). 
Bernard responds to Belton’s optimism, asserting that he “know[s] the Anglo-Saxon 
race” and that “he will never admit you to equality with him” (169). On the one hand, 
Belton’s appeal seems to be in line with a gradualist position that stresses patience and a 
nonviolent political response. On the other, both Belton and the reader are quite aware 
of the dangers posed by white supremacy. Consequently, Belton assures his audience 
and Bernard that despite Belton’s appeals to sentiment, violence remains a last resort. 
Belton proposes “[t]hat [they] spend four years in endeavors to impress the 
Anglo-Saxon that he has a New Negro on his hands and must surrender what belongs to 
him.” If the whites prove unconvinced, Belton suggests that African Americans will 
then emigrate to Texas and, due to their “unquestioned majority of votes,” take over the 
state government. Belton still insists at this point on a nonviolent resolution. He calls 
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this proposition “primarily pacific” but “firm and unyielding.” He says, “It courts a 
peaceable adjustment, yet it does not shirk war, if war is forced” (163-4, italics mine). 
Belton’s final warning, given what the reader might assume will be a negative reaction 
based on the picture of white supremacy the novel has painted, prepares the Imperium 
for war. He says, “But be prepared, if he deems us unfit for so great a boon, to buckle 
on our swords and go forth to win our freedom with the sword just as has been done by 
all other nations of men” (165). Griggs’s final resolution to the apparent choice between 
Belton and Bernard’s positions is to make no choice at all. The associations of white 
supremacy with pathology transcend the characters’ conflict about violence and enable 
an alternative resolution for Griggs, one that reveals the author’s ambivalence but also 
emphasizes the pathological nature of white supremacy. 
Like Bernard, Belton hearkens back to that notion of revolutionary violence that 
inspired both school boys. Despite their supposed political differences, both men agree 
that violence can effect social change; the difference lies in where to assign the limit. At 
the same time, the reader recalls the ambiguity at the center of Mr. King’s and Dr. 
Lovejoy’s speeches. Despite the apparent differences between their liberal attitudes and 
the conventional racial politics of the South, Belton’s conservatism loses its significance 
in the face of the threats justified by pathological blackness. Because even white liberals 
emphasize Belton’s racial identity at the expense of his political opinions, they diminish 
the importance of political opinions and unwittingly emphasize the existential danger 
white supremacist violence posed. 
Rather than choosing sides, Griggs introduces a third character—Berl Trout—to 
attempt to resolve the supposed tension between Belton’s gradualism and Bernard’s 
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militancy. By doing so, he ends the novel with a final warning about the future of white 
supremacy and the inability of violent resistance to counter it. The Imperium chooses 
Bernard’s path, despite Belton’s plea for patience and a promise of violence if 
necessary. When Belton decides he must ultimately leave the group, he is executed. 
Afterward, Berl Trout, a member of the Imperium, betrays the organization by revealing 
its identity thereby destroying the organization that has relied on its secrecy. Trout 
witnesses Bernard standing over Belton’s grave and expressing his grief in a “fearful, 
wicked laugh like unto that of a maniac” (176). Bernard vows violent revenge on the 
“Anglo-Saxon,” demanding that they “exhume Belton’s body if [they] like and tear 
[their] flag from around him to keep him from polluting it,” as even in death, Belton’s 
disease of blackness threatens infection (176). Trout is struck with fear and sees that, 
with Bernard as the president, the “Imperium was a serious menace to the peace of the 
world.” According to Trout, a “chance spark might at any time cause a conflagration, 
which, unchecked, would spread destruction, devastation and death all around” (176). 
Trout then describes an apocalyptic vision in which, after a “terrific explosion … [t]he 
only sound to be heard was a universal groan [because] those who had not been killed 
were too badly wounded to cry out” (176). 
Gruesser reads the novel as ending “on neither a positive nor a negative note” 
(61). Instead, Imperium “offers [Griggs’s] black readers a chance to indulge 
momentarily their revenge fantasies and dreams of power—and even empire—but also 
shows them that they must be rejected” (62). For Gruesser, the ending demands that 
readers “realistically face the here and now” by serving as a warning—either work with 
the Belton Piedmonts or face the Bernard Belgraves (62). I agree with Gruesser’s 
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resistance to the ending as a wholesale endorsement of conservatism or militancy. His 
reading also focuses on the dire nature of the consequences of violent confrontation, 
which the nature of white supremacy requires. For Gruesser, the ambiguity at the end of 
the novel results from both men's inability to recognize the true nature of the white 
supremacist enemy. Romanticized violence cannot face this menace, and while Belton 
comes closest to understanding this by initially advocating for an alternative nonviolent 
response, his commitment to the supposed moral certainty and superiority of 
revolutionary violence undercuts his position. But Griggs also shows that the supposed 
tension between the two characters does not serve any explanatory function except to 
emphasize white supremacy’s pathological nature. For this reason, Berl Trout gives 
voice to the novel’s lasting thought: white supremacist pathology leads to death for all. 
That Imperium in Imperio ends in a barely avoided catastrophe anticipates the 
apocalyptic pall Griggs later assigns to white supremacy in The Hindered Hand. 
 Though published over five years after Imperium, The Hindered Hand picks up 
on this theme at the end of Imperium and extends its violent vision for the future. The 
Hindered Hand dramatizes another nightmare scenario for white supremacists, as it 
takes some of the anxieties in Imperium regarding race mixing and distills them through 
examples of infiltration, border crossings, and secret relationships.107 It presents an 
apocalyptic vision of the consequences of white supremacy allowed to run its course. 
Like Imperium, The Hindered Hand has a double structure with two protagonists. The 
central target of The Hindered Hand is again pathological white supremacy, but as an 
                                                
107 At one point, a white character dons black face to infiltrate the black community to 
find his wife’s murderer. At another point, a black character dresses as a woman to 




end to Griggs’s investigation of violence, the novel ultimately descends into madness 
and nihilism, leaving its supposedly conservative voice, Ensal, fleeing the country 
rather than staying to fight for his race. Thus, Griggs forces the reader to reckon with 
the violent consequences of white supremacist racial thinking. But at the same time, 
Griggs is not ready to abandon hope completely, and in an appended supplement to the 
novel, which he titled “A Hindered Hand,” Griggs responds directly to Thomas Dixon’s 
popular novel The Leopard’s Spots. In both his novel and in this supplement, Griggs 
uses the language of disease to examine pathological white supremacy in an attempt to 
rescue African Americans from the discourse of black pathology and make a final plea 
for a rational alternative to a catastrophic race war. Coupled together, The Hindered 
Hand and its supplement represent a fascinating example of discursive intervention on 
Griggs’s part, as he responds directly to Dixon, the author of so much disinformation 
about African Americans and a key contributor to the language of black pathology. In 
doing so, Griggs returns the responsibility for pathological thinking and violence to 
white supremacists and their ideology. 
The Hindered Hand tells the story of Ensal Ellwood and Earl Bluefield as they 
navigate the political terrain of the United States at the turn of the century. Their pursuit 
of individual success comes into conflict with racial politics, and they become 
representative leaders of their race who chart two different paths forward, much like 
Belton and Bernard in Imperium. But The Hindered Hand is different for the number of 
characters and plot strands it incorporates in attempt to deal with the possible futures for 
African Americans. To simplify such a complex work, I focus on Earl and Ensal’s 
central conflict about violence by first analyzing a group of ancillary characters and 
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subplots: Ramon Mansford’s infection by the virus of white supremacy; the Seabright 
family plan to infiltrate the white South and the consequences of the racial caste system 
for Eunice Seabright; and Mr. Hostility’s apocalyptic scheme to bring about global race 
war. In each of these cases, Griggs critiques white supremacy with pathological 
language similar to that in Imperium. His use of another set of polarized characters 
again registers his ambivalence about possibilities for black resistance, and he defines 
pathological white supremacy in his most explicit terms, outlining in detail its dangers 
and the anxieties that motivate it. 
 The “Anglo Saxon race” as described in The Hindered Hand is motivated by 
fear and committed to violence, and it risks infecting others, no matter their political 
persuasions. When Ramon Mansford, a Northerner, arrives in the South, Arthur 
Daleman, a liberal Southerner, talks to him about “the dark shadow that projects itself 
over our section, the Negro problem” (99).108 Daleman argues that “two classes of 
Southerners exist,” and liberals like Daleman “hate to see [the Negro] the victim of the 
spleen of the radicals and they do grow furious at the sight of the Negro in exalted 
station” (101). These distinctions dissolve, however, when Ramon’s fiancée, Alene, is 
murdered, purportedly by a black man. The narrator states, “In the darkness of 
[Ramon’s] own calamity distinctions between right and wrong began to fade away, and 
he found his hatred of the Negro race assuming a more violent form than that 
manifested by the native Southerner” (108). This moment parallels Griggs’s analysis of 
                                                
108 Ramon’s name, like King’s, perhaps represents another effort on Griggs’s part to 
problematize political categories, this time the notion of whiteness with nonporous 




political categories throughout Imperium, as racial animus quickly dissolves ideological 
distinctions.  
Further, Ramon feels a connection to a racial identity that is elemental in its 
violence. In Ramon’s “heart there was the harking back to times more than a thousand 
years ago when his race was a race of exterminators” (108). Ramon’s experience of 
supposed racial violence galvanizes his connection to his imagined Anglo Saxon roots, 
which transcend current political divisions and make them obsolete. Pure Anglo Saxon 
racial hatred is supposedly even more extreme than the radicalism practiced in the 
South. He is overcome by rage; “it seemed to him that nothing would have suited him 
better than to have taken the lead of forces bent on driving back every black face from 
the land” (108). The way Ramon is quickly radicalized suggests something about white 
supremacy that goes beyond political ideology, something perhaps closer to the “spleen 
of the radicals” that Daleman initially describes. Alene was not actually murdered by a 
black man, but even the suspicion is enough to transform Ramon. This is the reality 
with which Ensal Ellwood is familiar. He asks Earl Bluefield, upon hearing of Earl’s 
plans for violent revolt, “[D]o you know the Anglo-Saxon race and particularly that 
brand found in the South? Provoke the passions of that race, arouse the dormant but 
ever-present fear of secret plottings for a general uprising, and you will inaugurate the 
wholesale slaughter of innocent men, women and children” (146). Ramon’s 
deterministic response illustrates the “dormant, but ever-present fear” Ensall describes. 
Given the proliferation of pathological language at key points in both novels, 
this moment extends the metaphor of disease to describe Ramon’s reaction in direct 
response to the pathologization of blackness in terms of criminality. The dramatic irony 
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in the scene emphasizes the fact that the ultimate victim of Ramon’s violence does not 
matter. He desires “to [drive] back every black face from the land,” because in his mind 
they are all guilty. This experience in part acculturates him to the racial caste system. 
As an interloper from the North unfamiliar with the racial politics of the South, Ramon 
must be familiarized with their nuances. At the same time, his own racial identity 
subsumes his geographic identity. Try as he might, Daleman cannot protect him from 
blackness, nor from the immediate and seemingly physiological response of whiteness. 
His experience as a victim of the kind of racial violence rumored in the discourse of 
black pathology enables Ramon’s racial hatred, perpetrating a violence that seems 
ultimately inescapable for African Americans. In Griggs’s characterization, the virus of 
white supremacy is always dormant and only requires activation. Like Mr. King’s fear 
in Imperium that all black men are only a moment away from violence, Ramon’s 
response indicates Griggs’s concern: no matter their geographical origins or if they 
claim liberal attitudes, all white men are only a moment away from racist violence. 
What Griggs will eventually label “the virus of race prejudice” is a persistent threat.109 
                                                
109 At one point in The Hindered Hand, a white attorney attempting to prosecute the 
perpetrators in the Bud and Foresta lynching, one of the most graphic spectacles of 
racial violence in American literature, asks plaintively, “Have we, the proud Anglo-
Saxon race, fallen so low that we are to ask that the Negro meekly lay down in our 
pathway, while we enjoy the pleasant sport of boring holes through his body?” (174). 
He likens lynching to a regression to man’s decision to “leave behind him these 
depraved parts of his nature” (171). He explains that “the moral health of the world 
demands that every community have a pest house where the isolation and treatment of 
the morally diseased may forestall an epidemic” (172). As he is discussing the 
supposedly atavistic crime of lynching, his appeal to the “pest house” for the “morally 
diseased” does not merely refer to prison meting out justice in general. He articulates 
the consequences of and dangers posed by a pathological racism that shores up the 
identity of whiteness through violence. For this character and for Griggs, white 
supremacist violence is a global problem that demands moral intervention. 
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The Seabright family subplot allows Griggs to continue to explore fears of 
infiltration that animate white supremacist thinking through metaphors of infection and 
disease. The mixed-race family includes Arabelle Seabright, her daughters Eunice and 
Tiara, and one son, Reverend Percy G. Marshall. Late in The Hindered Hand, the reader 
learns that Mrs. Seabright has led a convoluted plot to infiltrate Southern white society 
to “break down the Southern white man’s idea of the Negro’s rights” (230). She wants 
to influence white society by intermarrying into a Southern family, so she hatches a 
plan to marry her daughter, Eunice, to the Honorable H. G. Volrees, “the real head of 
the Democratic party of the state” (75). Mrs. Seabright’s daughter Tiara explains her 
mother’s strategy at the end of the novel. She says that Mrs. Seabright’s scheme to use 
her family as the first step of infiltrating Southern white society anticipated her desire 
“to organize the mixed bloods of the nation and effect an organization composed of 
cultured men and women that could readily pass for white, who were to shake the 
Southern system to its very core” (230). This subplot sets up the consequences visited 
on Eunice Seabright for her attempts to pass as white, and as a metaphor for the white 
supremacist anxiety about porous racial borders, Mrs. Seabright’s plan reflects fears of 
blackness and white fragility that pervade the novel. The white community immediately 
responds to the threat after it is revealed in Eunice Seabright’s trial for bigamy.110 From 
                                                
110 Eunice thwarts her mother’s plan by falling in love with a “Negro” who through a 
convoluted series of plot twists turns out to be Earl Bluefield. Despite this confusion, 
Eunice’s role at the end of the novel is to represent the arbitrary nature of the color line, 
the cruelty of the “caste” system in the South, and the futility of her mother’s plan to 
infiltrate the South. Eunice stands trial for bigamy because she married her lover while 
already married to Vorhees, and the trial becomes a referendum on her racial identity 
and the possibility of passing and miscegenation. If the white jury finds her guilty, they 
will validate an interracial relationship as legally binding. 
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the white supremacists’ point of view, this secret plot is a literal enactment of the 
metaphor of blackness as a disease. “Negro blood” surreptitiously infects the 
bloodstream and threatens the Anglo Saxon race. Her plot is thwarted, however, and her 
daughter suffers the consequences of an unbending racial caste system. 
 Eunice’s trial at the end of the novel threatens to subvert the white identity she 
claims and designates her eternally black and part of a race she calls “the burden bearers 
of the world” (236). She begs the jury to find her guilty, and in her testimony she 
echoes the white supremacist language of black pathology and refers to blackness as 
leprosy, “a loathsome disease [that] has befallen” her such that “everybody now spurns” 
her (244). In the sanitarium soon after, Eunice’s doctor reverses that language to 
identify her as a victim “of the Southern situation that has borne tremendously on her.” 
He claims that as a result she suffers from an “incurable” disease, and he diagnoses 
future cases of such suffering. He says, “That whole region of country is affected by a 
sort of sociological hysteria and we physicians are expecting more and more 
pathological manifestations as a result of the strain upon the people” (249). Griggs 
reverses the language of pathology from Eunice’s reference to blackness as leprosy to 
the doctor’s assertion of racism, and more specifically the white supremacist racial caste 
system, as a dangerous and pervasive disease. Further, this disease is a direct result of 
Eunice’s inculcating white supremacist ideology about herself and her race.111 
Eunice’s speech in her defense at her trial echoes this language of Anglo 
Saxonism’s global reach, but she focuses her argument on racial pathology in particular. 
                                                
111 At this point Griggs solidifies the metaphor of disease to describe the Ramon 
Mansford episode. This doctor’s diagnosis must explain what happened to Mansford: he 
was overcome by that “sociological hysteria,” the “virus of the racial caste system.” 
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She asks the court to consider, “for argument’s sake,” that she might indeed “have some 
Negro blood,” a possibility she denies vehemently as she lays claim to her white 
identity. She tells her white audience that they have “already made a mistake in making 
a gift of [their] blood to the African.” She then lists some accomplishments of Anglo 
Saxonism, each an example of the race’s violent power: “[Anglo Saxonism] hammered 
out on the fields of blood the Magna Charta; it took the head of Charles I; it shattered 
the scepter of George III; it now circles the globe in an iron grasp” (236-7). She claims 
the superior power of “Anglo-Saxon blood” to overwhelm any presence of “Negro 
blood” in her, and in doing so she becomes a mouthpiece for white supremacy in the 
specific pathological language of that ideology. Whiteness is a blood-borne pathogen 
that will defeat the lesser race. This belief parallels white anxiety about blackness as 
contagion, as racial thinking posits that the coming race war gets acted out in the 
bloodstream as well. 
Despite Eunice’s pleas to be found guilty, the jury acquits her of bigamy, 
thereby denying the validity of a mixed-race marriage and solidifying her identity as an 
African American. The jury foreman observes, “[Our] great race stands in juxtaposition 
with overwhelming millions of darker people throughout the earth, and we must cling to 
the caste idea if we would prevent a lapse that would taint our blood and eventually 
undermine our greatness” (238). Tainted blood marks race as a pathogen, and whether 
the threat is blackness itself, or black political empowerment, pathological white 
supremacist thinking obsesses over defending the race from outside intruders. Griggs 
uses the moment of Eunice’s acquittal to subvert white supremacist beliefs in racial 
hierarchy as defined by blood and to classify white supremacy as the threatening 
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disease. Eunice suffers because she has contracted white supremacist beliefs about 
black inferiority, an infection that causes her mental illness and demise. The only 
logical outcome for this kind of racial thinking is death.  
Griggs takes this conclusion to its extreme with the appearance of a mysterious 
white man at Ensal’s house, which initiates an apocalyptic vision of pathological white 
supremacy. Mr. Hostility meets Ensal at a crisis point in Ensal’s life. Gus Martin 
reported in a letter that he had seen Ensal’s fiancée, Tiara, kissing Reverend Percy 
Marshall, so Ensal has resigned himself to fleeing the country. Before he can leave, “a 
cadaverous looking white man” approaches him with a proposition. Griggs’s 
description of Mr. Hostility recalls that of Dr. Zackland in Imperium, who 
“cadaverously” analyzes the body of Belton Piedmont. Both men represent the violent 
logic of white supremacy, one clinical and probing of the individual body, the other 
diabolical and determined to cause a global race war. Both men enact the language of 
racial pathology to achieve their goals of racial superiority. While Dr. Zackland’s goal 
is black genocide, Mr. Hostility seeks to exploit African Americans as adjuncts in a 
global race war, an event that will certainly lead to the destruction of all “lesser races.” 
The narrator explains that Mr. Hostility “comes forward to inject his peculiar virus into 
the awful wound made in Ensal’s heart by the disclosures of the Gus Martin letter” 
(201). This “peculiar virus” reflects Mr. Hostility’s unclear motivations but continues 
Griggs’s previous use of the language of pathology to describe the disease of caste 




Mr. Hostility identifies himself as “the incarnation of hostility to [the Anglo 
Saxon] race, or to that branch of the human family claiming the dominance of that strain 
of blood.” He refers to the Anglo Saxon as “the God-commissioned or self-appointed 
world conqueror” (202). Though Mr. Hostility claims Anglo Saxon identity himself, he 
is working against that cause in a global battle for racial supremacy between the Anglo 
Saxon and the Slav. He does not want to explain why he is “Pro-Slav in this matter,” 
but he says that “it is the one dream of [his] life to so weaken the Anglo Saxon that he 
will be easy prey for the Slav in the coming momentous world struggle” (203-4).112 The 
nineteenth-century popularity of Anglo Saxonism and its status as a fluid signifier of 
white racial identity, utilizing various explanations for an Anglo Saxon origin for 
American dominance, contextualizes Griggs’s allusion to race history.113 Griggs 
emphasizes Mr. Hostility’s position as a so-called race traitor and the fear of an 
inevitable global race war as primary for his readers’ interpretation of Mr. Hostility, 
whose adherence to the language of pathology emphasizes the peculiar danger he poses. 
And Griggs indicates that the outcome of pathological thinking is global war. That the 
reasons for his horrifying proposed actions are nebulous only increases the reader’s 
sense of terror. 
 Mr. Hostility tells Ensal of the inevitable future of racial violence among the 
white races and that African Americans will be merely an accessory to this conflict. Mr. 
Hostility says, “The higher order is given the power of life and death over the lower. 
                                                
112 Hanna Wallinger argues that Mr. Hostility “embodies the feared figure of the 
European immigrant who threatens to overthrow the system of Anglo-Saxon 
superiority” (174). 
113 I addressed this issue in the chapter on Thomas Dixon, in which I cite the work of 




Can’t you see that your race is simply preserved because it is not yet in the way of the 
white race?” (208). White supremacist global dominance identifies African Americans 
as a mere obstacle in its way that will eventually face destruction, and Mr. Hostility 
proposes a particular strategy for Ensal’s participation that isolates pathological 
blackness itself as a potential weapon. Mr. Hostility suggests that Ensal exploit his 
supposed natural immunity to yellow fever to serve as the means to bring about race 
war. Mr. Hostility tells him to “[o]rganize … a band of trusted Negroes” and travel 
through the South to “pollute the water” with yellow fever germs. Such an act will 
cause the “greatest scourge that the world has ever known [to] rage in the South.” He 
concludes, “The whites will die by the millions and those that do not die will flee from 
the stricken land and leave the country to your people” (210). Mr. Hostility points to the 
biological makeup of African Americans as constitutive of immunity, as he tells Ensal 
that the “pigment that abides in [his] skin” as well as the “peculiar Negro odor renders 
[him] immune from yellow fever” (210). Mr. Hostility forwards a persistent historical 
belief in African American immunity to disease that Griggs may or may not have 
believed himself.114 In the process, Griggs animates another nightmare scenario for 
white supremacists, more spectacular but parallel to the Seabright plan to infiltrate the 
South. In both plans, the physiology of African Americans represents a secret and 
                                                
114 In his supplement to The Hindered Hand, which I discuss at the end of this chapter, 
Griggs describes black origins in Africa in racially essentialist terms, and he mentions 
that to “save [‘Negroes’] from yellow fever, nature gave them pigment and lost them 
friends” (315). The belief persists today, though with environmentally focused 
explanations. See Mariola Espinosa’s “The Question of Racial Immunity to Yellow 
Fever in History and Historiography.” Contemporaneous to Griggs’s historical moment, 
pervasive nineteenth-century beliefs about innate black immunity to yellow fever derive 
in part from the work of Benjamin Rush. See Kopperman’s “‘Venerate the Lancet’: 
Benjamin Rush’s Yellow Fever Therapy in Context.” 
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imminent danger to the white race. In Mr. Hostility’s plan, Ensal is to be the conduit for 
an infection that will severely endanger Anglo Saxonism. 
 After Griggs clarifies the pathological nature of the white supremacist threat, he 
ends the novel with the ambivalent conclusion familiar to readers of Imperium. When 
Ensal and Earl are locked in a physical struggle to decide whose philosophy will lead 
the movement, Earl accidentally shoots himself. His militant philosophy results in 
physical violence and self-inflicted harm, a clear warning about the dangers and 
unpredictability of violence. The narrator explains Earl’s refusal to seek treatment for 
the wound: “He preferred to heal the racial sore himself without calling a doctor, whose 
remedy might be worse than the disease” (165). The metaphor speaks to both sides of 
the racial conflict, the threat of white supremacy (especially through medicalized 
violence) and the challenge of creating an effective black resistance. It recalls the white 
supremacist benevolence of Mr. King and Dr. Lovejoy in Imperium, who patronized 
African Americans and risked disempowering them. And it echoes the ambivalence at 
the end of that novel. 
Like the previous appeals in Ensal’s manifesto to conservative values, Earl’s 
insistence on a self-authored solution that avoids exacerbating the problem reflects 
Griggs’s final appeal for caution rather than continued risk and violence. But because 
that caution derives from the pathological nature of white supremacy, it offers a more 
pessimistic resolution than Imperium. Having faced the reality of pathological white 
supremacy, Griggs cannot support violent reactions. His investigation of pathological 
discourse indicates his central conclusion: whiteness, not blackness, is a race problem. 
Griggs cannot advocate for any kind of violent resistance to white supremacy because 
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he has seen its pathological valence. He has also used a discourse of pathology 
committed to harming black people to identify that valence. Griggs’s novel 
demonstrates possibilities for re-orienting that discourse and disrupting naturalized 
assumptions of white supremacy and black pathology. But considered alongside 
Griggs’s graphic and terrifying depiction of the future, as well as with Ensal’s ultimate 
decision to flee the country, Griggs’s final assessment in The Hindered Hand lacks the 
openness at the end of Imperium in Imperio. There is no Berl Trout to act as arbiter, and 
only danger remains. 
 Instead, Griggs saves his more optimistic vision for the supplement that 
accompanies the third edition of the novel.115 The continued popularity of Dixon’s 
novel pressed a response from Griggs, who penned a 30-page attack on Dixon’s work as 
propaganda. Griggs appeals for reason in the face of the white supremacist philosophy 
Dixon promotes. In the process, Griggs articulates the ways Dixon’s position 
perpetuates the stereotypes of pathological blackness that put lives in danger, and he 
ultimately diagnoses pathological white supremacy and the resentment that animates it. 
He explains Dixon’s aim to “stir up the baser passions of men against [the Negroes] and 
to send them forth with a load of obloquy and the withering scorn of their fellows the 
world over” (306). This particular strategy romanticizes slavery, and Griggs notes that 
“as a part of the propaganda” in support of slavery, Southern whites “thoroughly 
committed themselves to the doctrine of the ineffaceable, inherent inferiority of the 
                                                
115 Griggs explains in the “Notes to the Third Edition” that previous editions included a 
review of Thomas Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots “in the form of a conversation between 
two of the characters of the book, whereas in the present edition the review is more 
fully given in an article appearing in the rear of this book after the closing of the story” 
(298). This supplement is the subject of my analysis. 
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Negro, and had no largeness of faith in his possibilities along lines of higher culture” 
(309, italics in original). Griggs’s appeals to reason in his novels take place in the larger 
context of violence committed against African Americans that benefits from these 
caricatures of African Americans. The “unreasoning, undiscriminating, brutal, 
murderous mobs arose to do violence” as a result of their anger regarding the reforms of 
Reconstruction, as in those places political leaders were not “prepared to deal with the 
Negroes as political equals” (316). Griggs rebuts the white supremacist version of 
history through a long excerpt from James G. Blain’s article in North American Review. 
Griggs believes that by setting the record straight he can appeal to his rational readers 
and rescue the African American reputation from the discourse of black pathology.  
Griggs redirects the language of this discourse in ways familiar to readers of 
Imperium and The Hindered Hand in the closing pages of the supplement. He says, 
“What a terrible enemy to humanity does Mr. Dixon prove himself to be when, essaying 
to speak for the South, he would impart to this mighty force, with work before it worthy 
of the gods, a larger measure of the virus of race prejudice.” Griggs instead hopes that 
“this unified Anglo Saxondom” that opposes African American rights and humanity 
might “choose the opening hours of its era for the purging from its great heart all the 
lingering vestiges of hatred of men and with eyes ever on the heights above, begin the 
final climb of the human race toward the ideal state” (327-8). Griggs echoes turn-of-the-
century Anglo Saxon popularity, the context of which I previously discussed in my 
chapter on Dixon, but most important in this passage is his repetition of the metaphor of 
race prejudice as disease that he deploys in his novels. He understands white supremacy 
as a pathology, curable in this case to support his optimism, and he completes his 
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diagnosis in the final pages of the essay. Part of this pathology manifests in a projection 
of white anxieties regarding African American success or endurance onto black people. 
Griggs asserts that Dixon’s popularity results from “the most powerful element 
in his work, namely, his grasp upon the emotions of men, his ability to rouse and sway 
their feelings.” Though he does not draw a direct parallel to his own project, Griggs 
notes the “irony of fate” of the fact that Dixon “owes his emotional power to the very 
race which he has elected to scourge.” According to Griggs, “Mr. Dixon has not 
breathed the Negro air of emotionalism without being affected thereby.” The contagion 
of blackness transfers a supposedly essential black trait to one of its most virulent 
critics. Griggs explains this ironically dependent relationship further by noting that the 
“fact that Mr. Dixon has chosen the discomfiture of the Negro race as the chief end of 
his existence is not inconsistent with the fact that the predominating element in his 
power is the gift of that race.” Dixon’s obsession, according to Griggs, is no surprise, 
given that he has been infected with the disease from which he has insisted upon 
segregating himself. Griggs notes that it “is perhaps this subconscious feeling on the 
part of Mr. Dixon that he is in the grasp of a power not Anglo-Saxon that causes him to 
rant and cry for a freedom that his own Southern brethren less affected do not 
understand” (329-30). Griggs exploits Dixon’s belief in absolute racial separation to 
argue that not only is such a belief naive but it also motivates Dixon’s own virus of race 
prejudice. Resentment is at the heart of white supremacy, and race paranoia and anxiety 
manifest those feelings through the discourse of racial pathology. Griggs satirizes that 
discourse in this moment, as he does throughout both novels, by accusing Dixon of 
suffering from Dixon’s biggest fear: the disease of blackness. In fact, blackness is not 
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the pathology here; it is pathological white supremacy that uses racial pathology 
discourse to express fear and animus. That discourse enables both discursive and 
physical violence against black people, and while Griggs’s supplement indicates his 
desire to continue to fight inaccurate depictions of black people and to label white 
supremacy accurately, his novels reveal his ambivalence about the state of the future. 
Ultimately, the threat of violence follows from all political or discursive instances of 
white supremacy, a fact that black writers attempting a resistant response at the turn of 
the century took seriously. While Griggs saw metaphors of disease as most instructive 
for understanding the contours of white supremacy, Charles Chesnutt focused on 













“Faded away like a vision of the night”: Lynching and Black Political Agency in the 
Work of Charles Chesnutt116 
“Ellis felt a surging pity for his old friend; but every step that he had taken toward the 
jail had confirmed and strengthened his own resolution that this contemplated crime, 
which he dimly felt to be far more atrocious than that of which Sandy was accused, in 
that it involved a whole community rather than one vicious man, should be stopped at 
any cost. Deplorable enough had the negro been guilty, it became, in view of his certain 
innocence, an unspeakable horror, which for all time would cover the city with 
infamy.”—The Marrow of Tradition, p. 220 
  
As a character in Charles Chesnutt’s 1901 novel The Marrow of Tradition runs 
to try to save an African American character from being lynched, the gravity of the 
“unspeakable horror” of lynching becomes clear to him. As he makes his way through 
the fictional stand-in for Wilmington, North Carolina, Lee Ellis, the white editor of the 
city newspaper, notices the pine bleachers being constructed, so that “the spectacle 
might be the more easily and comfortably viewed.” He learns from townspeople that 
special “excursions” from nearby towns were being commissioned by the railroad “to 
bring spectators to the scene.” He hears from another passerby that “the burning was to 
take place early in the evening, so that the children might not be kept up beyond their 
usual bedtime.” Finally, Ellis overhears a group of young men “discussing the question 
of which portions of the negro’s body they would prefer for souvenirs” (219-20). As the 
                                                
116 The quotation is taken from an essay by Chesnutt written c. 1899 titled “Liberty and 
the Franchise,” and the full text of the sentence is as follows: “Under the system of 
‘white supremacy’ now in vogue, murder and lynching abound, repressive and 
degrading legislation against the Negro is the order of the day, the civil rights which 
have heretofore been largely denied the colored race by mere force of custom and 
prestige and judicial decision, are now being steadily taken away from him by 
legislative enactment, until soon his boasted liberty, so dearly bought, so freely 
bestowed, so nobly maintained for a few brief years will have faded away like a vision 
of the night” (Essays 105). 
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epigraph that leads this chapter indicates, Ellis is horrified by what he sees and hears, 
and the fact that this spectacle of murder targets an innocent man is for Ellis ultimately 
irredeemable. It would be a crime, if allowed to proceed, that would “cover the city with 
infamy.” 
The 1898 Wilmington Race Riot, the subject of Marrow, now occupies a similar 
place in history, as the euphemism “race riot” occluded the true aims of the successful 
coup by white supremacist Democrats to gain control of the local government. While 
Chesnutt’s character recognizes the particular horror of lynching in moral terms, 
Chesnutt shows throughout his novel that he is equally committed to analyzing the 
political motivations of lynching. In Marrow, Chesnutt uncovers and dramatizes this 
coup through the metaphor of a lynching, which is for him the most instructive sign of 
white supremacy and the political and physical threats that African Americans at the 
turn of the century faced. While he expresses horror at spectacles of ritualized violence, 
he draws the reader’s attention to the ways lynching forwards white supremacist 
strategies for political and social domination, and he identifies the origins of violence in 
attempts to disempower African Americans politically. 
In both his fiction and in his essays and speeches, Chesnutt focused specifically 
on the importance of the franchise and the denial of political rights for African 
American that were guaranteed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. He saw a direct connection between denied rights and 
vulnerability to white supremacist violence. Consequently, he viewed political rights as 
fundamental and considered their enforcement primary to any other actions that might 
accompany progress regarding race relations in the United States. While others argued 
166 
 
that African Americans should work to improve and solidify a reputation deserving of 
such rights, Chesnutt rejected such a notion out of hand.117 For Chesnutt, there should 
be no conditions for the granting of political rights; they must simply be respected. And 
conditions in the South in the post-Reconstruction period did not bode well for that 
possibility, as the unprecedented rise of white supremacy during this period influenced 
his reading audience and certainly his own ideas. 
In this chapter, I analyze how Chesnutt connects black political rights to an 
increase in white supremacist violence through the sign of lynching in part by analyzing 
its relationship to the law in white supremacist ideology. Chesnutt theorizes that white 
supremacist ideology that seeks to render African American subjects abject creates the 
conditions under which they can be killed with impunity, and therefore lynching 
explains both white supremacist political motivations as well as the urgent existential 
threat it represents. Through current and contemporaneous analyses of lynching and 
readings of some of Chesnutt’s essays and Marrow, I demonstrate the ideological 
slippage between lynching and the law, as white supremacist ideology appeals to the 
authority of the law while also employing extra-legal violence to manage racial 
hierarchy. At the same time, white supremacist ideology benefits from the authority of 
the law to create second-class African American citizens that are therefore more 
vulnerable to extra-legal violence. Chesnutt draws a straight line between African 
American political status and lynching to assert that without the protection and 
                                                
117 In a letter to Booker T. Washington dated June 27, 1903, Chesnutt makes his 
feelings plain: “I am squarely opposed to any restriction of the franchise in the South on 
any basis now proposed. It is wholly and solely an effort in my opinion to deprive the 




enforcement of political rights that the Constitution defines, African American lives will 
be at risk. 
 To understand Chesnutt’s attempt to theorize white supremacy through the lens 
of lynching as a technology of power, I return in this chapter to Giorgio Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer, particularly to the “state of exception” and the figure of the homo sacer. 
Most important to Chesnutt are the ways lynching elides its political purposes, and 
Agamben’s work, as well as Robyn Wiegman’s American Anatomies, elucidates the 
ways that disciplinary structures work to consolidate power in part by occluding their 
logic. I apply Agamben’s work to illustrate how the denial of political agency to 
African Americans, a subject Chesnutt takes on in detail in his articles and essays, 
created a corollary and dependent relationship between whiteness and abject blackness. 
White supremacists defined the sovereign power of whiteness both within and without 
the law via the language of the state of exception; lynching represents the clearest 
expression of that relationship. Agamben’s homo sacer and state of exception help to 
explain the role of the law in defining racial others and exposing vulnerable 
marginalized citizens to violence all while those politically empowered to enforce the 
law appeal to its sanctity and guarantees. Lynching exists both within and without the 
law, and lynchers benefit from the complicity of government inaction and claiming 
exceptional status as “vigilante justice” when the law supposedly fails. 
Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereignty and Bare Life (1998) locates in “an 
obscure figure of archaic Roman law” a telling illustration of the origin of modern 
Western political philosophy (8). For Agamben, the figure of the homo sacer—a being 
who can be killed with impunity but not sacrificed—exemplifies the paradoxical fact of 
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the sovereign’s ability to rule through the state of exception.118 Developing his work 
through the political and social theorizing of Michel Foucault, Hannah Arendt, and Carl 
Schmitt, among others, Agamben argues that the inclusion/exclusion paradox of the 
state of exception suggests that the ideals of democracy and Western liberalism derived 
from the social contract as the originary metaphor for modern law and culture would be 
better served to recognize the ban as the founding act of current political reality.119 The 
sovereign ban creates the homo sacer, a liminal figure that is at once excluded from law 
but also subject to its limits because it is always already under the power of the 
sovereign. Similarly, as Carl Schmitt has explained, the sovereign is defined by the state 
of exception—it is contained within the rule of law (because his existence is constituted 
by it) but separate from it in the sense that he can enact the state of exception at any 
time. According to Agamben, the sovereign and homo sacer “present two symmetrical 
figures that have the same structure and are correlative.” The sovereign “is the one with 
respect to whom all men are potentially hominess sacri,” and “homo sacer is the one 
with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns” (84).120 Agamben defines sovereign 
power as the power over the life of the other, and the homo sacer represents its target. 
                                                
118 Agamben states at the beginning of Homo Sacer: “The protagonist of this book is 
bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not 
sacrificed, and whose essential function in modern politics we intend to assert…” (8, 
italics in original). 
119 According to Agamben, “The understanding of the Hobbesian mythologeme in terms 
of contract instead of ban condemned democracy to impotence every time it had to 
confront the problem of sovereign power” (109). 
120 In a previous chapter, I articulated this aspect of the homo sacer—that all men are 
potentially marginalized by the sovereign into non-citizens—as an animating idea in 
white supremacist ideology. In this chapter, I focus on the post-Emancipation African 
American subject as homo sacer, whose denied agency makes him vulnerable to white 
supremacist violence born of this anxiety. 
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As the sovereign creates both the law and the conditions for its exception, the homo 
sacer seemingly has no recourse and is subject to the whims of the sovereign.121 
 Agamben’s conception of “bare life” provides more insight about the structures 
of homo sacer and the sovereign, and it invites further comparison to racial power 
differentials in the United States. Grounding his argument in the terminology of 
classical Greek and Latin law, Agamben defines bare life through the concepts of zoē 
and bios. Whereas zoē—“the simple fact of living common to all beings”—and bios—
“the form or way of living proper to an individual or group”—could be distinguished 
one from another in classical antiquity, Agamben argues that this distinction is 
impossible in the modern biopolitical age that has made life the subject of politics.122 
Agamben argues that “the entry of zoē into the sphere of the polis—the politicization of 
bare life as such—constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical 
transformation of the political philosophical categories of classical thought” (4). For 
Agamben the concentration camp is the representative image of the politicization of 
bare life. According to Agamben, in the camp Jews were murdered “not in a mad and 
giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler had announced, ‘as lice,’ which is to say, as bare 
life” (114). Agamben does not conceive of the camp as an anomalous occurrence or 
exception in itself, as it contains the originary structure of modernity: the act of 
sovereign power that conflates bare life with the political as signified by the sovereign 
                                                
121 Notably, many critiques of Agamben cite his preclusion of collective resistance as a 
central shortcoming of his argument. See Ziarek’s review of Homo Sacer. 
122 Agamben defines biopolitics as “the growing inclusion of man’s natural life in the 
mechanisms and calculations of power” (119). His work extends Foucault’s analysis of 
biopower in The History of Sexuality and in his series of lectures delivered at the 
Collège de France. 
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ban and the state of exception.123 The exception is, in fact, the rule, as Schmitt argued, 
and the horrors of the camp result from the indistinguishability that marks the paradox 
of homo sacer and the sovereign power. One is contained within and defined by the 
other. They cannot be separated in their structural relationship.124 
 By locating within the concentration camp and totalitarianism a structure in 
common with democracy, in other words, by stating that both political systems share 
the same origin in the violent act of the sovereign, Agamben points out an important 
contradiction within democracy that he feels has been dangerously veiled by the 
language of rights and the so-called sanctity of life, most notably modern democracy’s 
claim to liberate life. Agamben states: “Hence, too, modern democracy’s specific 
aporia: it wants to put the freedom and happiness of men into play in the very place—
‘bare life’—that marked their subjection” (9-10). According to Agamben, because 
modernity conflates political life with the simple fact of living, we are blind to the 
structures of subjection that exist often in the name of democracy.125 Claims of the 
value of human life coexist alongside ideologies and policies of exclusion that make life 
                                                
123 Leland de la Durantaye speaks to the controversy caused by Agamben’s claim and 
mentions some of the initial reviews of the book that declaimed such a view as 
untenable, but he explains Agamben’s claim as opposed to those who allowed that “the 
concentration camp indeed served as an example, but of a different sort—an example of 
a horrendous exception to the civilized norm” (213). Agamben’s argument, of course, 
claims that the concentration camp represents, as de la Durantaye states it, “the rule 
toward which we are dangerously tending” (213). 
124 There is a danger in making too broad of a comparison between two discrete 
historical events, or theorizing about these events in such an abstract way that they 
become disconnected from the suffering of their victims. I want to emphasize the 
singularity of each event while also investigating useful points of comparison that will 
make the operation of racism clearer and more precise. 
125 For a specific application of this idea in the context of the nineteenth century 
racialized United States, see Saidiya Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection. 
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expendable. And an ethical perspective that views modern violence as somehow 
exceptional and abnormal fails to reckon with the truth about how modern political 
theory defines the subject. Further, because Foucault did not complete his analysis of 
biopolitics and racism in a twentieth-century context, Agamben seeks to fill that gap. 
 While the post-Reconstruction South inhabits an historical period distinct from 
the vantage point of Agamben’s work, Agamben’s critique of the illusion of the social 
contract resonates with a period of perhaps unparalleled frustration for Chesnutt and 
others interested in the functioning (or lack thereof) of the rule of law. The highest order 
of the rule of law, the Constitution enshrined black freedom and political agency in the 
Reconstruction Amendments. That state governments would actively work to 
circumvent the law by codifying discrimination in their own constitutions through 
grandfather clauses and other instruments of vote suppression demonstrates the 
precarious position the law as guarantor of rights defined by the social contract occupies 
in the nineteenth-century United States. Additionally, the figure of the homo sacer 
creates a metaphor to explain the status (or non-status) of African Americans. The 
definition of homo sacer as one who can be killed with impunity and yet not sacrificed 
is important considering the centrality of lynching to the post-Reconstruction South and 
to Marrow. As the narrator of Marrow explains, lynching often scapegoated the 
innocent to impute crimes to the race as a whole, and “there was neither the martyr’s 
glory nor the saint’s renown in being killed for some one else’s crime” (179). The fact 
that most lynchings led to virtually no arrests of white perpetrators and were often 
sensationalized in the local and national media speaks to the “impunity” with which the 
acts were committed and consumed. As a technology of white supremacist power, 
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lynching exploited the second-class status of black citizens and utilized the law as both 
justification and endorsement of the crime. 
Especially in the post-Reconstruction South, the social construct of whiteness 
operates as sovereign power, beyond the reach of federal law, the effectiveness and 
applicability of which, ironically, both white southerners and African Americans 
questioned. As Chesnutt noticed, more often federal law was used to perpetuate and 
maintain the sovereign power of whiteness rather than the ideals of liberal citizenship. 
And perhaps nowhere was this phenomenon more apparent than within the legal 
justification of segregation. Concerning Plessy vs. Ferguson, Grace Elizabeth Hale 
writes, “As important as the ruling was the Court’s reasoning: its insistence that racial 
differences lay outside the law, beyond and before any act of human agency” (23). The 
Court effectively stripped African Americans of their political agency by insisting upon 
an arbitrary and supposedly essential racial difference. Such an arbitrary act of power 
creates bare life, which has been “denuded” of its political agency and can therefore be 
killed.126 Gwen Mathewson notes that the sole dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan was 
especially prescient because of how it forecast the effects of the decision. Justice Harlan 
wrote that the “present decision … will not only stimulate aggressions, more or less 
brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens” but will encourage 
those intent on defeating the “beneficent purposes” of constitutional amendments 
regarding black rights “by means of state enactments” (qtd in Mathewson 232). Justice 
Harlan’s warning about the legal precedent set by Plessy exactly identifies white 
                                                
126 This arbitrariness can also be understood in terms of the choice of skin 




supremacists’ future justifications for circumvention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution, which had promised political agency to 
African American men. Plessy illustrates the dangerous and arbitrary conflation of the 
ontological and the political, the notion of life/existence and that person’s right to 
participate politically, a site of indistinction that Agamben locates as the fundamental 
and primary act of sovereign power and the obsession of biopolitics.127 
 In the above example, whiteness as sovereign power depends upon a central 
paradox: whiteness is constructed by the creation and exclusion of blackness, and 
whiteness depends upon this exclusion to maintain itself. For Chesnutt, the post-
Reconstruction legal system both guarantees rights and is a means to deny them to 
African Americans. And Chesnutt recognizes that the law serves to maintain whiteness 
and to target blackness. Though lynching technically represents an extra-legal strategy 
for asserting white supremacy, the complicity of the law in these acts of terrorism 
represents for Chesnutt a central danger for African Americans, either in the case of 
courts refusing to prosecute or convict lynchers or in the fact that the legal system 
enables lynching by creating citizens who can be killed with impunity.128 At the same 
                                                
127 Sovereign power and biopolitics are not mutually exclusive, and because of this fact 
it is misleading to assume that one begets the other. Instead, in Agamben’s reading of 
Foucault, sovereign power is always already existent in biopolitics, ready to be 
deployed through spectacular acts of violence—like lynching in the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century American context—or to recede into less specifically violent 
operations of power like legal segregation. See Jeffrey Nealon’s Foucault Beyond 
Foucault, particularly his analysis of power’s “intensifications,” which revises readings 
of Foucault that see a simple progression of power systems. 
128 According to Jacqueline Goldsby in A Spectacular Secret: Lynching in American 
Life and Literature, important U.S. Supreme Court cases that emboldened and enabled 
lynching included Slaughterhouse (1873), Cruikshank (1876), the Civil Rights Cases 
(1883), and Plessy (1896). She explains that “[b]y nullifying African Americans’ rights 
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time, for Chesnutt the law represents the only feasible way forward, as its protections, 
executed in good faith, possess the power to save African Americans by guaranteeing 
their political agency and ultimately their personhood. Consequently, Chesnutt’s work 
focuses on identifying these functions of the law and emphasizing the fundamental 
importance of political rights. 
During his career, Chesnutt was active in publishing essays and newspaper 
articles and delivering speeches and lectures around the country in which he stressed the 
direness of the situation for African Americans in the United States, especially those 
living in the South. Steady erosions of political rights for African Americans had 
followed the passing of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and 
segregation laws and circumscribed voting rights late in the century, coupled with 
increased instances of violence, threatened African Americans. Appeals to the legal 
system continually failed, and southern state governments became further emboldened 
when unchecked by the federal oversight of Reconstruction and the Supreme Court. In 
his 1899 essay “Liberty and the Franchise,” Chesnutt explains that there “is absolutely 
no recourse for the colored man who is denied his rights.” The Supreme Court “stands 
                                                                                                                                          
of citizenship and, with them, the affirmative duty to protect black people from unjust 
harm, the federal government effectively granted mobs a license to kill” (17). The fact 
that this status of being beyond the law, both for white citizens and black (essentially) 
non-citizens, meant that African Americans could be killed with impunity resonates 
with Agamben’s definition of the homo sacer banished by but paradoxically contained 
within the law. Further, a tendency to forget the victims of lynching in the cultural 
memory is based on the presumption that “once African Americans became the majority 
targets of lynching’s violence—and because African Americans lacked the legal, civic, 
and moral authority to repel mob assaults on their collective lives—the history of those 
deaths could be marginalized from our conventional accounts of the formation and 
meaning of modernity in American life” (27). The victims of lynching could be 
forgotten because lynching worked in part under the assumption of their lack of citizen 
status in the first place.  
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by the doctrine of the Dred Scott decision,” and the federal government is unwilling to 
intervene to prevent states from undermining the Civil Rights amendments. He argues 
that “no more disastrous course could be pursued by the colored race than to carry their 
wrongs to the Supreme Court of the United States” because though “[t]hey have rights 
… that have been violated” when they go to the Court, “when they leave, they are likely 
to have no rights at all” (106). Chesnutt specifically references the successful 
disfranchisement of black voters in Mississippi and the failure of the “Civil Rights bill,” 
or the 1883 Supreme Court ruling that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was 
unconstitutional, as evidence of the law’s failure to protect African Americans. The 
liberties the Amendments granted were being threatened by state attempts to circumvent 
that legislation through lawsuits that raised as-applied challenges to the constitutionality 
of those amendments.129 
As a result of these conditions, Chesnutt argued that the most urgent 
requirement for African Americans was the franchise. Any other considerations must 
proceed from that institution and the protections it guarantees. If the franchise were to 
be denied African Americans, in other words, if the Fifteenth Amendment were to be 
repealed, then a lack of legal recourse would become a lack of political existence, 
                                                
129 In a 1903 essay published in The Negro Problem titled “The Disfranchisement of the 
Negro,” Chesnutt explains such attempts. He explains that “in defiance of the Federal 
Constitution,” the states of Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Virginia, which “contain an aggregate colored population of about 
6,000,000,” have denied African Americans the right to vote. He says that methods of 
disenfranchisement “devised with much transparent ingenuity” are designed “to violate 
the spirit of the Federal Constitution by disfranchising the Negro, while seeming to 
respect its letter by avoiding the mention of race or color” (180). 
176 
 
further emboldening white supremacist violence.130 Each battle waged to procure and 
protect the principles of the franchise was therefore vital not only in itself and the 
principles it defended but in its relation to other ongoing cases and existing legal 
precedent. According to Chesnutt in “The Negro’s Franchise,” African Americans must 
“let no right, great or small, go by default.” Citizenship is a guaranteed status, and the 
African American “is either a citizen or not a citizen, and our laws and the theory of our 
government recognize, so far, no halfway ground.” Further, African Americans should 
ensure that their own particular cases of denied political agency “be not taken to 
establish a precedent for a curtailed citizenship” (166). The fight of the individual was 
the fight of all African Americans. Chesnutt’s urgent appeal to his audience reflected 
the severity of the conditions in the South and the ironic complicity of the law in 
denying the rights of African Americans. Without the right of citizenship, which 
guaranteed the protections required for survival and therefore existence, African 
Americans could never be safe in the United States. The disfranchisement of the 
African American man represented an attempted negation of his existence, his 
designation to an in-between status subject to the law but with no recourse to benefit 
from it.131 
                                                
130 In “The Negro Problem,” Chesnutt writes: “There is no doubt that an effort will be 
made to secure the repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment, and thus forestall the 
development of the wealthy and educated Negro, whom the South seems to anticipate as 
a greater menace than the ignorant ex-slave. However improbable this repeal may seem, 
it is not a subject to be lightly dismissed; for it is within the power of the white people 
of the nation to do whatever they wish in the premises—they did it once; they can do it 
again” (184). 
131 I continually refer to African American men in terms of the franchise because at this 
point in history it applied directly only to them. This is not to deny, however, the 
importance of women to the franchise at this time. In Gender and Jim Crow, Glenda 
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Chesnutt warned against accommodationist arguments that called for patience in 
the face of such threats. He described as “fatally short-sighted” the argument of “peace-
loving Northern white men and Negro opportunists” that because the political power of 
African Americans had “long ago been suppressed by unlawful means, his right to vote 
is a mere paper right, of no real value, and therefore to be lightly yielded for the sake of 
hypothetical harmony” (184). Chesnutt understood the potential of this right, if it could 
ever be realized through committed federal support, and its fundamental importance to 
human beings. He recognized the “latent power of … unexercised rights,” power that 
could not only allow for equal representation in the creation and administration of law 
but could protect the lives and well being of African American citizens in the United 
States under constant siege (184). He also understood the intersection of the mission to 
disfranchise African Americans with the logic of other strategies of terrorism and 
dehumanization and with the maintenance of the fiction that defined the supposedly 
essential differences between the races. Chesnutt understood, like Justice Harlan, that to 
erase the primacy of rights meant to invite violence with impunity. 
If for Agamben the exemplary site of the homo sacer and the sovereign ban is 
the concentration camp, in the discourse and period within which Chesnutt is writing it 
is the lynching tree. As the sovereign fiat that constructs homo sacer creates the 
possibility through the state of exception that he can be killed with impunity, lynching 
had extra-legal status that was sometimes uncomfortably acknowledged but still 
allowed to exist, exploited the non-status of African Americans, and effectively rejected 
the supposed sanctity of the rule of law. The scholarship on lynching is extensive, and 
                                                                                                                                          
Elizabeth Gilmore argues for the significance of African American women in holding 
on to “what they deemed the race’s most important right: the male franchise” (104-5). 
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this chapter engages a few notable examples in order to explore the theoretical 
underpinnings of lynching and its effect on literature and culture. Both contemporary 
and current analyses of lynching observe the ways its apologists obscured its political 
motivations. As an instrument of white supremacist power, lynching ritualizes a process 
to secure the fiction of whiteness and to punish African American political potential or 
economic success. Lynching trafficked in assumptions of black criminality and 
pathology and revealed the psychological obsessions of white supremacy in gendered 
and racialized terms. 
For my analysis of lynching in Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition, I rely on 
the work of critics who emphasize the political operation of lynching and point out the 
importance of historical analysis in establishing lynching’s broader implications as a 
sign of its political and discursive power. Ida B. Wells-Barnett provides an essential 
contemporary analysis of the political motivations of lynching and its dependence on 
assumptions about black sexuality and criminality. In To Wake the Nations: Race in the 
Making of American Literature, Eric Sundquist expands upon Wells-Barnett’s analysis 
and historicizes the ways that charges of rape became a fluid signifier that masked the 
political motivations of lynching as a technology of power that shored up white identity 
and entrenched white supremacist power. He and Wells-Barnett demonstrate the 
specific importance of the white supremacist occlusion of history, and they illustrate the 
consequences of a racist discourse of black pathology that helps create abject citizens. 
As a further extension of this important historicist work, Jacqueline Goldsby analyzes 
the broader cultural implications of lynching and argues for its particularly modern 
qualities, and in this way she echoes Agamben’s argument about sovereign power in an 
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ostensibly democratic society. She rejects the idea that lynching is anomalous and 
warns against historical or critical accounts that fail to emphasize lynching as 
symptomatic of some aspects of modern industrial society. While my argument focuses 
in more detail on the historical and political motivations and consequences of lynching, 
Chesnutt’s use of lynching as a literary sign invites the kind of larger cultural critique 
Goldsby offers. Finally, I apply Robyn Wiegman’s work on lynching as a specific 
technology of power to analyze lynching’s role as a cultural sign of political exclusion 
and violence dependent on a discourse of black pathology. Taken together with 
Agamben’s work, these critics help to illustrate how Chesnutt constructs a symbolic 
logic of lynching that erases its political function through discourses of the law and 
black criminality and becomes acculturated, if not normalized, into racial discourse at 
the turn of the century. 
Ida B. Wells-Barnett was perhaps the most accomplished contemporary theorist 
on the sociopolitical motivations of lynching in the South.132 In his article “Theory in 
History: Foundations of Resistance and Nonviolence in the American South,” Preston 
King identifies Wells-Barnett as especially influential in the study of and activism about 
lynching. Rather than accepting the contemporary conception of lynching as the angry 
mob run amok, or retributive justice gone awry, or even as the justified punishment for 
guilty rapists or murderers, Wells-Barnett, according to King, “saw lynching as nothing 
more than a deliberate campaign of terror, borne along by the specific concern to end 
                                                
132 Her pamphlets Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in all its Phases, published in 1892, 
and The Red Record: Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynching in the United 
States, published in 1895, provide an in-depth analysis of the causes and consequences 
of lynching and remains an influential scholarly intervention on the subject. For more 
on Wells-Barnett’s campaign, see Patricia A. Schechter’s Ida B. Wells-Barnett and 
American Reform, 1880–1930. 
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competition, entrench dependent labour, and sustain the dominance of twisted 
oligarchs” (44).133 Wells-Barnett also challenged the discourse on pure white 
womanhood and the black rapist, the frequent sources of justifications for lynchings, in 
order to subvert the supposed moral status of white supremacy by suggesting not only 
that black men were innocent of most of the charges leveled against them by their 
supposed victims, but that white men must accept the possibility that these relationships 
between white women and black men were voluntary.134 Gail Bederman argues that 
Wells-Barnett “convinced nervous white Northerners that they needed to take lynch law 
seriously because it imperiled both American civilization and American manhood” 
(46).135 Wells-Barnett’s claim figures into the discourse in which Northern white men 
were living vicariously through their Southern counterparts to prop up a model of 
whiteness that benefited from the destruction of blackness. White Northerners followed 
the sensational stories of lynchings that dominated the northern press and “[t]hese 
representations … encouraged Northern white men to see themselves as manly and 
powerful and gave them a rich ground on which issues of gender, sexuality, and racial 
dominance could be attractively combined and recombined to depict the overwhelming 
                                                
133 According to Goldsby, “During the period 1882–1930 (the years, scholars agree, 
when the most reliable lynching statistics were kept), 3,220 African American men 
women and children were murdered by lynch mobs” (15). 
134 Wells-Barnett writes: “In numerous instances where colored men have been lynched 
on the charge of rape, it was positively known at the time of the lynching, and 
indisputably proven after the victim’s death, that the relationship sustained between the 
man and woman was voluntary and clandestine, and that in no court of law could even 
the charge of assault have been successfully maintained” (The Red Record, n.p.). 
135 Bederman echoes Agamben’s language in her description of Wells-Barnett’s 
personal experience with lynching in Memphis, noting that “white men could ignore 
any rights a black man claimed—could even murder black men with impunity—in order 
to retain absolute dominance” (54). 
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power of their civilized white manliness” (46). By implicating white Northerners as 
unlikely participants in the spectacles of lynching in the South, Wells-Barnett indicated 
that not just Southern whites benefitted from the ritual.136 Lynching helped to construct 
a communal identification of whiteness even from afar by victimizing African 
Americans. 
Lynching and its political motivations reveal a constellation of assumptions 
regarding belief in black inferiority, cultural anxieties about racial borders, and white 
resentment. In particular, gender and sexuality intersect in lynching because, as Wells-
Barnett shows, the standard justification for it was the protection of white womanhood 
based on charges of rape.137 As Eric Sundquist argues, the threat of the black rapist 
proved to be a fluid signifier that masked more expedient motives. Sundquist observes 
that “[w]hat Wilbur Cash would later call the South’s ‘rape complex’ was detached 
from contemporary as well as historical reality, a free-floating trope of attack that could 
be used with virtual impunity on any political occasion and in support of any racial 
                                                
136 In White Violence and Black Response, Herbert Shapiro echoes Wells-Barnett’s 
analysis of the logic of lynching and its national implications. He notes that in response 
to charges of black criminality, “Northern opinion … generally lamented lynching and 
found it proof of southern backwardness but largely accepted the racist argument that 
southern white men were motivated by the desire to protect white women against black 
rape” (31). Northern complicity included the tacit assumption, in other words, that 
though lynching was technically an extra-legal strategy, it still effectively meted out 
purportedly necessary justice, even if its methods were barbaric to some. 
137 Further, as a technology of power, lynching exploits the two predominant gendered 
caricatures that both define and attempt to neutralize the apparent threat of the African 
American male, “the feminized, bumbling black ‘coon’” and “the hypermasculine black 
male rapist” (Wiegman 13). In Race, Rape, and Lynching, Sandra Gunning argues that 
Chesnutt “offer[s] radical and complex indictments of post-Reconstruction white 
supremacy” in part by sustaining a clear gender division (74). She notes that Chesnutt 




cause” (410). White supremacists argued that in the post-bellum South, emancipated 
black men posed a new threat not faced during slavery. As a result, post-Reconstruction 
white society developed an anxiety regarding these supposedly empowered African 
American men and channeled it into fear of rape. Martha Hodes explains that “for the 
first time, black men possessed political power, as well as opportunities for greater 
economic and social power … [and] White Southerners thus conflated those powers 
with a new alarmist ideology about black male sexuality” (61).138 Lynching is first and 
foremost a technology of power. Like the open signifier of black sexual criminality used 
to justify it, lynching shifts between the law and its apparent absence because it benefits 
from the power to define both racial hierarchy and the discourse that supports it. 
Despite modern critical consensus about the political motivations of lynching, 
Jacqueline Goldsby warns against the designation of lynching as extra-legal, and in the 
process she articulates what she sees as continued attempts to occlude its “cultural 
logic.” Her argument reminds us of the imporance of historicizing lynching’s broader 
implications while being precise in our attempts to theorize its operation. According to 
Goldsby, the history of lynching before it became a post-Reconstruction technology for 
                                                
138 In his essay “Race, Place, and Space: Remaking Whiteness in the Post-
Reconstruction South,” Angelo Rich Robinson argues that “lynchings also sought to 
reverse the progression toward humanity that Negroes gained as a result of 
Reconstruction amendments that granted them the civil rights of personhood” (105). In 
White Violence and Black Response, Shapiro recounts Frederick Douglass’s activism 
concerning lynching and explains that Douglass “demonstrated that the basic aim of the 
lynchers was to render blacks powerless through disfranchisement.” Shapiro states that 
“Douglass did not argue that blacks were never guilty of criminal acts, but he rejected 
the charge of criminality leveled against blacks as a group” (37). Instead, the 
justification of lynching through the charge of rape served a key role in “the campaign 




disciplining black bodies, in which “frontier justice” served a supposedly necessary 
function in spaces at the limits of society and the law, invites confusion as the word 
lynching “potentially misidentifies the range and aims of punishments targeting African 
Americans precisely because the state routinely allowed extreme, and often lethal, 
measures of discipline to be exacted on them” (17). Goldsby avoids what she sees as the 
conventional economic, psychological, or sociological readings of lynching in favor of 
analyzing the ways lynching’s cultural logic reveals a particularly modern bent.139 She 
argues that the historiography of lynching “has institutionalized the perception that 
lynching means less to the central processes defining American life and culture because 
the violence is, we presume, best understood as regional and aberrant” (20-1). Whether 
or not the fact and function of lynching reveals a broader insidious logic at the heart of 
American life, its complicity with the law and a larger national concern regarding 
pathological black criminality demands a close analysis of how lynching functions as a 
part of white supremacist ideology, especially as part of that ideology uses the law as a 
cover for its political strategies. And the intersection of race and sexuality is a central 
focus for that analysis. 
In American Anatomies, Robyn Wiegman is also attentive to both the historical 
and theoretical implications of lynching; however, she particularly focuses on lynching 
in terms of Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary structures and the ways such structures 
intersect with narratives of black pathology. She claims that lynching “proves to be an 
interesting link,” in the context of the nineteenth-century United States, “between the 
                                                
139 Goldsby sees lynching as symptomatic of and coextensive with “the nation’s 
ambivalences attending its nascent modernism,” including anxiety about the power of 
the state and a rapidly changing economy (24). 
184 
 
spectacle of public torture and execution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and the strategies of surveillance that increasingly accompany the production of 
subjects in the nineteenth” century (13). The “shift” after Emancipation of the 
influential trope of the black male rapist, instrumental to the discourse of black 
pathology as I have shown throughout this project, “as the narrative around which the 
practice of lynching becomes racialized at the end of the nineteenth century points as 
well toward a reinvigoration of the disciplinary structures of white supremacy” (13). 
According to Wiegman, lynching as a disciplinary practice “figures its victims as the 
culturally abject—monstrosities of excess whose limp and hanging bodies function as 
the spectacular assurance that the racial threat has not simply been averted, but rendered 
incapable of return” (81). This racial threat manifested in white supremacist ideology as 
fear of infiltration of the race through miscegenation, but it occluded political and 
economic motivations to disempower African Americans. As his essays demonstrate, 
Chesnutt recognizes the consequences of disenfranchisement; it enables lynching by 
evacuating what Wiegman identifies as the power of the “disembodied abstraction.” 
According to Wiegman, “With the advent of Emancipation and its attendant loss of the 
slave system’s marking of the African American body as property, lynching emerged to 
reclaim and reassert the centrality of black male corporeality, deterring the now 
theoretically possible move toward citizenry” (94).140 The fact that lynching became “an 
increasingly routine response to black male as well as female attempts at education, 
                                                
140 Wiegman attributes the “disembodied abstraction” to Lauren Berlant’s work. 
Whiteness claims the privilege of the abstract self, as opposed to the embodied nature of 
the other, to define its power. It is the transcendental subject that defines political 
identity and creates the abject other. See also Russ Castronovo’s Necro Citizenship: 
Death, Eroticism, and the Public Sphere in the Nineteenth-Century United States and 
Priscilla Wald’s Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form. 
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self- and communal government, suffrage, and other indicators of cultural inclusion and 
equality attests to its powerful disciplinary function” (94). As current critics as well as 
Chesnutt and his contemporaries like Ida B. Wells-Barnett make clear, to understand 
lynching as a white supremacist strategy was to understand white supremacy. 
The historiography of lynching illustrates the importance of signification in the 
way lynching operates as a technology of power. It is both a physical act of terrorism 
and an act of discursive violence that creates vulnerable subjects. Chesnutt recognized 
this connection in various acts of politically motivated violence, and consequently he 
uses lynching and the incident of a racially motivated coup in a symbolic logic to 
analyze the way the law is both completely involved and completely breached in a 
white supremacist ideology that deems African Americans homo sacer, capable of 
being killed with impunity but not sacrificed. In Marrow, Chesnutt explores the causes 
and implications of the 1898 Wilmington, North Carolina race riot and examines the 
relationship between political agency and white racially motivated violence towards 
blacks by articulating the white supremacist violence of the coup through the sign of 
lynching. As a result, his protagonists recognize the political messaging of all white 
supremacist acts of violence and lose faith in the law as a source of security and 
stability. 
Chesnutt wrote the novel in part in response to the designation of the political 
coup as a “race riot” by white-owned newspapers throughout the South.141 His novel 
recovers the historical event of the coup in response to various inaccuracies perpetuated 
                                                
141 I refer throughout this chapter to the event in Wilmington as a coup rather than a riot 
to emphasize its actual motivations and, following scholarship on the event, to place 
responsibility on its white supremacist actors rather than on its black victims. 
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in the media and depicts the event based on the experiences of African Americans who 
survived it.142 “Wellington,” the fictional stand-in for Wilmington, is an instructive 
example of what can happen when white supremacists are emboldened by the continued 
reduction of black rights. Chesnutt explains how cultural assumptions and the denial of 
political rights make possible events like Wilmington, promise future events like the 
various “race riots” throughout the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, 
and virtually guarantee the continued torture and murder of African Americans in the 
United States.143 The urgency of the situation was clear to Chesnutt, even if it was not 
so clear to his largely white readership. In Marrow, he configures his analysis through 
lynching, both literally and metaphorically, to trace the way white supremacist power 
operates and to caution those who might underestimate the white supremacist threat. 
The most cited sources of historical reconstruction of the event include Leon 
Prather’s We Have Taken a City and, more recently, a study commissioned by the 
Wilmington Race Riot Commission in 2000, LeRae Sike Umfleet’s A Day of Blood: the 
1898 Wilmington Race Riot.144 Umfleet relies upon extensive archival evidence and 
grounds her discussion in the contemporary and historical revisionist accounts of the 
coup.145 Umfleet contends that “riot” was a misnomer and that the event was actually a 
                                                
142 For an analysis of contemporaneous newspaper accounts of the event, see Dolen 
Perkins’s “White Heat in Wilmington: The Dialogue Between Journalism and Literature 
in The Marrow of Tradition.” 
143 Shapiro’s White Violence and Black Response is a useful source on this topic, as is 
Paul Gilje’s Rioting in America, especially chapter 4, “The Tragedy of Race.” 
144 Sundquist explains the historical events of the coup in his introduction to the 1993 
Penguin edition of Marrow. 
145 Umfleet points out that Helen G. Edmonds’s 1951 study The Negro in Fusion 
Politics was perhaps the first attempt by a major publication to decry the conventional 
rehearsal of the events, though the white citizens of Wilmington denied its historical 
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“planned insurrection” by white citizens threatened by African American representation 
in city government (xviii). According to Umfleet, because white rioters in Wilmington 
“were able to murder blacks in daylight and overthrow a legitimately elected 
Republican government without penalty or federal intervention, everyone in the state, 
regardless of race, knew that the white-supremacy campaign was triumphant on all 
fronts” (xix). Umfleet also notes that “[t]he change in government on that day 
completely terminated black participation in city and county government until the 
advent of the civil rights era” (xviii).146 The willful attempt by the white press to 
misrepresent the story as a race riot instigated by African American citizens angered 
Chesnutt. As a result, he traveled to North Carolina not long after the event to begin 
research for a book. 
In Marrow, Chesnutt attempts to correct the inaccuracies in the historical record 
of the Wilmington coup by identifying the political motivations of the so-called riot and 
figuring the “Secret Nine”—the white businessmen in Wilmington responsible for 
orchestrating the coup—through “the Big Three” in Marrow. These three men, Major 
Carteret, General Belmont, and Colonel McBane, represent various aspects of the white 
community in Wellington, as Chesnutt aims to demonstrate that the doctrine of white 
supremacy that motivated the coup was not localized within one particular social or 
                                                                                                                                          
accuracy. It was only upon the publication of Prather’s book in 1984 that the corrected 
historical record was solidified (Umfleet xviii). 
146 Umfleet’s text also addresses the issue of casualties on that day, which is complex. 
She analyzes a variety of official and anecdotal evidence and concludes that the exact 
number is impossible to ascertain. The generally agreed upon estimate is that twenty 
African American citizens were killed, though anecdotal evidence suggests that this 
number could have approached as man as one hundred, as some claim that bodies were 
concealed in the river or buried in secret (119). 
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professional class.147 They see black citizenship as a “grotesque farce” and seek to 
“endeavor, through [the state] constitution, to escape from the domination of a weak 
and incompetent electorate and confine the negro to that inferior condition for which 
nature had evidently designed him” (79). William Miller, a middle-class black doctor 
who serves as a central protagonist in the narrative, becomes a reluctant force of 
opposition to these men, though he is ultimately helpless in the face of white 
supremacist violence. Ultimately, Chesnutt explores white supremacist political 
violence through two events: a lynching and the political coup to reclaim the city in the 
name of white supremacy.148 The lynching never actually takes place, as Sandy, the 
accused servant and former slave for Mr. Delamere, the last of the town’s antebellum 
aristocrats, is vindicated at the eleventh hour, in large part due to Delamere’s 
(inaccurate if well intended) testimony. Consequently, Chesnutt displaces the violence 
                                                
147 In The Slave’s Rebellion, Adeleke Adeeko reads Marrow in part as an exploration of 
interracial class issues. 
148 Parallel to this strand of the novel’s plot is a story of family genealogy represented 
by the two figures of Janet Miller and Olivia Carteret. These two families are 
inextricably linked through the slave-era past, as the patriarch of Olivia’s family 
(Merkell) fathered Janet Miller with his black housekeeper. Similarly, the living 
patriarchs of the family, Major Carteret, a white newspaper editor, and Dr. William 
Miller, a middle-class black physician, serve as doubles for each other, tied together by 
their families but also by their social classes. This phase of the plot not only illustrates 
the logical impossibility of truly separate races through legal enactments like the Jim 
Crow laws, and by positioning this argument within the genealogical frame, Chesnutt 
seems to suggest also that the biological, ontological distinctions of race are equally 
tenuous. The parallel plot structures develop throughout the story, culminating on the 
one hand in a final dramatic scene to resolve the family genealogy plot—Janet Miller 
rejects the recognition offered by Olivia in exchange for saving her son—and on the 
other in a near lynching and subsequent “riot” in order to enact the political coup. 
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of the near-lynching onto another act of racist violence, the coup, to demonstrate the 
disciplinary function all acts of racist violence serve.149 
The near-lynching occurs when Polly Ochiltree, another representative of the 
old guard and a part of the Carteret-Merkell family, is robbed and murdered. Sandy is 
suspected, even though the actual perpetrator, Mr. Delamere’s son Tom, a white man, 
committed the robbery in order to pay off gambling debts and disguised himself in 
blackface and Sandy’s clothes to make Sandy his patsy. The novel builds toward a 
violent conclusion with Sandy incarcerated and the anger of the mob approaching a 
frenzy. Meanwhile, the Big Three are working hard to use the imminent lynching to 
provoke the mob toward their goal of disfranchising the city’s African Americans.150 By 
republishing an editorial by the editor of an African American newspaper that rejects 
the black male rapist justification of lynching, the Big Three stoke the rage of the white 
citizens of Wellington.151 Their logic is that, by exacerbating white anxieties regarding 
                                                
149 Initially, the violence of the coup seems not to share the ritualized features of 
lynching that historians identify in the scholarly literature on lynching. For instance, 
Trudier Harris analyzes the psychological and symbolic function castration serves to 
cathect white anxieties about black sexuality onto the victim. But as this act serves a 
part of a broader political message, one designed carefully to terrorize and disempower 
African Americans, the coup reflects a similar level of design. Moreover, the 
spectacular aspects of violence, which, as I will show, the coup shares, should not 
occlude its carefully planned political motivations. 
150 H. Leon Prather notes that African Americans comprised approximately 60% of 
Wilmington’s population and that the extent of their representation in government was 
overstated by the white supremacists. For a more detailed discussion, see Prather’s We 
Have Taken a City. 
151 This event, as is the case with much of Marrow, is based on the historical facts of the 
Wilmington riot. Arthur Manley, the successful owner of a black newspaper in 
Wilmington, published an editorial that, besides defending black men from accusations 
of rape, sardonically asserted that perhaps white men should do a better job of keeping 
watch over their women. In this way the letter echoes Ida B. Wells-Barnett’s argument. 
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the murder and presumed sexual assault of a white woman, they will be incite a “riot” 
that will intimidate black voters and reclaim political power from the Republican Party 
in Wellington. The common assumption that served as the pretext for lynching—the 
sexual criminality of black men—becomes the means by which the white supremacists 
launch their political attack. Therefore, lynching is the foundational sign for violence in 
the novel. But by subverting expectations and never allowing the lynching to take place, 
instead channeling the political manipulations of the Big Three and the rage of the white 
citizens into the “race riot” in the novel’s last act, Chesnutt indicates the role lynching 
serves—its political motivations, its function in galvanizing white anxiety, and its 
ability to explain how white supremacist ideology structures the world.152 
As the history of lynching demonstrates, the anxiety about the rape of white 
women by African American men is inextricably tied to the disfranchisement of those 
same African American men, and Chesnutt critiques the logic of lynching and 
disfranchisement while challenging the general notions of racial hierarchy that support 
them. Early in the novel, Major Carteret writes an editorial for his newspaper in which 
he makes clear one of the central assumptions of white supremacy and the 
disfranchisement of the African American man—his supposed “unfitness” to govern. 
                                                                                                                                          
The Manley letter explains that many lynchings “were not for crimes at all, but for 
voluntary acts which might naturally be expected to follow from the miscegenation laws 
by which, it was sought, in all the Southern States, to destroy liberty of contract, and for 
the purpose of maintaining a fanciful purity of race, to make crimes of marriages to 
which neither nature nor religion nor the laws of other states interposed any 
insurmountable barrier” (85). Manley’s newspaper office was burned to the ground in 
the Wilmington riot and he fled the city (see Sundquist’s critical introduction to the 
Penguin edition).  
152  The Wilmington coup continues a strategy of Southern “redemption” to roll back 
gains achieved by African Americans in Reconstruction. For another example of a 
Democratic political coup, see LeeAnn Keith’s The Colfax Massacre. 
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The narrator explains that Carteret took “for his theme the unfitness of the negro to 
participate in government … due to his limited education, his lack of experience, his 
criminal tendencies, and more especially his hopeless mental and physical inferiority to 
the white race.” Carteret asserts that “the ballot in the hands of the negro was a menace 
to the commonwealth” (31). He configures his argument within the discourses of race 
and the franchise, asserting white superiority while decrying the African American 
man’s “unfitness” to even participate in government. He situates his attack on African 
American citizenship in the praise of whiteness as mentally and physically superior and 
in the assertion of black pathology. Carteret is talking about the right to vote, but his 
language invokes the charge against African Americans that provokes white 
supremacist violence: supposed black inferiority in terms of criminality. The black man 
must be denied the franchise because he is a “menace.” This is the same rationale that 
makes his life expendable and allows him to be killed with impunity.153 Carteret sees 
the “darker race” as “an incubus, a corpse chained to the body politic” and believes 
“that the negro vote was a source of danger to the State no matter how cast or by whom 
directed” (80). The black voter in Wellington is both a non-citizen undeserving of 
political agency—a “corpse” and an “incubus”—and an existential threat that must be 
dealt with, violently if necessary. He is bare life, at once outside the law but defined 
within it. 
                                                
153 African Americans still have the vote at this point in the story, which explains the 
particular urgency and form of Carteret’s argument. The outcome of the riot at the 
novel’s end will be to impose the “grandfather clause,” which was one of many Jim 
Crow-era strategies to restrict the African American vote and which spread across the 
South at the end of the nineteenth century as legal precedent shifted and opened the 
door for new restrictions to constitutional law. 
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The irony that whites claimed the law as justification for the exclusion and 
eventual disfranchisement of African Americans was not lost on Chesnutt. Nor is white 
supremacy in his novel limited to the Big Three. Chesnutt instead suggests that these 
assumptions were endemic to the white community he represents in Marrow. Matthew 
Wilson argues in Whiteness in the Novels of Charles W. Chesnutt that Chesnutt “used 
the Manley editorial in particular to show how the fiction of whiteness was 
manufactured and how that whiteness was employed to create a solidarity that 
transcended political and class differences” (133). The solidarity of whiteness is 
represented in Marrow by a notion of a “higher law” that governs (white) human 
behavior and that by definition can trump the legal constructions of the state or federal 
government. While much of Chesnutt’s nonfiction was focused on identifying and 
challenging specific legal cases that tried to circumvent constitutional law, in Marrow 
he identifies the terrifying pervasiveness of an illogical appeal to whiteness itself, 
fictionalized as pure and constantly under threat, to govern decisions that caused violent 
harm to American citizens. Therefore, higher law also served to justify lynching. 
Despite its official extra-legal status, lynching functioned as an instrument of 
dominance that appeals to justice and, in the case of Chesnutt’s novel, forwards the 
white supremacist mission of the Democrats determined to take back control of the 
government. As Wilson explains, “The higher law was then a transcendent principle 
that could be used to rationalize any illegal or immoral behavior on the part of white 
folks; any violence, public or private, could be countenanced by resorting to this 
explanatory principle” (135). Like the appeal to black criminality, higher law became an 
empty signifier justifying white supremacist violence. 
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Carteret makes this clear frequently during the narrative. After the men discover 
that Sandy is indeed innocent, and after Carteret decides that political diplomacy 
requires that he suppress the news of the event to retain some degree of “moral 
standing” for the citizens of Wellington, he spins the story his way. In doing so, he 
appeals to the sentiment of “higher law” while ironically asserting the just nature of 
whiteness. Carteret states that, “even as a negro,” Sandy “is entitled to protection of the 
law,” but only if he “behaves himself and keeps in his place.” Carteret explains the 
moral high ground reserved for white supremacists: “We may be stern and unbending in 
the punishment of crime, as befits our masterful race, but we hold the scales of justice 
with even and impartial hand” (229-30). The full extent of the irony in Carteret’s 
comments is realized later when those African Americans who have behaved 
themselves by showing the proper amount of deference and docility to their white 
superiors, namely Jerry and “Mammy Jane,” are murdered during the riot. Chesnutt’s 
point is clear, especially when the reader considers his commentary on political theory 
and the franchise in terms of the sign of lynching. The law as it is practiced by those 
who would attempt to disenfranchise African American citizens is nothing but a ruse to 
justify otherwise wrongful actions they might take in defense of white privilege. They 
are willing to expand the supposed limits of the law to render “justice” to those African 
Americans who try to assert any agency. At the same time, what Agamben might call 
the sovereign power of whiteness also means that nothing is outside the law. Whatever 
exceptional status lynching claims to occupy, it is always available as an instrument of 
power, and Carteret’s appeal to the “even and impartial hand” shows how the law can 
both enable and validate lynching. Denied the true protections of citizenship through the 
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law, African Americans are vulnerable to extra-legal instruments of white supremacist 
power, and white supremacists’ claim to legal justice demonstrates their power over the 
rule and the exception. 
Carteret illustrates lynching’s tenuous relationship with the law, and he argues 
for the justness of lynching in terms familiar to Chesnutt’s early twentieth-century 
readers. According to an article in Carteret’s Chronicle, a white public with an aroused 
sense of moral indignation could be justified in meting out their own form of “justice”: 
If an outraged people, justly infuriated, and impatient of 
the slow process of the courts, should assert their inherent 
sovereignty, which the law after all was merely intended 
to embody, and should choose, in obedience to the higher 
law, to set aside, temporarily, the ordinary judicial 
procedure, it would serve as a warning and an example to 
the vicious elements of the community, of the swift and 
terrible punishment which would fall like the judgment of 
God, upon any one who laid sacrilegious hands upon 
white womanhood. (185-6) 
Carteret grounds his argument in an appeal to the law, as he asserts that the law is a 
servant to the naturally embodied sovereignty of the people, in this case white citizens. 
This sovereignty precedes any legal sanction and is subject to the state of exception, 
which the article argues can be invoked by the sovereign power to create the anomalous 
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but necessary situation of a public lynching.154 Further, the “vicious elements” to which 
Carteret alludes represent African Americans as homo sacer. They are both within and 
without the law, inscribed by its limits but not subject to its protections, and always 
vulnerable to white supremacist violence through the state of exception. 
In his article “‘Between Absorption and Extinction’: Charles Chesnutt and 
Biopolitical Racism,” Ryan Jay Friedman reads the state of exception Chesnutt 
represents in Marrow, with reference to Agamben. Though Friedman only briefly 
focuses on the issue of lynching, he identifies an important scene in the tense moments 
leading up to what could be Sandy’s death. William Miller’s friend Watson, a lawyer, 
attempts an eleventh-hour appeal to Judge Everton to save Sandy’s life. Judge Everton 
is a man whom Watson thought “always seemed to be fair.” Watson explains that Judge 
Everton “admitted that lynching was, as a rule, unjustifiable, but maintained that there 
were exceptions to all rules … [and] in a state of emergency the sovereign people might 
assert itself and take the greater law into its own hands” (193). Friedman points out that 
this important scene reaffirms the assumption that whiteness functions as the sovereign 
power and that in these terms the “perceived threat to white womanhood constitutes a 
case of extreme necessity, justifying a state of ‘exception’ to the rule of law” (49). Like 
                                                
154 Ironically, the moment of the sovereign exception creates the opportunity for its 
opposition, as the riot that results from the failed lynching gives rise to Josh Green, the 
potential revolutionary hero of the novel, and the literary embodiment of Agamben’s 
homo sacer. As I will make clear in my analysis of the riot, the sign of lynching 
represents an attempt to adjudicate the crime of black empowerment behind accusations 
of black criminality. As the hypermasculinized representation of white anxiety, Green 
brings lynching and revolutionary violence to the fore. As opposed to Sandy, who 
eventually loses his life despite playing the role of the docile slave, Green rejects both 
white supremacy and the law that supports it, and his role at the end of the novel 
indicates Chesnutt’s ambivalence about possibilities for social change. 
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the appeal to higher law that justifies white supremacist violence, the legal system has 
limits defined by “exception.” In this case circumstantial evidence, coupled with his 
racial identity, is enough to find Sandy guilty. But the heinousness of his purported 
crime and his abject identity are enough to remove the case from the field of law and 
into a state of emergency that allows the “unjustifiable” to take place. 
At the same time, Delamere’s attempt to rescue Sandy strains the limits of the 
supposed sanctity of the law, as Chesnutt satirizes white supremacist appeals to moral 
superiority through the law that creates vulnerable second-class citizens and justifies 
their murder. Though lynching supposedly acts as the last defense of Southern honor, 
charges of rape prove no match for Delamere’s testimony that Sandy “has the family 
honor of the Delameres … at heart” and could not be guilty of the crime (198-9). 
Delamere naively believes his word and Sandy’s status as a loyal family servant should 
be enough to save Sandy’s life. Delamere tells another servant that the townspeople “are 
good people,” and when Delamere testifies, he says that when “they have an 
opportunity for the sober second thought, they will do nothing rashly, but will wait for 
the operation of the law, which will, of course, clear Sandy” (200). When Delamere 
confronts Carteret to declare Sandy’s innocence, he explains that Sandy could never 
have committed the crime because he has been so loyal to Delamere. According to 
Delamere, Sandy, “like all the negroes … has been clay in the hands of the white 
people.” He explains that African Americans “are what we have made them, or 
permitted them to become.” Delamere claims that his “negroes … were well raised and 
well behaved” (210-11). This language anticipates Carteret’s later explanation that the 
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lynching must be called off because innocent “negroes” who “behave themselves” 
should be spared. 
As a member of the old generation of plantation aristocracy, whom Chesnutt 
renders with the familiar trope of the master and his contented slave, Delamere seems 
not to realize the ways lynching is used to impose order in the postbellum South. His 
word is not enough to guarantee Sandy’s innocence and safety because Sandy no longer 
belongs to him, or to any white people. Carteret explains that the “negroes are no longer 
under our control, and with their emancipation ceased our responsibility.” Instead, their 
“insolence and disregard for law have reached a point where they must be sternly 
rebuked” (212). Delamere sees Sandy as his loyal slave, defined by his personal 
relationship with him but also by the belief that Sandy’s devotion and dependency on 
Delamere render him harmless. Carteret, however, views Sandy through the post-
Emancipation anxiety that demands lynching as social control. Because Sandy is no 
longer a slave, he is a potential danger, but more importantly his murder is the spark 
that can start the coup. As in lynching itself, Sandy’s guilt or innocence is not at issue. 
Even if Sandy is innocent, he can still serve as a scapegoat and therefore an example to 
others. Further, Carteret is most concerned with how calling off the lynching will play 
politically, since the “white people of the city had raised the issue of their own superior 
morality, and had themselves made this crime a race question.” They have played 
directly into Carteret’s hands, and they are unaware of Carteret’s design to exploit their 
race hatred. For Carteret, the “success of the impending ‘revolution’ … depended in 
large measure upon the maintenance of their race prestige, which would be injured in 
the eyes of the world by such a fiasco” (228).  
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More than their reputation, though, Carteret and his men risked the failure of 
their coup, as there “would be great disappointment if the lynching did not occur” (230). 
Delamere discovers his grandson actually killed Polly Ochiltree, and in exchange for 
the protection of his family honor by hiding this fact, the Big Three allow Delamere to 
swear an oath that he was with Sandy during the time of the murder, thereby securing 
Sandy’s eventual freedom. Chesnutt satirizes the white supremacists’ appeal to the 
sanctity of the law throughout this scene. General Belmont says that they will not 
“interfere … with the orderly process of the law, or … advise the prisoner’s immediate 
release” (231). Sandy’s freedom will only be granted after the spectacle of a trial built 
on Delamere’s false testimony is complete. Ironically, the Big Three’s ruse of justice 
through the law constrains them in their response to Sandy. If Delamere tells the truth 
and admits he lied to provide an alibi, the farce of the legal proceedings is laid bare. On 
the one hand, the law is merely a tool for political expediency. But it is also powerful 
enough to deny political agency to Sandy and to justify his lynching. Sandy is a citizen 
by the spirit of the law but not its application. This moment echoes Chesnutt’s concern 
that the law for African Americans is still defined by Dred Scott, and while African 
Americans lack protection, white supremacists continue to use the law to entrench racial 
hierarchy and undo the progress of Reconstruction. Chesnutt’s narrator notes the 
arbitrary nature of the law in the final words of the scene: “Thus, a slight change in the 
point of view had demonstrated the entire ability of the leading citizens to maintain the 
dignified and orderly processes of the law whenever they saw fit to do so” (232).155 In 
                                                
155 Upon Sandy’s release, Chesnutt’s narrator also notes the “fickleness of a mob” that 
would greet Sandy with “congratulations” when “some … would cheerfully have done 
him to death a few hours before” (232). The narrator notes that the “workings of the 
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this case, seeing “fit to do so” involved Carteret’s political calculation for how best to 
play white resentment against the black population of Wellington. 
As the white supremacists are shoring up their claim to moral superiority with a 
vacant appeal to the process rather than the substance of the law, the African American 
citizens of Wellington feel the effects of the near lynching as a technology of power, 
even though a particular murder has been thwarted. Chesnutt’s narrator explains that 
“the charge against [Sandy] Campbell had been made against the whole colored race.” 
The spectacle of the lynching and of the actions of the “black brute” that necessitated it, 
even though it did not actually take place, “had been displayed in large black type on 
the front pages of the daily papers” across the nation (233). In contrast, the news that it 
had been called off and Sandy released “received slight attention” (234). Consequently, 
the damage had been done, and the mere sign of a lynching had further endangered 
African Americans nationally. The white supremacists’ vacant appeal to the law 
signifies for Chesnutt the false claims that justify lynching and yet its complicity with 
the law. This ambiguous position allows the men flexibility in deploying the technology 
of power as Sandy’s case proved too costly politically and yet the net effect was the 
same. White supremacists retained their claim to the law by demonizing and 
intimidating African Americans. The Big Three’s political aims remain possible 
because they cathect the resentments and political assumptions of white racists in terms 
of lynching onto the riot that follows, furthering their goals of political domination at 
the expense of African Americans. 
                                                                                                                                          
human heart are the profoundest mystery of the universe,” Chesnutt’s sarcastic 
satirization of white supremacist appeals to moral superiority through higher law. 
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 In an interesting departure from the historical record of the Wilmington riot, 
Chesnutt positioned the coup in Marrow before the election. In Wilmington, the 
election occurred and the white supremacists swept the Republicans out of office before 
the Manly editorial was printed and the riot erupted. Chesnutt figures the riot as prior to 
the election, however, and Sundquist reads this choice as important. According to 
Sundquist, “Chesnutt subtly collapsed the two actions, placing the riot before the 
election and thereby revealing the violent logic of disfranchisement and Jim Crow as it 
was bound up with the existing legal processes of United States racial justice” (420). 
Additionally, I contend that positioning the failed lynching before the coup is 
significant in this causal chain because the failed lynching illustrates that the logic of 
disfranchisement is inextricably tied to the illegal processes of racial “justice” in the 
form of lynching. It also shifts the potential function of the lynching onto the coup 
itself, solidifying the fact that the ruse of spontaneous violence that is historically used 
to justify lynching is merely cover for its political design to disempower and intimidate 
African Americans. The coup is effectively a lynching, even as the plan to lynch Sandy 
goes unfulfilled. But the coup does not represent frustrated violence redirected 
spontaneously into another act of violence. To believe that would be to accept the 
rationale of apologists who claim that lynching is an atavistic yet justified expression of 
communal rage. To render the racist violence of the coup through the images of 
lynching is to illustrate the programmatic nature of that violence, its political purposes, 
and the problems it creates for black resistance. Like a literal lynching, the coup warns 
black citizens against any resistance, all under the guise of a just response to 
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exceptional conditions, and it makes clear that white supremacists have legal and 
extralegal means of power at their reach. 
Chesnutt describes the coup from William Miller’s point of view as Miller 
frantically makes his way through town attempting to find his wife and child. He sees 
the body of a man with “blood oozing from a ghastly wound in the forehead.” He 
observes that the “negroes seemed to have been killed, as the band plays in circus 
parades, at the street intersections, where the example would be most effective.” The 
narrator describes the scene with the imagery of a lynching, with its “gruesome 
spectacle” and the bodies positioned as “examples.” Even the comparison to the “circus 
parade” echoes the terminology of lynching (287).156 The white leaders of Wellington 
stage this spectacle of violence to communicate a particular message to the black 
citizens. Like the political function of a public lynching, designed to disempower the 
individual and terrorize the group into political passivity, the Big Three orchestrate the 
“race riot” to caution African Americans against political agency and economic success 
and to seize power back from Republican control, all the while laying the responsibility 
for the violence at the feet of the black citizens of Wellington. The sovereign power of 
white supremacy appears to be insurmountable, always threatening to assert social 
                                                
156 The notion of lynching as “entertainment” is a central issue in much of the 
scholarship on the subject. Part of Goldsby’s argument regarding the distinctly modern 
spectacular function of lynching is that it benefits from the technologies that allow its 
dissemination through the national press as well as through the sale of postcards with 
images of lynchings, phonograph recordings of the suffering of the victim, etc. In the 
buildup to Sandy’s near lynching, Chesnutt’s narrator describes the crowd’s 
preparations, a common occurrence during Southern lynchings: “Some enterprising 
individual had begun the erection of seats from which, for a pecuniary consideration, 
the spectacle might be the more easily and comfortably viewed” (219). See also Amy 
Wood’s Lynching and Spectacle. 
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control through its own expressions of violence. The coup is the site at which the 
various strands of the novel come together in a consummative event, and an unlikely 
potential hero is charged with bringing about its conclusion. 
Josh Green, the dock laborer who attempts to face down the angry crowd at the 
end of the novel, is one of Chesnutt’s most interesting characters.157 Sundquist calls him 
a “folk hero” in his willingness to face the aggression and threats of the white 
supremacists with defiance and violence if necessary.158 His overt rejection of the 
assumptions of white supremacy is obvious throughout the text, as he refuses to play the 
role ascribed to him by white supremacists.159 Returning to Wiegman’s reading of 
lynching, Green represents for the white supremacists of Wellington the 
“hypermasculinized threat of the black rapist,” as they displace onto Green their anxiety 
from the attempted lynching over the murder of Polly Ochiltree (13). Fundamentally, 
Green represents a threat to white supremacist power as a potential black revolutionary. 
During the coup, he leads a group of armed men to protect Dr. William Miller’s 
hospital, a symbol of African American economic success in the community and 
therefore a threat to the white supremacists. Green makes his final stand defending the 
                                                
157 Josh Green has a personal vendetta against Colonel McBane, the most provincial of 
the Big Three. McBane, a leader in the local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, killed 
Green’s father when he was a child, and his mother never recovered from the 
experience. Green has made it his mission to seek retributive justice by killing McBane, 
and Chesnutt revisits this subplot numerous times throughout the text. 
158 Sundquist goes on to place green in the tradition of popular black folk heroes (425). 
159 As a physically imposing black man with a penchant for drunken street fights, Josh 
Green is an easy mark for the prejudices of the white townspeople obsessed with the 
perceived threat of black sexual violence. Ironically, however, it is Sandy, the loyal 
servant to old Mr. Delamere, whom Tom Delamere’s crime implicates. This choice 
supports Chesnutt’s suggestion that playing the “proper” role will not save African 
Americans in Wellington. 
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hospital and at the same time gets vengeance by killing McBane, the Klan leader who 
murdered his father and a member of the Big Three. Green dies a hero’s death, as the 
narrator describes him charging through a hail of bullets to find his retributive justice 
and kill McBane. The narrator notes the crowd’s reaction. Some “paused in involuntary 
admiration of this black giant, famed on the wharves for his strength.” In a final display 
of power, Green charges the crowd of white men with “a smile on his face, his eyes lit 
up with a rapt expression which seemed to take him out of the mortal ken.” He seems 
impervious to “the shower of lead which less susceptible persons had continued to pour 
at him” (309). The lionization of Green in death is immediately interrupted, however, as 
Chesnutt’s narrator wonders aloud, “One of the two died as the fool dieth. Which was it, 
or was it both?” (309-310).  
The implications of Green’s death have been a popular subject of criticism 
regarding Marrow.160 Some critics have considered Green’s death in terms of its effect 
on Miller, who is the voice of middle-class restraint, in contrast to Green, who 
represents one pole of the contemporaneous debate about the appropriate nature of 
black response to white violence in terms of accommodationism or militancy.161 For 
example, Dean McWilliams in Charles W. Chesnutt and the Fictions of Race identifies 
Green both as “the return of society’s repressed” and as “the embodiment of the urbane 
                                                
160 Jerry Bryant observes that “for all his personal satisfaction, Josh dies a futile death” 
(111). 
161 In “Charles Chesnutt’s Dilemma: Professional Ethics, Social Justice, and Domestic 
Feminism in The Marrow of Tradition,” Susan Danielson writes, “Given the context 
that the novel has so carefully presented, Miller’s refusal to assume leadership in the 
midst of chaos rests on his conflation of assimilation and accommodation and can not 
be mistaken for naivete” (82). As I argue, Miller is indeed naive about the extremity of 




Miller’s suppressed rage” (150). In “Violence, Manhood, and Black Heroism: The 
Wilmington Riot in Two Turn-of-the-Century African American Novels,” Richard 
Yarborough explains that for Miller, Green represents an “embodiment of black rage 
and vindictiveness,” and Yarborough notes the “ideological tension” between the two 
men (232).162 In Whiteness in the Novels of Charles Chesnutt, Matthew Wilson argues 
that Dr. Miller and Josh Green seem to represent separate parts of the same whole, as 
opposed to an “unresolved binary opposition” (117). Richard Yarborough notes the 
“ideological tension” between Miller and Green and suggests that while Green 
embodies rage and righteous anger, Miller remains rational and controlled (232). 
Yarborough argues that Miller “survives as the embodiment of what Chesnutt sees as 
the most rational and constructive posture for blacks to assume” (238). Critics agree that 
these two characters illustrate something about a proper course of action for black 
resistance in the face of white supremacist violence. More interesting than the potential 
ideological opposition of the characters is the way the sign of lynching specifically 
disillusions Miller regarding the nature of white supremacist violence. Rather than 
radicalizing him, the coup achieves its intended effect, further marginalizing Miller and 
pushing him away from political empowerment. 
Miller urges restraint as the resistance to the coup becomes more violent and as 
Green implores Miller to lead the fight. Miller tells Green that he had “better be 
peaceable and endure a little injustice, rather than run the risk of a sudden and violent 
                                                
162 In “Keeping an ‘Old Wound’ Alive: The Marrow of Tradition and the Legacy of 
Wilmington,” Jae H. Roe argues that a white reading public would be resistant to Josh 
Green and any notion of heroism. Roe writes, “Ultimately, Josh’s concrete commitment 
to, and leadership in, the struggle against the white mob are what make him tower 
above the other black characters in the novel … [and] this obviously did not appeal to 
the genteel tastes of Chesnutt’s white readers” (241). 
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death” (110). Miller sees the attempted revolution as impossible, even as the narrator 
explains that “every manly instinct” pushed Miller “to go forward and take up the cause 
of these leaderless people.” But Miller is left with the question, “to what end?” (282). 
Miller tells the men they are overmatched and that violent resistance will only result in 
their “throwing [their] lives away.” He calls back an appeal to the law that demonstrates 
how he understands the current conflict. He says that “[i]n the minds of those who make 
and administer the law, [they] have no standing in the court of conscience” and 
therefore they face certain doom if they respond with violence (282). Miller says he 
“may be of some use” to the men, but only if he is alive. He compares the “riot” to a 
war and says that though current conditions suggest that an armed offensive would be 
foolish, their “time will come,—the time when [they] can command respect for [their] 
rights” (283). He recommends, therefore, that they wait. At this point Miller 
understands the white supremacist Democrats as any other political enemy. If they bide 
their time and reason carefully through their options, they can avoid wasting their lives, 
since Miller notes how “those who have been done to death in the Southern States for 
the past twenty years” seem to have been forgotten (283). 
Despite his pessimism, Miller feels “shame and envy” after refusing Green’s 
plea. The narrator explains, “Miller, while entirely convinced that he had acted wisely 
in declining to accompany them, was yet conscious of a distinct feeling of shame and 
envy that he, too, did not feel impelled to throw away his life in a hopeless struggle” 
(285). In many ways this quotation embodies what critics see as the ambivalence at the 
heart of this novel, as both Dr. Miller and Chesnutt struggle to reconcile justified 
feelings of anger with the realities of their logical outcomes. For Miller, Green 
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represents the impossibility of revolutionary violence in the face of overwhelming odds, 
and the imagery of lynching in these final confrontations emphasizes the hopelessness 
for African Americans due to the white supremacists’ political strategy. At the same 
time, Green’s willingness to sacrifice everything for the cause garners Miller’s respect. 
As Miller will learn, however, Green’s death cannot be heroic in the context of white 
supremacist violence, and Chesnutt uses the sign of lynching to drive that point home. 
Additionally, Miller is naive at this point in the novel. Despite his recognition 
that nothing will end well for Green and his men, he still insists that avoiding violence 
provides the possibility of a future. Miller assures Green and his men that the white 
supremacists will ultimately behave reasonably, that “they’ll not burn the schoolhouses, 
nor the hospital” as those institutions “benefit the community.” He says, “they’ll only 
kill the colored people who resist them” and resistance “only makes the matter worse” 
(295). In fact Miller is wrong; he has underestimated the white townspeople. Like old 
Mr. Delamere, Miller believes restraint will prevail when whites realize that the black 
townspeople, like Sandy, are innocent. He does not recognize this modern incarnation 
of white supremacy with its focus on disciplining African Americans into political 
impotence and punishing aspirations for political rights, economic success, or social 
equality. 
Gradually, the lessons of the coup dawn on Miller as he recognizes its purposes 
and methodology focused through the imagery of lynching. Miller sees a double 
standard applied to men like Green. The threat Green poses to the white race is not 
mitigated by the heroism of his willingness to die for a just cause. Miller recognizes the 
specific danger Green poses and that white supremacists construct that danger and 
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depend upon it. Miller sees that the “qualities which in a white man would win the 
applause of the world would in a negro be taken as the marks of savagery.” If a black 
man died for glory, his “courage would be mere desperation” and “his love of liberty, a 
mere animal dislike of restraint.” Ultimately, even if “forced to admire” this man’s 
heroism, “they would none the less repress” him. According to Chesnutt’s narrator, 
“They would applaud his courage while they stretched his neck, or carried off the 
fragments of his mangled body as souvenirs, in much the way that savages preserve the 
scalps or eat the hearts of their enemies” (295-6). Chesnutt uses the images of lynching 
to explain the harrowing cruelty of white supremacy, including by reversing the 
assumptions of savagery usually assigned to African Americans, but most importantly 
he aims to indicate how white supremacy operates. Green’s act of ultimate sacrifice 
represents a political threat to white supremacists’ power, but one that is easily 
dispatched. He also represents a danger in his potential influence on others in his role as 
a leader.163 Green understands what Miller initially does not: white supremacist 
ideology leads to genocidal violence. Green feels that his only hope is to resist it by any 
means necessary, even if he must lose his life. He represents the ultimate “African 
American agency,” as Matthew Wilson observes, and for that he must die in a spectacle 
of instructive violence (116). A metaphorical lynching, however, robs him of his 
sacrificial potential, as he is killed with impunity while white supremacist violence 
remains relentless. The burning of Miller’s hospital leaves no doubt about the 
                                                
163 Like in the works of Sutton Griggs, the theme of leadership plays an important role 
in Chesnutt’s novel. Chesnutt casts a debate between Miller and Green about resistant 
strategies as a referendum on what kind of leadership might prove most successful 
going forward. Like Griggs, he settles on no overriding and obvious choice, though 
Miller’s pragmatic appeal for caution in the face of white supremacist violence, while 
ambivalent, survives the riot by novel’s end, suggesting Chesnutt’s own choice. 
208 
 
continuing threat of white supremacist violence and the seeming futility of Green’s 
revolutionary resistance, but also of Miller’s advice not to resist. 
After Green is killed, the white mob sets fire to the hospital, the symbol of 
progress that Miller believed would never fall victim to their rage. After the fire, the 
narrator describes the “handsome structure, the fruit of old Adam Miller’s industry, the 
monument of his son’s philanthropy, a promise of good things for the future of the city” 
that now “lay smoldering in ruins, a melancholy witness to the fact that our boasted 
civilization is but a thin veneer, which cracks and scales off at the first impact of primal 
passions” (310). Chesnutt’s language parallels lynching apologists in assigning the 
violence a primal nature, but given his earlier description of the “savagery” of the 
violence of the coup, and what Miller has learned as a result, Chesnutt applies the 
metaphor of lynching to signify both its political expediency and the enormity of the 
white supremacists’ threat. Chesnutt again reverses the poles of the trope of savagery 
and civilization to describe white supremacist violence and an ideology based on racial 
panic and resentment that is always only a moment away from revealing itself. Because 
Chesnutt takes pains to show its political calculus, the coup resists designation as an 
aberrant, emotion-filled event, and the imagery of lynching emphasizes the message 
white supremacists intend to deliver. The hospital symbolizes black success and 
political possibility, both of which threaten the sovereign power of whiteness. Therefore 
it must be destroyed. 
At his most naive during the height of the coup, when he does not fathom the 
degree to which white supremacists will pursue their cause, Miller assures Green that 
the white supremacists merely suffer from “a fever” that will “wear off to-morrow, or 
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to-night” (295). Unlike Sutton Griggs’s characters, and unlike Chesnutt himself, Miller 
conceives of the pathology of white supremacy as a temporary state, the kind of frenetic 
energy an angry mob might expend quickly. In fact, after they burn the hospital the mob 
does disperse, but only after their work is done. Though Chesnutt does not reveal the 
outcome until the final scenes of the novel, Miller discovers that, immediately after his 
warning to Green and his men, his son has been killed in the coup. On his way home, 
“his eyes fell upon a group beneath a lamp-post, at sight of which he turned pale with 
horror, and rushed forward with a terrible cry” (297). Chesnutt brings the violence of 
the coup home to his protagonist, and Miller can no longer convince himself that white 
supremacist violence can be avoided. He has learned the lesson lynching is designed to 
deliver. Everyone who has either urged restraint or tried to“behave themselves” has 
been a victim of violence, either through their own murder, or near-murder in Sandy’s 
case, or through the murder of a loved one, as in Miller’s case. 
Ultimately, Chesnutt assigns Miller’s wife the task of resolving the novel. She 
appeals for sympathy for Carteret’s suffering, as his son faces death from an illness, but 
she first stands up to her sister and rejects the idea that she must be beholden to white 
ideology or a desire for white approval. She does what her husband cannot do: she 
resists white supremacy while also retaining her humanity. For Janet Miller, it is not a 
choice between passivity and revolutionary violence, as it is for her husband. Dr. Miller 
rejects Carteret’s plea to help his son, and Carteret recognizes “Miller’s refusal to go 
with him [as] pure, elemental justice” (321). Carteret’s wife, who is also Janet Miller’s 
sister, rushes to plead for help for her son. Dr. Miller tells Mrs. Carteret that she must 
ask Janet, and that he “will abide by her decision” (325). In this moment Chesnutt 
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moves the opportunity for resolution away from Dr. Miller and toward Janet. His 
attempt at reconciling his ambivalence regarding a path forward has failed, and Janet 
Miller represents a final chance. Chesnutt’s narrator describes that Janet “towered erect, 
with menacing aspect, like an avenging goddess” (326). Her sister, who had “only now, 
for the first time” after twenty-five years, “called [her] so,” finally admits that Janet is 
her “lawful sister” (327). By doing so, Mrs. Carteret recognizes Janet’s right to half of 
their father’s estate, which she had kept from her. By refusing to recognize Janet’s 
identity as her sister because of her race, Mrs. Carteret also rejected Janet’s personhood 
and agency, another example of a white person ascribing marginalized status to an 
African American citizen. 
Mrs. Carteret’s appeal to the law creates the “recognition for which, all her life, 
[Janet] had longed for,” but the fact that it “had come, not with frank kindliness and 
sisterly love, but in a storm of blood and tears; not freely given, from an open heart, but 
extorted from a reluctant conscience by the agony of a mother’s fears,” fills Janet with 
rage. She rejects her father’s name and her sister’s recognition. She says, “But that you 
may know that a woman may be foully wronged, and yet may have a heart to feel, even 
for one who has injured her, you may have your child’s life” (329). Mrs. Carteret’s 
appeal to the law reminds Janet of the power Mrs. Carteret enjoys. Her privilege as a 
white woman allows her to choose to acknowledge Janet’s existence, or not, and the law 
circumscribes Janet’s ability to be recognized and denies her the inheritance that is 
rightfully hers. While the imagery of lynching is not present in this final scene, the sign 
of the law is. The sovereign power of whiteness that throughout the novel has made 
vulnerable African American citizens through the law has done so again with Janet 
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Miller. But in her defiance she asserts her agency independent of the law and Mrs. 
Carteret. Her sympathy for Mrs. Carteret in spite of what Janet has suffered shows that 
Janet is not limited by the “elemental justice” that traps her husband in an initially naive 
and now static position. The coup/lynching leaves Dr. Miller powerless with only his 
resentment remaining. By contrast, Janet represents a perhaps idealized justice 
independent of white supremacist power structures, the same ideals that should animate 



















Epilogue: The Persistence of Black Pathology Discourse 
 White supremacy in the United States continues to use black pathology 
discourse, and black artists, authors, and thinkers continue to resist portrayals of 
pathological blackness and to attack and expose the discourse. Two recent artistic 
works, Colson Whitehead’s novel The Underground Railroad and Jordan Peele’s film 
Get Out, offer resistant responses similar to the turn-of-the-century works I have 
explored in this project. In addition, Ta-Nehisi Coates, through his contributions to 
political discourse on white supremacy and black pathology, refuses convenient 
narratives of national progress and challenges the idea that the consequences of slavery 
and white supremacist oppression are black cultural deficiency. The political scene in 
the Trump era illustrates the importance of these challenges to the discourses of white 
supremacy, because those discourses have proven adaptable in different political 
moments. A new administration that emboldens overt white supremacist expressions 
highlights the historical ebb and flow of white supremacy in American popular and 
political culture and its reliance on black pathology discourse. Rather than representing 
a sudden shift in our politics, the last two administrations illustrate that a progressive 
view of history at the expense of uncomfortable truths about white supremacy only 
feeds the desires of white supremacists to insistently re-naturalize white supremacist 
assumptions. Current political movements like Black Lives Matter challenge this 
current phase of emboldened white supremacy, and future movements will no doubt 
challenge white supremacy and black pathology discourse directly. By pointing to the 
historical continuities in white supremacy across eras in the United States, as well as to 
the subtle ways that white supremacist thinking adapts to cultural change, resistant 
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voices persist in the work of writers like Pauline Hopkins, Sutton Griggs, and Charles 
Chesnutt. 
 In The Underground Railroad, Whitehead depicts an alternative history of the 
United States in which the Civil War and the end of slavery seem to have never 
happened. The novel is a nineteenth-century odyssey that explores racism and violence 
through the lens of slavery as well as through a depiction of a more modern-feeling 
America—complete with skyscrapers and a secret eugenics program—that rejects the 
spectacle of white supremacist violence in favor of a more acceptable moderate appeal 
to paternalistic racism. The protagonist Cora’s journey through the South via the 
underground railroad—a physical incarnation of the historical metaphor—could have 
been lifted from the pages of Hopkins, Griggs, or Chesnutt. And it could describe a 
world Dixon imagines in his paranoid fantasies of white persecution, in which racist 
violence is required to save the white race from extermination. 
 Critics have praised this inventive novel for its imagination and its timeliness. 
Alex Preston calls it “brutal, vital, [and] devastating.” Rebecca Carroll echoes the 
importance of the novel to our current age and calls it “timely and necessary.” In an 
interview with NPR, Whitehead describes his strategy for creating an alternative history 
in the novel, one in which the setting at times feels imbued with the details of an early-
twentieth-century urban America. White explains that “not sticking to the facts allowed 
[him] to combine different forms of racial hysteria” in the novel (“Colson 
Whitehead’s”). He also explains that contemporary examples of racism and white 
supremacy illustrate the ways these hysterical attitudes migrate from spectacular and 
overt examples of racial violence—represented in the novel by the daily lynchings that 
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take place in North Carolina—to more accepted “scientific” approaches—described in 
the “living history” museum in South Carolina and in the forced sterilization campaign 
Cora barely escapes. Whitehead explains that in writing his novel, “it didn’t take a lot of 
energy to find parallels for the language of the slave problem and the inner-city 
problem,” as current issues of racial inequality benefit from “coded language” that mask 
their historical roots. Like other artists working today, Whitehead recognizes the 
continuities between past and current forms of white supremacy, and the urgency of 
identifying those forms and the mechanisms by which they operate. 
 Another important contemporary example of resistance is Jordan Peele’s Get 
Out, the director’s first major feature film. Peele uses the genre of the horror film—
historically an effective mode of social critique as evidenced by, among others, George 
Romero’s 1968 film Night of the Living Dead—to explore the insidious realities of 
liberal racism and white supremacy in the post-Obama age. Film critic Ann Hornaday 
explains that Get Out takes “notions of assimilation, cultural appropriation, white liberal 
pieties and the fetishization of black bodies to their most existentially fatal extreme.” In 
his review in The Atlantic, critic David Sims explains that Peele addresses “the fallacy 
of America being a post-racial society, and of the nightmares one can imagine under 
that benign surface.” Sims calls Get Out “one of the most relevant films of the year.” By 
speaking directly to white liberal beliefs in “post-racialism,” Peele, like Whitehead, 
asserts that white supremacy persists in part because of its discursive adaptability and 
because of the persistence of entrenched beliefs about black pathology. Though white 
characters in the film insist on their bona fides as liberal allies to African Americans, 
they also believe in essential black physiological and cultural difference, culminating in 
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an obsession with black bodies as the future vehicles for white individual 
consciousness. The last third of the film combines the fetishization of black bodies of 
the plantation slave owner with the “scientific” experimentation on black bodies 
familiar to Sutton Griggs, parallelling the continuity Whitehead sees between white 
supremacist violence on the plantation and that shrouded by the polite racism of the 
present-day bourgeoisie. 
 The details of today’s political scene and that of the recent past affirm the 
codependent relationship of white supremacy and black pathology discourse. In a series 
of columns in The Atlantic during the second term of the Obama presidency in 2014, 
Ta-Nehisi Coates addresses the issue of black pathology discourse. Coates defines black 
pathology discourse by asserting that “there is an accepted belief in America—black 
and white—that African American people, and African American men in particular, are 
lacking in the virtues of family, hard work, and citizenship” (“The Secret Lives” 2). 
Coates echoes Khalil Gibran Muhammad in reorienting the timeline regarding the 
history of black pathology discourse long before Daniel Paul Moynihan’s 1965 report 
on pathological black poverty, asserting that beliefs about black cultural inferiority are 
“much older” (3).164 According to Coates, the “message” of black pathology “makes all 
our uncomfortable truths tolerable.” He says that “[o]nly if black people are somehow 
undeserving can a just society tolerate a yawning wealth gap, a two-tiered job market, 
and persistent housing discrimination” (4). 
                                                
164 In “Black Pathology and the Closing of the Progressive Mind,” Coates writes, “For 
some reason there is an entrenched belief among many liberals and conservatives that 
discussions of American racism should begin somewhere between the Moynihan Report 
and the Detroit riots” (8). As I discuss in the Introduction, Muhammad argues that the 
1890s represent a key point in the origin story of black pathology discourse. See Khalil 
Gibran Muhammad’s The Condemnation of Blackness. 
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 In “The Secret Lives Of Inner-City Black Males” Coates also responded to Paul 
Ryan’s designation of urban poverty as “a real cultural problem … that has to be dealt 
with” and to then-President Obama’s manner of addressing poverty in a language of 
personal responsibility (2). Coates’s comparison of Ryan’s language with Obama’s 
provoked a response from Jonathan Chait in the pages of New York magazine, as well as 
a subsequent set of responses by Coates in The Atlantic. Chait accuses Coates of 
“committing a fallacy by assuming that Obama’s exhortations to the black community 
amount to a belief that personal responsibility accounts for a major share of the blame” 
(Chait 4). Chait asserts that Obama seeks not to ignore racial bias but to encourage 
“people to concentrate on the things they can control” (5). Coates responds by saying 
that Chait and “Obama-era liberals” like him echo Moynihan’s belief in the “‘tangle of 
pathologies’ haunting black America born of oppression” (“Black Pathology” 2). In 
“Other People’s Pathologies,” another article in this exchange, Coates argues that Chait 
conflates black culture with “a culture of poverty,” which assumes that the two are 
“interchangeable” (3). Moreover, Chait’s commitment to black cultural pathology 
depends largely on belief rather than actual evidence, just as positions on black cultural 
difference did in the nineteenth century. Coates observes that while twenty percent of 
black children were reported to be born out of wedlock in the 1960s, today thirty 
percent of white children are born out of wedlock. Because “the reaction to this shift has 
been considerably more muted,” according to Coates, it “makes sense if you believe 
that pathology is something reserved for black people” (7).165 In “Black Pathology and 
                                                
165 In “The Black Pathology Biz,” Ishmael Reed examines the central role played by the 
media in forwarding stereotypes and misinformation about supposed black cultural 
pathology. According to Reed, “Now that network news shows have become ‘profit 
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the Closing of the Progressive Mind,” Coates asserts that Chait’s “theory of 
independent black cultural pathologies … can’t actually be demonstrated in the 
American record” (3). He concludes: “There is no evidence that black people are less 
responsible, less moral, or less upstanding in their dealings with America nor with 
themselves.” Instead, history points to white supremacy as the persistent threat the black 
survival, cultural or otherwise, “evidence that America is irresponsible, immoral, and 
unconscionable in its dealings with black people and with itself” (11). In the case of 
black marriage, according to Coates, it was “white terrorism, white rapacity, and white 
violence” that represented its most consequential threat, not any notion of black 
disinterest (5). Further, black pathology discourse excludes African Americans from 
American culture, and Coates argues that “[t]here is no reason to suppose that 
enslavement cut African-Americans off from broader cultural values” (7). As black 
pathology discourse demonstrates historically, white supremacy both occludes its 
existence as an operative influence on black suffering, and it further entrenches white 
supremacist assumptions that guarantee its survival by turning the blame back on black 
victims. 
                                                                                                                                          
centers,’ news producers have found a lucrative market in exhibiting black pathology, 
while coverage of pathologies such as drug addiction, child abuse, spousal battering and 
crime among whites and their ‘model minorities’ is negligible.” Reed published his 
article in 1989, but his conclusions about the role of the media still ring true, as the 
Kendrick Lamar song that frames the Introduction makes clear. Reed asserts that the 
“only difference between white pathology and black pathology is that white pathology 
is underreported.” He also suggests a historical continuity between the twentieth-
century and the nineteenth century and states that in order to maintain “the country’s 
cozy fetal sleep” regarding the prevalence of white supremacy in America, “the shrill 
half-wits that [the country] elects” must “run the sort of campaign that former 




 Ultimately, black pathology discourse transfers the focus of racial inequality 
from white supremacy and trains it on black culture. Coates argues that, in the case of 
President Obama’s comments on poverty and the black community, “removing white 
supremacy from the equation puts Barack Obama in the odd position of focusing on that 
which is hardest to evidence, while slighting that which is clearly known” (“Other 
People’s Pathologies” 8). Coates contends that a liberal commitment to black pathology 
discourse relies on a progressive view of history that sees American race relations as 
increasingly improved, ignoring the continuities between the past and the present as 
well as the adaptability of white supremacy. Coates argues that “[w]hite supremacy 
does not contradict American democracy—it birthed it, nurtured it, and financed it.” 
According to Coates, “[t]hat is our heritage,” and we must stop explaining it or wishing 
it otherwise (13). 
 The Trump era validates Coates’s argument and returns us to the past and to the 
white supremacist discourses that Hopkins, Griggs, and Chesnutt challenged. Coates’s 
insistence in 2014 that the first black president unwittingly participated in black 
pathology discourse was provocative because it upset the narrative of racial progress. 
Today’s political scene, defined by a president whom CNN’s Don Lemon explicitly 
called “racist” on national television, confirms Coates’s position: Our current moment 
does not represent a new nadir, nor did the election of the first black American president 
represent a new moment of reconciliation. Instead, recent history illustrates the 
continuity with the past that existed all along (Schmidt). Trump is the symptom of what 
Sutton Griggs calls “the virus of racial thinking,” not the cause. It is true that more 
spectacular examples of racism feel prevalent now. For instance, Reverend Jaime 
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Johnson, director of the Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Faith-Based & 
Neighborhood Partnerships was fired in the fall of 2017 for a 2008 radio appearance in 
which he said that “it’s an indictment of America’s black community that [they have] 
turned America’s major cities into slums because of laziness, drug use and sexual 
promiscuity” (Rosenberg). But of course these beliefs are not new, and if there is any 
conclusion to draw at this point about the Trump presidency and the political climate of 
resentment that has produced it, it is only that this cultural moment allows more overt 
examples of racism to appear from the shadows. If they were not expressible in that 
form during the last presidency, or at least without such brazen confidence, our new age 
portends more emboldened responses and the return of a language of black pathology 
that could have more long-felt effects. A return to more extreme and obvious forms of 
housing discrimination, or to “stop-and-frisk” policing of Americans of color, or to new 
commitments to the private prison industry are all possibilities that black pathology 
language enables and naturalizes. At the same time, the evidence of white supremacy’s 
flexibility in this project shows that resistance requires continued vigilance in 
identifying white supremacist logic and rejecting the operation and assumptions of 
black pathology discourse. While today might feel reminiscent of the past, the future 
promises further examples of adaptive white supremacist thinking responsive to shifts 
in cultural expectations. 
New political movements like Black Lives Matter represent organizations 
committed to direct action as resistance to white supremacist violence. Police brutality 
benefits from and is protected by pervasive beliefs about black criminality, and Black 
Lives Matter makes that connection clear. Additionally, Black Lives Matter embodies 
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the important work by women in anti-racist movements and new philosophies that avoid 
excluding those committed to those movements. Black Lives Matter represents an 
influential political organization founded by women who “have always recognized the 
need to center the leadership of women and queer and trans people” in order to avoid 
“replicating harmful practices that excluded so many in past movements for liberation” 
(https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory/). A particular sensitivity to avoiding 
continued marginalization within political movements may represent a new front in 
expanding opportunities for those who resist white supremacy and violence. 
 These resistant responses to white supremacy all share a commitment to 
exposing the dependent relationship between black pathology discourse and white 
supremacist violence. Historical continuities between nineteenth-century writers and 
thinkers and their modern counterparts emphasize both the persistence of white 
supremacy and the importance of resistant responses. As I concluded my work on this 
project, it seemed that numerous additional examples of black pathology discourse and 
white supremacist discourse would appear every day, only a small number of which 
have been discussed herein. An increasing catalog of examples can be overwhelming 
and risks causing complacency. But because white supremacist ideology depends on its 
adaptability and cultural amnesia, the lessons related by Pauline Hopkins, Sutton 
Griggs, and Charles Chesnutt regarding the urgency of the moment and the importance 
of a historicist cast of mind, as well as the mounting examples of overt and implied 
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